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ABSTRACT
In the work of radical historians and in Xhosa tradition 
the Cattle Killing has become the supreme example of the 
deliberately destructive impact of a colonial governor, 
helped by missionaries, on the Black peoples of the 
eastern frontier of the Cape. This figure of con­
troversy, Sir George Grey, was Governor of the Cape 
and High Commissioner from 1854-1861. As a civilian, 
he sought to pacify the Xhosa through 'civilization1 
and education. To do this he enlisted the help of 
the frontier missionaries, who themselves desired a 
stable Xhosa society to aid their work. The result, 
it has been alleged, was the final demise of effective 
Xhosa resistance to the encroachment of imperial forces 
and white settler society.
By the early 1850s the work of the missionaries on the 
frontier was at an all-time low. And so they certainly 
did hope that Grey's plans, of which the extension of 
education was part, would provide a long-sought break­
through for them. But this, in turn, has led to the 
accusation that the missionaries acted merely as mer­
cenary imperial agents and as a 'collaborating group'
ii
for the extension of colonial authority over the 
Xhosa, rather than for the benefit of their would- 
be converts. Because of the nature of the allega­
tions, it seemed a significant historical exercise 
to investigate more closely the nature and extent of 
the links which the missionaries did in fact forge 
with Sir George Grey.
It must be admitted that Grey's frontier plans, 
together with the steady erosion of traditional 
society over the years, economic distress in the 
mid-1850s, and the Cattle Killing dealt a death­
blow to effective Xhosa resistance to colonial en­
croachment. Radical historians have blamed Grey 
and the missionaries of deliberately engineering the 
Cattle Killing for their own Machiavellian purposes. 
There is not enough evidence to convict Grey on this 
charge, but certainly his actions, or lack of them, 
during the crisis suggest that once the Cattle 
Killing had started he deliberately allowed it to 
develop to the point where the Xhosa could be more 
easily subordinated. It can not, with any justifi­
cation, be said that the missionaries had a part 
either in instigating or maintaining the crisis,
iii
though they were not slow to hope for some advantage 
from it in the shape of a more receptive Xhosa nation 
driven by adversity to 'humble themselves before God1 
and accept conversion.
The Xhosa were deeply divided over Nongqawuse's 
prophecy - which was a fact that tended to work very 
much to Grey's advantage. He also used the crisis 
to break the chiefs who survived the disaster and to 
evict Sarhili from his ancestral land in Kaffraria 
Proper. On what seems to have been fabricated 
evidence, Grey accused Sarhili, together with Moshoe- 
shoe, of plotting the Cattle Killing to force the 
Xhosa into war with the Colony. Far from this being 
the case, the Cattle Killing should rather be regarded 
both as a millenarian movement and as a feature of a 
so-called 'closing' frontier.
Grey had hoped to use the crisis to extend his 'civi­
lizing' plans to Kaffraria Proper; but though his 
expulsion of Sarhili to beyond the Mbashe River pre­
pared the way, he did not receive official sanction 
to go ahead with his plans. This, together with 
other setbacks to his plans, may well have led Grey 
to accept a transfer to New Zealand in 1861, sooner
IV
than had been expected.
It has been suggested that the Cattle Killing resulted 
in an unprecedented advance by the missionaries, but 
detailed investigation of their records has shown this 
to be untrue. The influence attributed to the 
missionaries has, thus, been somewhat overrated and 
their links with Grey, who was essentially a man of 
independent and arbitrary action, exaggerated.
Although their converts were few, missionaries did, 
however, foster far-reaching changes in traditional 
society. One of the most notable was the growth of 
peasant communities around the stations, which 
supplied a viable alternative to wage labour in the 
pre-capitalist colonial society. They also contri­
buted to the stratification of Xhosa society and to 
the creation of an educated elite which would become 
leaders in a new industrial situation of contracting 
options.
Grey was Governor at a time when the frontier was in 
the process of closing. A study of his era is,
Vthus, relevant not only in terms of the relationship 
between the missionaries and the personality 
embodying the authority of the colonial state - 
and their consequent combined impact on Xhosa history 
but also in terms of more general frontier studies.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
As a frontier zone, the present Eastern Cape has 
received much attention from historians, beginning 
with settler historians like Cory, passing through 
liberal writers such as W.M. MacMillan, to the 
modern radical historians who have recently been 
offering new interpretations of frontier processes.
Until these revisionist writings appeared, much 
attention had been given to the white settler tradi­
tion though, with the closing of the frontier, black 
Africans were drawn inexorably into colonial society 
and became inextricably bound up with that society, 
both economically and politically. According to 
these historians, as class attitudes among the white 
settlers hardened into race attitudes and economic 
imperatives increased the need for cheap labour, both 
the economic and political options were deliberately 
closed for frontier blacks. Within this context and 
in addition to the tradition attributed to white 
settlers and their descendents by Liberal historians, 
the Eastern Cape was to produce a second 'independent*
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tradition - that of mounting black reaction and resis­
tance to the closing of these options. In the early 
years, the leaders of this resistance movement were 
men of the stature of J.T. Jabavu and his son Davidson 
Don. With these men, and others, the eastern Cape 
became, in fact, the seed-bed of African Nationalism 
and Black Consciousness. The new generation of 
leaders in the wider South African context, reacting 
to a new industrial situation and apartheid, were men 
like Nelson Mandela and Steve Biko.
If there was, and is, a common denominator for these 
men, it was the fact that they had all received a 
mission education. The leading figures in the early 
African National Congress (ANC) were drawn from a 
small elite of highly educated Africans whose Chris­
tian mission backgrounds were a source of their 
liberal 'bourgeois' aspirations. Their main goal was 
the maintenance of the Cape non-racial franchise and 
its extension to the other provinces; while later 
generation of leaders were, to some extent, inspired 
by the myth of Cape Liberalism.
But, in spite of this impetus given to African Nationa­
lism by mission education, a real and deep anger has
-3-
fomented among Africans against the missionaries 
and their work. In the Eastern Cape it is linked 
to the still almost painful reality of that tragic 
event of 1856/7 - the great Xhosa Cattle Killing.
Even over a hundred years later, the pain of it at 
times is as fresh as it was then. There are 
memories in the place names as well: Mpetu, 
between Komgha and the Kei Mouth, is the 'place of 
maggots', so-called from the maggots which fed on 
the dead during the Cattle Killing.
There has always been a tendency in history to 
search for villains and scapegoats, and the events 
of the 1850s have provided no exception. In 
earlier - 'settler' - historiography Nongqawuse, 
Mhlakaza and Sarhili were cast as the 'villains', 
while Sir George Grey, Governor of the Cape and 
High Commissioner for Southern Africa, was 'good'. 
Missionaries, it was suggested, were more or less 
impotent onlookers. More recently black and radical 
historians have reversed these roles. Grey and the 
missionaries are now cast as villains who deliberately 
plotted in 1856/7 to destroy the Xhosa chiefdoms.
The missionaries have a reputation as 'agents of con­
quest' who promoted colonial expansion and the
-4-
capitalist system.
As Croce has remarked, every age rewrites its History, 
and within this context the continuing relevance of 
the Cattle Killing, and the renewed interest in the 
event for purposes of modern propaganda and polemic, 
make a reassessment valid. Apart from this, 
events on the Cape eastern frontier and the 1850s in 
particular have an added personal relevance. The 
writer of this thesis was born and bred in the 
Eastern Cape; an ancestor was a missionary to the 
Thembu in 1856/7; a Xhosa friend, to whom the events 
of the Cattle Killing and the 'traditional' roles of 
Grey and the missionaries are still very real issues, 
made his suggestion for a re-investigation of the 
event into a challenge; and, finally, a question put 
to an Armenian Archbishop by a black listener, and his 
answer, acted as a further incentive. In this inter­
change a theological student at the Federal Theological 
Seminary asked the Archbishop whether, it would not 
have been better for Africa to have been missionized 
by the more spiritual Eastern Orthodox Church. In 
his answer the latter suggested that it was now time 
to stop being angry about the past, and to take what
-5-
was good from it and build the future. This led 
to the question, simply put, of just how 'bad' the 
missionaries had in fact been for Africa, and for the 
Eastern Cape in particular. Did they really offer 
anything ’good' in Xhosa terms?
There is no denying that the 1850s were a decisive 
decade. The governorship of Grey saw the 'beginning 
of the end' for the Xhosa. After it, inclusion 
within the colonial society either as labourers or 
later, owing to the accelerating territorial annexa­
tions, was more rapid than it had previously been. 
Because of the unflattering roles recently attributed 
to the governor and the missionaries, a reassessment 
of this period on the eastern Cape frontier made it 
necessary to discover whether they were, in fact, 
involved in a conspiracy against the Xhosa, and 
whether they could, with any truth, be regarded as 
either consciously or unconsciously opening the way 
for the determinist forces and processes which sub­
verted the traditional way-of-life and drove that 
age-old communalism to destruction.
To make this assessment a further historical investi-
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gation of what appears to have been the critical 
element - the link between Grey and the missionaries - 
was also unavoidable. This thesis is not therefore 
an attempt to reassess the whole frontier situation 
or even the Cattle Killing as such, but, rather, for 
the purpose of achieving an M.A. focus, it is an 
essay at concentrated analysis of this simple, but 
vital, central issue - the coupling-point (or chain 
of interaction) between the two agencies of political 
incorporation and ideological transformation.
At its most basic level, the Cattle Killing was a 
frontier incident which seemed to contemporaries to 
herald another Cape-Xhosa war in the tradition of 
Nxele and Mlanjeni. In the face of the continuing 
challenge posed by the expanding British polity at the 
Cape the political leadership of the Xhosa had, since 
1819» tended to pass at critical points into the hands 
of prophet figures. This, too, has been identified 
as a feature of 'closing frontiers' - in which a return 
to traditional nostrums has seemed often the only way 
to deal with novel circumstances posed by intrusive 
modern cultures. Nxele and Mlanjeni had been 'war 
doctors' who had led their people into battle. Nong-
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qawuse was certainly the spiritual heiress of these 
two, but with a difference. In spite of what was 
felt at the time, and evidence later led, there 
seems to have been no question of war-intent directly 
linked with the Cattle Killing. The tragedy of this 
growing ’prophet tradition’ for the Xhosa was that 
traditional techniques had become increasingly impotent 
against European power.
The Cattle Killing was the critical turning-point at 
which the Xhosa resistance in the 'Hundred Years War' 
on the Cape eastern frontier really broke. That it 
happened in peace-time, and as part of the prophetic 
tradition, underlines the undermining effect of 
previous wars and the nature of the overall 'frontier 
process' at work at the Cape. The 'eastern frontier' 
was just one of many such frontiers in which the 
expanding European metropole pushed out from the 15th 
Century onward over the land surface of the other five 
continents and over the East and West Indies and 
Oceania.
Distinctions between the 'pre-industrial' and 'indus­
trial' phases in such frontier processes have often
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been drawn. In the case of the Cape in the 1850s 
the mineral revolution had not yet transformed the 
country into a full sub-metropole of industrializa­
tion; yet Grey and the missionaries have been seen 
as representing the extended arms not only of an 
industrial state but also, at the same time, of the 
struggling society in a weak colony attempting to 
turn itself into a replica of the metropolitan 
power.
Apart from its subsistence sector, the Cape Colony 
certainly had some of the elements of a developing 
capitalist economy - which, in the very nature of 
the imperial relationship, was closest-linked to 
industrial Britain. By the 1850s mercantilism, and 
with it, preferential treatment for her colonies, 
had ended as a powerful force in Britain. It was 
hoped that the encouragement of Free Trade would 
bring peace among nations. These new ideas of Free 
Trade also led to widespread discussions in Britain 
on the reformulation of colonial policy and on the 
introduction of self-government into the colonies.
On one hand, the Manchester School of Cobden and 
Bright favoured self-government as they felt that 
Free Trade must sooner or later make colonies
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unnecessary and, on the other, a group dominated by 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield, urged self-government in 
order to retain the Empire.
These new directions in colonial thinking, coupled 
with demands from the Colony itself, led to the 
granting of representative government to the Cape 
in 1853. The franchise, which was 'colour blind' 
with a £25 property and a £50 salary qualification, 
became the best known aspect of what came to be 
considered as Cape Liberalism. But, according to 
radical historians, the intrinsic nature of 'libera­
lism' at the Cape was fundamentally questionable, 
owing to its connection with underlying economic 
imperatives. On some levels, it seemed to be 
little more than an alliance of missionaries, mer­
chants and administrators, all of whom supported 
the creation of an African peasantry for their own 
ends. This fostering of African peasant farmers 
was, in the absence of numerous white settlers, not 
only supported by local officials, but also by 
Imperial authorities themselves. They saw in an 
African cash-crop production a way of getting newly 
annexed territories to pay their way.
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The missionaries have an ambivalent place in the 
newer types of frontier history. Because of their 
indirect and often tenuous association with govern­
ment frontier action, they are often bracketed with 
governor and magistrates as part of the colonial 
'state*. Together with the latter, they are seen 
as representing the superstructure and coercive 
element which reinforced the 'capitalist mode of 
production' that was increasingly dominant in the 
substructure. An obvious reliance at other times 
on government support for survival and for the 
maintenance of order has reinforced this impression 
of the role of the missionaries. Along with traders 
and settlers, they have been classified as 'informal 
agents' of the empire in southern Africa who trans­
formed Africans into 'inoffensive Christians' in 
the material interests, in this case, of the Cape 
colony. The Protestant churches, but more parti­
cularly the Wesleyans, have been seen, first, as 
carriers of the work-discipline, second, as seeking 
outright confrontation with pagan cultures, and, 
third, as aiming at 'revolutionizing' those societies 
to the advantage of the established colonial social 
order and to the disadvantage of the indigenous 
society concerned.
In recent historiography the role of the 'imperial 
state' and its representatives is seen as swinging 
the 'balance of advantage' in quite evenly-balanced 
white and black frontier societies in the pre-indus­
trial era decisively in favour of the whites and the 
capitalist mode. This intervention, though at times 
couched in terms of 'humanitarian' apologia, was 
ultimately directed towards the protection of im­
perial interests and was essentially linked to the 
development and demands of the British economy.
In the final analysis this interpretation of the 
imperial role in southern Africa is rather too 
mechanistic, especially when applied to the 
missionaries. Their actions, when investigated at 
the micro-level of their complex interaction with 
state-authority and Sir George Grey, simply does 
not always conform to that pre-designated role which 
makes them hardly distinguishable from the 'imperial 
state' at the macro-level.
On the other hand, it must be accepted that economic 
and social processes cannot allow one to treat the 
actions of the frontier missionaries in pure isolation 
from the overall context and simply as those of dis­
interested individuals. In some respects they did
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form a group, and their overall role can therefore be 
brought under certain forms of collective and umbrella- 
assessment. In making such an analysis of group- 
action, Marxist and Weberian paradigms have both been 
found useful, especially where the religious part of 
the missionary commitment overlapped a set of ethics 
on 'work', 'dress' and 'behaviour' - which was in 
itself subversive of the whole ethos of traditional 
society and to the advantage of local markets and 
traders.
While such an erosive element can be identified, it 
is, however, a moot point whether the missionaries 
were in a sufficiently strong position to achieve 
overwhelming success in this 'undermining'. What 
seems crucial here is the extent to which they had 
gained a preponderant influence in frontier matters 
on one hand with the Governor, and on the other, with 
traditional society. Close investigation of this 
double-influence may reveal an inherent anomaly: 
that, in fact, the missionaries were little more 
than limited agents; that they were not always 
the Governor's 'collaborators'; that they generally 
did try to help the Xhosa according to their some-
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what limited lights, even during the Cattle Killing 
crisis; and, finally, that their overall role must 
be downgraded from the importance which it has 
been assumed to have.
Close examination of this role may also have the 
reciprocal advantage of throwing a new light on the 
part played by the Governor on the frontier. If 
the missionaries did not have the influence attri­
buted to them, who did?
Clearly the Imperial government had concerns other 
than that of simply reducing its tax-burden at 
Westminster. It had also to make colonial society 
more viable by lifting the threat of the turbulent 
frontier away from the colony and by reducing the 
cost of incursions to the frontier people. If in 
the process the colony improved its labour supply, 
so much the better. And though labour relations did 
in fact form a major part of the interaction and 
conflict at the Cape, it is perhaps too simplistic 
to say that they were at the very centre all the
time.
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In the mid-19th Century, the colonial state was in 
the process of expansion. Costly new districts 
and the newly-established colonial parliament had 
made both local and central government more elabor­
ate. All this suggests that the 'imperial state' 
needed to take a more active role in both pacifying 
and neutralizing the frontier zone. Nevertheless, 
the actions of the various governors on the frontier 
were idiosyncratic and did not always follow a 
straightforward, conventional path toward 'conquering 
and proletarianizing' the indigenous blacks nor the 
Weberian example of 'disenchanting and rationalizing' 
their belief-system. Hence, Grey as an individual 
colonial administrator with very strong personal 
convictions and commitments is a worthy subject of 
study in his own right.
For the purposes of this thesis the Cape eastern 
frontier has been considered to include not only 
the colonial side of the frontier, but also British 
Kaffraria. Lying between the Keiskamma and the Kei 
Rivers this was brought under British 'sovereignty' 
by Sir Harry Smith in 1847* But, by 1854 this 
territory was still not formally part of the Colony,
-15-
though it was administered separately through the 
Cape governor as High Commissioner. At times in 
the thesis this concept of the Cape eastern fron­
tier has been stretched to include Kaffraria 
Proper, or the Transkeian territories, which means 
the land lying beyond the Kei River and still 
independent of formal British control. Across this 
extended belt of territory the persuasive influence 
of the missionaries and the pervasive power of the 
governor and of his supporting civil and military 
agents were harnessed to draw together. But which 
partner mainly pulled the Xhosa polity asunder 
remains the central question that this study will 
attempt to answer.
SIR GEORGE GREY GOVERNOR
(Cape Town Archives - AG 7362)
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CHAPTER TWO
SIR GEORGE GREY AND HIS 'CIVILIZING MISSION'
The governorship of Sir George Grey saw a turning 
point in Xhosa history as well, so it is maintained, 
as in missionary fortunes in southern Africa. To­
gether, Grey and the missionaries have been indicted 
of being instrumental in the destruction of the Xhosa 
nation as an effective power. The missionaries have 
been accused of softening the edge of Xhosa resis­
tance to colonial advance and Sir George Grey of 
destroying the Xhosa polity and thus opening the way 
for an unprecedented advance of missionary work among 
the Xhosa people. This was achieved in a relatively 
short space of time, 1854 - 1861, when Sir George Grey 
was Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner 
for southern Africa.
Grey's directive on arriving at the Cape was to create 
a stable and lasting peace on the frontier and to 
reduce the costs of maintaining the Cape Colony for the 
Imperial Government. As a civilian governor, his 
answer lay in a 'civilizing', integrationist approach 
which was couched in humanitarian language but often 
concealed a determination and threat of force.
-17-
Grey’s personal aims were far-reaching, and in an age
of avowed anti-imperialism, they paradoxically included
the extension of British influence in southern Africa.
It is difficult to ascertain with any certainty the
true mind and ambitions of Sir George Grey. Most of
his private papers were destroyed by his niece and his
official communications were at times confusing and
always written for the public eye. Grey's biographer,
J. Rutherford, has suggested that he was a romantic
imperialist, an opinion which was backed up by James
Milne in a panygeric work compiled from discussions
held with Grey, and published in 1911, not long after 
1Grey's death. According to this, Grey's overriding 
belief was in the mission and destiny of the Anglo- 
Saxon people. In South Africa, Grey spoke of a 
federation of states under British influence, but if 
Milne is to be believed, this would have been only a 
part of a world federation of British possessions which 
would have given Britain the balance of power. But no 
doubt, this was Grey talking for posterity and caution *&
1. J. Milne, The Romance of a Pro-Consul, (Thos. Nelson
& Sons, 1911 ) •
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is needed in accepting what was said at face value.
As men of their age, not only Grey, but also the 
missionaries active on the Cape eastern frontier, 
believed in the civilizing mission of Great Britain, 
and both inherited the 'liberal1 and 'humanitarian' 
attitude of the British Government towards the African 
people within their sphere of interest. This was an 
attitude which had its roots in the 1820s and 1830s 
and which, from the actions of at least some of the 
local administrators, could be called into question.
In South Africa, Grey hoped that his measures would 
pacify the frontier region, stabilize the Cape
Colony and lead to an economic saving for Great
2Britain. He wished to extend British influence and
3control over the people between the Cape and Natal 
and, if possible, create a federation of states under
Britain. It was, however, too soon after the Sand
River and Bloemfontein Conventions for the Colonial
Office to view the latter plans with any sympathy.
Grey needed the willing co-operation of the Cape
Parliament, and the incentive he offered was that his 23
2. C.0.48/365: Sir George Grey, Governor, to Grey, Secretary 
of Colonies, No.22, 31 January 1855*
3. C.0.48/365: Note to Sir C. Trevelyan, 14 May 1855;
D. Williams, Umfundisi - A biography of Tiyo Soga 1829-1871, 
(Lovedale Press, 1978), p. 52.
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plans would turn the Xhosa people into a labouring and
money-making community which would be the means of
4expanding the Cape economy.
Official Colonial contact with the Xhosa prior to 1854 
was characterized by vacillation and confusion. The 
Dutch officials of the 18th Century had favoured a 
policy of exclusion but were unable to enforce the Great 
Fish River boundary proclaimed in 1780. When the 
British took possession of the Cape Colony, the exclu- 
sionist policy was at first perpetuated, but with more 
resolution and force. The Xhosa were expelled from 
the Bushmans-Sundays River area across the Fish and 
white British settlers introduced to consolidate the 
frontier.
After the War of 1819> Governor Somerset attempted to 
establish a buffer zone between the Xhosa and colonists.
A strip of land beyond the Fish River was expropriated 
from the Xhosa and proclaimed a neutral territory.
This 'Ceded' Territory was soon violated, first by the 
traders and then by the extension of magisterial district 
boundaries across the Fish. Missionaries and settlers 4
4. C.0.48/368: Grey to Grey, No.39, 17 March 1855. Speech 
opening the second session of the Colonial parliament.
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followed.
The confusions which arose from the attempts of the 
colonial authorities to deal with a paramount chief 
representing all the Xhosa chiefs led to a system of 
treaties with several chiefs after the death of Ngqika 
in 1828. The success of this system was limited and 
the following years were characterized by advance and 
retreat. Governor D'Urban extended British authority 
over the Xhosa between the Keiskamma and Kei Rivers in 
1835, hut was forced to abandon the territory. How­
ever D'Urban's action was significant in that it was 
the first attempt at the incorporation of the Xhosa 
within the colonial system.
The policy of undermining the authority of the chiefs 
which Grey was to follow with such vigour, was suggested 
by Governor Sir Harry Smith after the War of the Axe 
1846-7, when a system of direct control over the Xhosa 
was re-instated. In 1847 Sir Harry had annexed the 
land between the Keiskamma and Kei Rivers which became 
known as British Kaffraria. A year earlier, the 
Governor of the Cape also became High Commissioner, 
entrusted with the solution of frontier questions. 
British Kaffraria was ruled directly by the High
-21 -
Commissioner and though Letters Patent for the institu­
tion of British Kaffraria as a separate territory had 
been prepared, by the time Sir George Grey became 
Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner in 1854, these 
had not been promulgated.
The Xhosa nation had been a formidable foe to the 
colonists over the years, but by 1854 the forces at 
work within Xhosa society had already contributed 
significantly to the erosion of that polity. In 
assessing the impact of Grey and the missionaries, it 
would be essential to investigate the background arid 
extent to which the Xhosa social system had begun to 
break down, and the nature of the forces which were 
at work.
Two major splits in Xhosa society had occurred before 
1770. By 1750, several minor chiefdoms had broken 
away and were settled between the Kei and the Keiskamma 
Rivers. These were the Ntinde, Mbalu, Dange and Gqunu- 
khwebe. The lattermost group was regarded as inferior 
by the Xhosa because they were partly of Khoikhoi origin. 5
5. Information based on H. Giliomee, 'The Eastern Frontier 
1770-1812', in R. Elphick & H. Giliomee (eds), The 
Shaping of South African Society 1652-1820. (lineman. 
1979), p . 291 ff. ‘ ------ w '
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The other schism occurred when the Xhosa nucleus split 
into Gcaleka and Rharhabe. Rharhabe moved westwards 
towards the Fish River and in the authority crisis 
which followed, the Rharhabe and Gcaleka chiefs each 
claimed to be a paramount chief with some authority 
over the other chiefs in his vicinity.
The relationship of the chiefs in the Ciskei with 
Rharhabe and his successors was fluid and the chiefs 
already west of the Kei were unwilling to acknowledge 
his paramountcy when he moved into their area. The 
Xhosa and colonists in the Fish River area had, by 
this time, worked out a measure of co-existence.
Their lifestyles followed similar patterns. Both 
were cattle owners, and both needed to expand when the 
territory they occupied could no longer meet the needs 
of those living on it. When expansion beyond the 
colony was no longer possible for the colonist, expansion 
into Xhosa territory appeared to offer at least one 
solution. Thus, at the turn of the century, the 
Zuurveld was an area where chiefdoms and colonists com­
peted for land. The competition was exacerbated by con­
flicting views of land ownership. The colonists believed 
in private ownership, whereas the Xhosa held land 
communally.
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By 1854 Sarhili was paramount chief of the Gcaleka (east 
of the Kei) and was held responsible by the colonial 
government for the depredations of the other Xhosa 
chiefs. The Xhosa west of the Kei had by that time 
further divided into the Ngqika and Rharhabe. The 
Ngqika Xhosa were under the nominal rule of Sandile, and 
were divided into lesser chiefdoms under Oba, Stock,
Anta, Xhoxho, Tola, Botomane and Ian Tshatshu. Also 
west of the Kei were the Ndlambe under Phato, who had 
been 'loyal' in the war of 1850. Kama, his brother, 
and a number of followers had broken away and settled 
further west. Kama was the first Christian chief, 
though Christianity had not been accepted by his 
followers, nor encouraged by him. Chief Mhala, 
situated between Sandile and Phato, veteran foe of 
1835 and 1846 wars and a friend of Sarhili, was re­
garded by the colonial authorities as untrustworthy.
The Zuurveld regions was, in the Legassick sense, a 
'frontier zone' and at the end of the 18th Century was 
a fluid region of social transition, relatively auto­
nomous from both colonial base and the indigenous social
g
systems, but also dependent on both. Until the arrival 6
6. M. Legassick, 'The Northern Frontier to 1820: The 
emergence of the Griqua people', in R. Elphick & H. 
Giliomee, The Shaping of South African Society, p.247«
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of the British at the Cape, the frontier remained in
limbo. After 1806, the processes were set in motion
for the re-incorporation of the frontier zone into the
Cape Colonial system. H. Giliomee has called the time
prior to re-incorporation the 'open frontier'f when
individuals and groups had a measure of liberty in
establishing relations and maintaining their interests,
7and when land was relatively sparsely populated. The 
'closing' of the frontier in the 19th Century was, among 
other things, characterized by pressures on land on 
both sides of the frontier and the deterioration of 
labour relations in that region.
Contact with the Colony on various levels had made 
significant inroads into traditional Xhosa society.
Trade had been an early source of interaction and by 
1830 the settler trading network had extended as far 
as Pondoland. According to J.B. Peires, in The House 
of Phalo, the extension of the trade network resulted 
in the Xhosa becoming increasingly dependent on the 
colony and even posed a threat to Xhosa national
Q
sovereignty. Xhosa traders were edged out of the 78
7. H. Giliomee, 'The Eastern Frontier 1770 - 1812',
p.316.
8. J.B. Peires, The House of Phalo. (Raven Press 1QR1 1
p.102. "
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market because of the more efficient organisation of 
the colonial traders in terms of wagon transport and 
supply of goods. Trade in labour had begun as early 
as 1777 but as long as the Xhosa still had an indepen­
dent subsistence base in Xhosaland, they, as a people, 
could not be forced onto the labour market and could 
still opt out of it. As Xhosaland became unable to 
provide for its population in the 1830s the option of
leaving his employer became increasingly less open to
gthe Xhosa labourer.
The Xhosa were inexorably caught up into a relation­
ship with advancing colonialism which was to end 
disastrously for at least one chief and his people. 
Ngqika, in seizing power from his uncle Ndlambe in 
1819» allied himself to the Cape Colony, an ally which 
was to prove unfaithful and treacherous. He probably
did more than any one else seriously to weaken Xhosa
. , 10 resistance.
The total war against the Xhosa initiated by Lt. Col.
9. Ibid. p.163.
10. J.B. Peires, 'Ngqika1, in C. Saunders (ed), Black
Leaders in Southern African History, (Heineman, London,
1979), p.15.
-26-
Graham on the orders of Governor Sir John Cradock in 
1811, and the subsequent expulsion of the Xhosa from 
their lands west of the Fish River, created a set of 
problems which the chiefs were unable to solve. Their 
well-ordered universe had been deranged by the whites, 
and the Xhosa had to work out a suitable corrective.
The response of many was a re-assertion of their tradi­
tional values, so political leadership tended to pass 
temporarily from the hands of the chiefs into the hands 
of prophet figures such as Nxele, Ntsikana, Mlanjeni 
and in 1856 to Nongqawuse and Mhlakaza whose great
revelation was to all but destroy the Xhosa people 11
Political divisions and petty rivalry between the east­
ern chiefs were aggravated by interaction with the 
Colony. Phato stayed out of the war of 1834-5 and 
Maqoma retired early in 1846. Some minor chiefs
defected altogether. By the 1850s the Xhosa political
. 12system was in a state of permanent instability.
Though the struggle against the Colony did much to heal 12
11. J.B. Peires, 'Nxele, Ntsikana and the origins of 
Xhosa Religious Reaction', Journal of African History, 
20, 2(1979), p.52.
12. J.B. Peires, The House of Phalo, p.163.
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the breach between chiefs and commoners, it also 
created new cleavages. A notable example was between 
what Peires terms 'resisters and collaborators'. The 
latter group included the Christian chief, Kama, and 
the community of school-people around mission 
stations. What Peires has not mentioned is that
in 1850 the school-people were a small group and an 
analysis of the group shows them to have been, apart 
from Mfengu and Gqunukhwebe, on the whole outcasts and 
refugees from Xhosa society, and mostly women. How­
ever, the introduction of the plough and market concept 
by the missionaries did have far-reaching effects and 
was more subversive of the old way of life than many of 
the other divisions. Both traders and missionaries 
created demands for new types of commodities which 
slowly drew the Xhosa into the cash economy of the 
Colony.
The political and economic instablility of the Xhosa 
weakened the resistance to the blow soon to be delivered 
by Grey and the Cattle Killing. Grey, who considered 
the continued existence of the Xhosa social system to 
be inimical to the progress of civilization and the
Ibid, p.164.
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success of his frontier plans, deliberately aimed 
at undermining the power of the chiefs and encouraging 
the traditional tendency of the Xhosa towards fission.
In all his actions he set out to weaken any possibi­
lity of a combined resistance to his measures, to the 
extent that he refused to hold a general meeting with the 
chiefs, and would not allow Maclean, Chief Commiss­
ioner of British Kaffraria, to do so either. Grey, 
as High Commissioner, felt that he had the power to 
introduce his new system into British Kaffraria, 
though there was some doubt, especially in the mind 
of Col. Maclean, as to whether the Xhosa were in 
fact true subjects of the British Crown. Grey 
chose to ignore this.
Grey tackled the task before him promptly and vigorously, 
overriding local objections to certain aspects of his 
plans and often presenting the Colonial Office with a 
fait accompli which they sanctioned with varying 
degrees of reluctance. In his role as colonial ad­
ministrator in New Zealand and South Africa, Grey felt 
that he had been given a unique task to mould raw 
human materials to higher ends, though on a more 
realistic level he admitted that the problem posed
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for him in the colonies was rather how to utilize
the 'natives' for the civilization which had begun
1 4to invade both these territories.
Grey's reputation as a humanitarian begins to falter
under closer scrutiny. The Cape colonists believed
implicitly in his benevolence and the Advertiser of
2 December 1854 reported him as 'a lover of the
Kafir race', 'a man of Christian humanity', 'with a
1 5character of benevolence, wisdom and virtue'. His
despatches and speeches supported this view, but his 
actions certainly did not always give credence to his 
words and, underlying it all, his first concern was 
not unnaturally for the interests of the British 
Empire and the Cape colonists. Xhosa interest came 
a rather poor third, and the threat of coercion to 
get what he wanted was never very far below the 
surface. Philanthropy was a thin veil over his iron 
will.
Peace on the frontier may well have been necessary for 14*
14. J. Milne, Romance of a Pro-Consul, p.104.
15* J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey K.C.B. 1812-1890. 
(Cassell & Co., London, 1961 ), p.305•
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the progress of the Xhosa in the arts of 'civilization', 
always supposing the Xhosa wanted to advance in those 
arts, but it is difficult to see how submission of the 
Xhosa and their removal from their land in British 
Kaffraria to make way for white immigration could 
possibly be described as humanitarian or in the 
interests of the Xhosa people. In planning their re­
moval, Grey ignored the promises made to the Xhosa by 
previous governors regarding the tenure of their loca­
tions. He declared that the Xhosa must either be
1 6absorbed by the Europeans or succumb to them, and
came to the amazing conclusion that 'throughout
British Kaffraria the native has no recognized right
17or interest in the soil'. Again and again his
concern for British interests emerges from his descrip­
tions of the benefits of civilization for the Xhosa.
The chief was to be stripped of his power because it 
stood in the way of the advancement of civilization, 
but Grey later also pointed out that leaving the chiefs 
in control would lead to the increase of a dangerous 16*
16. C.0.48/381: Grey to Labouchere, No.35* 23 March 1857; 
J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.329.
17* Br.Pari.Papers XL of 1857/8 (2352), p.36: Grey to 
Labouchere, No.12, 18 October 1856; J. Rutherford,
Sir George Grey, p.329.
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1 8  t a opower already in existence. He was sure that his
new system of administration for the Xhosa would 
secure colonial property, stimulate industry and in 
time to come prove to be a source of revenue to the 
Crown. ^
What recommended Grey as the governor who would be able
to stabilize the frontier and bring peace and prosperity
to the Colony, was his supposedly successful term of
office as governor of New Zealand and his handling of
the 'Maori problem'. Having brought the Maori wars
to an end, Grey had experimented with a policy of
'civilizing' the indigenous population and hoped to
repeat his success in South Africa. The response to
his ideas in the Colonial Office in London was a
mixture of optimism and pessimism, but the underlying
theme was that there would be no harm in letting him
try. Grey's friend, Sir George Barrow, was encouraging,
saying that if he succeeded it would be a glorious 
20triumph. Sir William Molesworth, however, pointed 18*20
18. C.0.48/368: Grey to Sir William Molesworth, No.46,
18 December 1855*
19• Cape of Good Hope - Parliament Correspondence between 
Grey and Sec, of State for Colonies, presented to both 
Houses of Parliament by His Excellency. April 1857» 
Grey Coll. G.11.C.20: Grey to Maclean, 17 September 
1855* Enel.5 to No.46.
20. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.318.
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out that the situation in South Africa was different 
from that in New Zealand. If Grey succeeded, he 
would accomplish an extraordinary feat and one that 
would be most beneficial to the Empire, but he cyni­
cally concluded that in New Zealand Grey had been 
dealing with smaller numbers and the problem had been 
infinitely smaller:
'They (the Maoris) were early influenced by 
the missionaries and they are rapidly dying 
out. In another generation or so they will 
be exterminated by European colonization and 
disease and the problem will be solved.'21
This was a sobering example of the realism displayed by
the men of the Colonial Office.
Grey's proposals for South Africa were identical to 
those he had employed in New Zealand, and he seemed 
to have had little doubt that he would be as success­
ful with the Xhosa as he considered himself to have 
been with the Maoris. He planned to strengthen colonial 
defences and build strategic roads. Chiefs were to be 
encouraged to accept salaries and in return hand over 
their judicial functions to magistrates who would be 
stationed with the chiefs. Tribal law would be re­
placed with a suitable code of laws which would aid 21
21. C.0.48/365: Note from Sir William Molesworth on 
No.14, 11 June 1855.
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the absorption of the Xhosa into the European polity 
on an economic level. Christian missions, schools 
and hospitals would promote civilization and counter­
act superstition and ’witchcraft'. Employment on 
public works would be offered to the Xhosa to incul­
cate industrial habits and to provide them with the 
means of purchasing food and other material goods. 
British Kaffraria would be opened up to White 
settlers to form a checkerboard of black/white settle­
ment. Thus, civilization was to be helped along by 
proximity to those already civilized.
While putting his plans into operation, the frontier 
defences were to be strengthened as a precautionary 
measure. In fact, his public works programme, 
supposedly a further means of 'civilizing' the Xhosa, 
was linked to Grey's plans for frontier security.
Thus, the roads which he built in British Kaffraria 
with Xhosa labour were military roads, and Grey was 
later to write with satisfaction, that the Xhosa
were effectively opening up their own territory to
22colonial forces, 'conquering it for us'. The power *19
22. C.0.48/368: Grey to Lord John Russell, No.27,
19 September 1855-
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of the chief was to be destroyed not only by the govern­
ment salary, but also be replacing traditional customs 
with a system of administration devised by Grey. The 
people were to be settled in villages with a resident 
magistrate, appointed by Grey and not chosen by the 
chiefs, and later individual land titles were to be 
granted. This village scheme was not original. In 
1850 the Rev. William Impey, a Methodist minister, 
proposed to Sir Harry Smith that the Xhosa and Mfengu 
should be concentrated in villages to facilitate 
measures for 'uplifting' and 'civilizing' them. He 
made similar proposals to Grey in 1857* The Rev.
H. Calderwood, missionary turned government agent, 
had also suggested measures such as individual land 
titles and industrial schools.
Education had come to be regarded by colonial governors 
as one of the most effective means of controlling the 
Xhosa entry into relations with the Colony and of paci­
fication. Grey was no exception. Indeed, he had a 
special interest in education, and it was here that the 
missionary body as a whole entered into his calculations. 
The missionaries were equally insistent on the value of 
education for the spreading of the Christian message 
and several educational establishments had already
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been set up by missionary societies. Grey planned to 
use and extend these as part of his civilizing pro­
gramme. Hospitals were to be used to counter the in­
fluence of the 'witchdoctors' from whom Grey expected 
his most spirited opposition.
Grey's plans for South Africa differed in one or two 
important aspects from those he had in New Zealand. 
Firstly, the Xhosa were not to be protected in the 
possession of their land as the Maoris had been.
Secondly, the Xhosa were not actually within the bor­
ders of the Cape Colony. It would therefore follow 
that in order to subdue and 'civilize' them, and to in­
corporate them as a labour force, British Kaffraria would 
have to be drawn into a much closer relationship with the 
Colony, if not annexed to the Colony - which is exactly 
what Grey ultimately intended.
Furthermore, in granting land titles to the Xhosa,
Grey either could not see, or would not see, that 
British Kaffraria was not as fertile as he imagined.
The amount of land he envisaged for the individual 
titles was too small for South African conditions and 
the Xhosa way of life. Missionary voices were raised 
in protest when the details of Grey's land settlement
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became known. It was pointed out that to deprive the
Xhosa of their land was not only the quickest way of
alienating them from British interests, but also that
the two acres planned for the individual titles would
. . 23be insufficient to support a man and his family.
But again, Grey chose to ignore the protests and push 
ahead with his plans, believing implicitly in his own 
timing and judgement. He believed that the manage­
ment of ’native races’ resolved itself into a few 
natural laws, the most important of these being man's 
basic need for food. The path to adopt, then, was
to be the means by which the Xhosa could obtain more 
24-food. Thus, the public works programme fulfilled
two functions. Apart from this, Grey was not the 
man to easily accept criticism and opposition to his 
plans. In the opinion of one of his supporters,
Bishop Gray, Sir George was a 'proud, mean, overbearing 
man', high-handed in his actions and given to tantrums 
if opposed.^
This raises the question of the extent of the interac­
tion between Grey and the missionary bodies on the Cape 234*
23. B.K.91 : John Ross to Col. Maclean, 15 July 1856.
24. J. Milne, Romance of a Pro-Consul, p.105.
25* T. Gutsche, The Bishop's Lady, (Howard Timmins, 1970), 
p.169»
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eastern frontier. Robinson and Gallagher have put 
forward the argument that the Imperial power needed
to encourage local ’collaborating groups’ with which
2 6it formed and maintained special relations. Al­
ready Grey had solicited the help of two groups in 
introducing his new administration, the Cape Colonial 
Parliament as well as the missionaries. Atmore and 
Marks have pointed out that this tactic had also been 
used earlier: from the time of their occupation of
the Cape the British had attempted to cultivate a 
local group of collaborators to establish an adminis­
tration and to help finance that administration.
The first of these groups had been the Cape Dutch, par­
ticularly the wealthy merchant class. As the number
of British settlers increased, they augmented the
27Dutch as a collaborating group. Grey had been
instructed to reduce the cost of the Cape Colony to 
Great Britain and to do so he needed the collaboration 
of the new Cape Parliament. More specifically, he 
needed a Parliamentary grant of money for British 
Kaffraria, and its support in the defence of the Colony 267
26. In R. Robinson, 'Collaboration in the Politics of the 
Colonies’, quoted in A. Atmore & S. Marks in 'The 
Imperial Factor in South Africa in the 19th Century: 
towards a reassessment', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 3(1975 ) > p. 1 08.
27. A. Atmore & S. Marks, 'The Imperial Factor', p.111.
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so that British troops could be released for service 
in other parts of the Empire. The incentives he 
offered to Parliament would provide grist to any 
Marxist historian's mill. As the Cape merchants 
were a powerful group within the Colony, Grey con­
tinually emphasized the increased trade and wealth 
a 'civilized' population in British Kaffraria would 
bring. Shutting the Xhosa out of colonial interests 
would be reason for them to remain a troublesome 
people, but to include them would encourage the 
Xhosa to be:
'useful servants, consumers of our goods, 
contributors to our revenue; in short, a 
source of strength and wealth for this 
Colony as Providence designed them to be.'2®
Grey hoped that the Xhosa would be changed into useful
2Q 30labourers, v and a 'tractable, money-making people',
but in a position in colonial society subordinate to
the White colonists and bolstering their economy.
This was language that the colonists could appreciate 
and they enthusiastically supported Grey's measures. 28*30
28. C.0.48/368: Grey to Grey, No.39, 17 March 1855* Speech 
at opening of the second session of Parliament.
29* C.0.48/381: Grey to Labouchere, No.45, 8 April 1857* 
Speech at fourth session of Parliament.
30. C.0.48/388: Grey to Labouchere, No.20, 10 March 1858. 
Speech at fifth session of Parliament.
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In July 1855 the Cape Parliament passed an Act to pro­
vide an extra £34 940-4-4 in addition to sums already 
granted for 1855, to make provision for the changes 
Grey wanted to introduce on the frontier. They also 
provided for the equipment and maintenance of an 
armed Mounted Police Force of 500 men for the defence 
of the frontier and added another Judge to the Supreme 
Court. A burgher militia in each of the 21 districts 
was created, over and above the 500 Mounted Police, 
to be called out in defence of their district should 
danger threaten. Grey was satisfied and could write 
a year later that the European population was pros­
perous and contented and co-operating with the plans
31of the government. In fact, as Rutherford points
out, the colonists were soon convinced that Grey was
32the best governor they had ever had.
While making overtures to the Cape Parliament, Grey, in 
1855> was also making contact with the various missionary 
bodies. Bishop Gray of Cape Town, who had become a 
friend and confidant to Grey, was enthusiastic about 312
31. C.0.48/375J Grey to Labouchere, No.60, 14 July 1856.
32. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.295»
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Grey's plans. He promised Anglican support and the 
entry of the Church into the mission field. In the 
frontier regions the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary 
Society and the Free Church of Scotland were already 
well established and their co-operation in Grey's 
plans for extending education among the Xhosa people 
as a civilizing agent has led to the accusation that 
they too, were a collaborating group intent on the 
destruction of the Xhosa as a nation. Aspects of 
missionary policy and actions certainly do seem to 
lay them open at times to such charges. Insofar as 
the missionaries believed that the 'wickedness' of 
traditional Xhosa society stood in the way of the 
Gospel and education was a way of eradicating this, 
they must be seen as a collaborating group. How­
ever, in the early phase of missionary work they 
cannot be accused of wanting to educate the Xhosa to 
the subordinate place in colonial society that Grey 
did. The type of education planned by Grey differed 
from the education the missionaries, particularly the 
Free Church of Scotland, were offering.
Grey wanted to change the emphasis of the education 
available to Africans, and the grants he offered to 
missionaries for education were for industrial
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departments or for the setting up of new industrial
schools. This was part of his plan to produce a
group of useful labourers, as well as to train the
Xhosa in trades and as teachers. Grey was insistent
that the ’native' was not the equal of the European
and could not form a friendship with him, even after
receiving education. This was his rationale behind
extending education to Xhosa girls. They could
then become partners for the educated young men who
could not be fully assimilated into white society
and who were no longer comfortable in 'traditional'
33society.
On the frontier, existing schools were to be expanded
and new ones set up. The Anglicans now entered into
the mission field, and Bishop Armstrong, newly appointed
to Grahamstown, undertook to set up stations and schools
at Keiskamma Hoek in the Crown Reserve, at Mhala's and
Sandile's locations as well.as with Sarhili in 
. 34Kaffraria Proper. Grey seemed particularly im­
pressed with the Methodists and gave them generous aid. 
Healdtown, the largest of the Methodist education 3
33. J. Milne, The Romance of a Pro-Consul, p.110. 
34• J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.318.
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institutions, was set up with the grant from the Governor. 
However, it was the Mfengu rather than the Xhosa who 
would derive the most benefit from the facilities. In 
this regard, it was the Methodists anyway who reflected 
most closely Grey's aims for African education. Perhaps, 
because they had not been as active as the Presbyterians 
in this field, the educational institutions they estab­
lished followed Grey's pattern of trade schools more 
closely than, for example, Lovedale.
Grey's aid to missionary institutions and his emphasis
on education were an important part of his plan to
pacify the frontier and make the Xhosa more amenable
to his system of administration. Education was,
without doubt, one of the most effective means of
undermining traditional values, but the attendance at
the schools in the 1850s was small, as the main body
of the Xhosa were still unwilling to send their children 
35to school. Thus, at least in the early part of Grey's
governorship, the impact of missionary education was not 
great. More effective as an agent of destruction, would 
be his system of replacing the authority of the chief 
with that of the special magistrate, his forced re­
movals of chiefdoms, and their resettlement in villages *
35• C.0.48/400: Bishop Henry of Grahamstown to the Duke of
Newcastle, 15 July 1859*
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under police control. This was accomplished without 
reference to the missionaries.
Although Grey went out of his way to foster special 
relations with the Colonial Parliament and the 
missionary bodies, he insisted on having complete 
freedom of action and on several occasions deli­
berately acted contrary to the advice of men on the 
spot such as Col. Maclean, and Charles Brownlee, 
the Ngqika Commissioner. Both protested that the 
introduction of Grey’s proposals was premature and 
hazardous, as the Xhosa were a conservative people, 
suspicious of white interference and unwilling to be
• z  /T
civilized. Governor Cathcart had reinstated the
chiefs' jurisdiction over their own people and
Maclean doubted whether the Xhosa were in fact British
subjects. Grey, however, felt it his duty to act on
37his own judgement and carry out his plans. This
highhandedness was criticized by a contemporary 
visitor to the Cape, Robert Wilmot, who considered 367
36. Cape of Good Hope - Parliament, Grey Coll.G.11.c.20: 
Maclean to W.F. Liddle, Enc.2 to No.46, 4 August 1855i 
J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.334*
37. Cape of Good Hope - Parliament, Grey Coll.G.11.c.20: 
Grey to the Rt. Hon. Sir William Molesworth, Bart.,
No.46, 18 December 1855*
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it to be 'mere presumption and not statesmanship' on
T Othe Governor's part.'/’w The Xhosa for their part were 
not given the opportunity to discuss the new arrange­
ments. Grey was prepared to meet the chiefs, but not 
prepared to listen to what they had to say in case he 
led them 'to hopes which he later could not fulfil'. 
When the chiefs pressed the point, he changed the 
conversation and promised them gifts and insisted 
that all communication with him should be in 
writing.
The Colonial Office was informed of the introduction 
of Grey's new system of administration after the event. 
In reporting his fait accompli^Grey supported his 
actions by highlighting the possible danger to the 
Colony of allowing the chiefs to remain independent.
The Colonial Office accepted his actions with little 
protest. Sir William Molesworth noted on the rele­
vant despatch that the Colonial Office would not 
normally countenance a High Commissioner acting in­
dependently, but that Grey had taken the opportunity 
offered by the outbreak of lungsickness among the 38
38. Robert Wilmot, A Cape Traveller's Diary, 1836,
(A. Donker, 1 98471 p» 68.
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cattle and had probably done well in doing so. He
did express a fear that Grey had been too rapid in 
pushing forward with his ideas and that he should have 
started with the 'loyal' Mfengu, but the general 
sentiment was one of resigned acceptance.
Grey, himself, was prepared to go to almost any lengths 
when determined to carry through his policies and was 
a master at writing despatches which showed his actions 
in as favourable a light as possible, if not always in 
as accurate a light as possible. Part of his settle­
ment plans for the frontier included white settlement 
in British Kaffraria in an attempt to even out the 
black/white ratio, promote civilization by example and 
consolidate the frontier. He wrote of the ability of 
British Kaffraria to carry a dense population when he 
must have been well aware that this was not true. It 
seems that to reduce the Xhosa population in British 
Kaffraria he may even have intended to move them out 
of the territory to make way for the proposed wliite 
settlers.^  Grey was determined to introduce 
military pensioners into that area even though the 3940
39
39. C.0.48/368: Sir William Molesworth to Labouchere, 
Note on No.46, 18 December 1855*
40. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p328.
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scheme had not been an unqualified success in New 
Zealand. He was prepared to set aside the objec­
tions made by Col. Maclean who knew the country 
intimately. When the latter presented his report 
containing his reservations about the scheme, Grey 
owned 'that he had sent home his despatch on the
subject long before' and that Maclean's report 'put
41a rope around his neck'. The Governor had no
intention of modifying his plans however.
Grey had only six months to put his measures into 
operation before the Cattle Killing gave him an un­
precedented opportunity to complete, as far as he 
could, the break-up of the chiefdoms. However, even 
before the Cattle Killing got into full swing, he was 
writing of the success of his measures. One has to 
read Grey's despatches with some caution, but it 
seems remarkable that he was able to induce the chiefs 
to accept their new position, when in August 1855 Charles 
Brownlee was convinced that only a revolution in both the 
circumstances and sentiments of the Xhosa could get 
them to accept Grey's proposals, and he had advised 41
41. R. Wilmot, A Cape Traveller's Diary, p.68.
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a delay.^ Yet, in March 1856 Grey wrote to Labouchere
mentioning that the Xhosa, both chiefs and people, had
43 •appeared to accept the special magistrates. This
seems all the more remarkable when one notes that in
I860 even Kama, the 'loyal' Christian chief, was
attempting to free himself from the restraints of his 
44magistrate.
Once on the pay roll, Grey could use 'strong arm' tac­
tics to keep a chief there. The chief, if recalci­
trant, could be struck off and disciplined with the 
threat of force? a threat which was meted out to chief 
Anta when he tried to evade the village system in 1858. 
He was told by Col. Maclean that whatever opposition 
was encountered, the system would be carried out and 
the Xhosa not located in villages in a reasonable
time would be treated as 'vagabonds and unauthorized
45squatters and would be punished accordingly'. • In 
the report on Kama, Maclean went on to note that 
similar attempts might be made by other chiefs, as 
they were by the Thembu in I860, and that military *23
42.
43.
44.
45.
Cape of Good Hope - Parliament, Grey Coll.G.11.c.20: 
Grey to Molesworth, No.46, Enel.4, Brownlee to Maclean
23 August 1855.
C.0.48/373: Grey to Labouchere, No.12, 22 March 1856.
C.0.48/402: Sub.Enel, to No.51> Maclean to
Wynyard, 10 March I860.
C.0.48/389’* Encl.1 to No.86, Maclean to Maj 
R.S., Sec. to the High Commissioner, n.d.
Lt.Gov.
. Francis
9
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force was important to the full development of the 
magisterial scheme as well as the colonization of the 
territory between the Kei and the Mbashe Rivers.
But this was after the Cattle Killing, and Sarhili 
had been banished from his country by the Mounted 
Police, and colonization of his territory was being 
proposed by Grey, Lt.Gov. Wynyard and Maclean.
Why then did the chiefs accept the new dispensation 
prior to the Cattle Killing? They, in fact, never 
really had a choice. The veiled (and not so veiled) 
threats of force coupled with economic and political 
dislocation must have provided fairly strong motiva­
tion. Grey's introduction of his new system of 
administration coincided with a serious outbreak of 
lungsickness among the cattle in British Kaffraria and 
Kaffraria Proper. This severely depleted the chiefs' 
source of income and wealth, and the salary offered 
by Grey to the chiefs and counsellors was an attractive 
alternative. The introduction of salaried chiefs 
also encouraged the tendency of the Xhosa chiefdoms 
towards fission, and reduced the possibility of 
combined opposition in any form. Maqoma refused to 
meet with Sandile to discuss Grey's measures and 
sent a message to Col. Maclean stating that he would
-49-
at once accept Grey's offer if the Governor made him
46independent of Sandile. He saw clearly the im­
plications of receiving a government salary, as did 
Sandile's counsellor Soga, who strongly advised his 
chief to refuse the salary. In a message to Sandile 
Maqoma asked whether he was fully aware of what he 
was about to do, as hitherto the Xhosa had been 
British subjects in name, whereas now they would be 
British subjects in truth. ^  As far as possible 
Maclean met the chiefs singly to introduce the new 
system, and he positively refused a request from
the Ngqika Xhosa to meet in counsel with the Ndlambe
v. 48 Xhosa.
Apart from linking Xhosa interests to the Colony, Grey 
hoped with his measures seriously to weaken the 
authority of the chiefs over their people. In this 
regard it seems that his plans may well not have 
succeeded. Wilmot felt that the government salaries 
strengthened the chiefs' hold over their counsellors 
at least, as the chiefs had control of their 46*8
46. Cape of Good Hope - Parliament, Grey Coll. G.11.C.20: 
Brownlee to Maclean, Enel.7 to No.46, 18 October 1855.
47• Ibid. Brownlee to Maclean, Enel.8 to No.46, 6 December 
1855­
48. Ibid. Brownlee to Maclean, Enel.7 to No.46, 9 October 
1855.
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subsidies. • According to Wilmot, this was also a 
fact which annoyed Col. Maclean.
As far as at least one of the missionaries was con­
cerned, it seems that Grey’s intentions were also 
misunderstood. The Rev. William Sargeant of Annshaw 
Mission expressed the hope that Grey's scheme would 
consolidate chief Kama's authority and influence over 
his people and enable him to exercise a stricter 
surveillance over the more remote parts of his country. 
Not unnaturally, Sargeant also hoped that the new 
arrangements would facilitate missionary work as 
well.* 50
The chiefs' reasons for accepting Grey's plans are not 
all recorded and one can only guess at them. Cer­
tainly, introduced when the steady erosion of Xhosa 
society was reaching a climax, and at a time of 
economic distress, his system of administration must 
have done more than anything to sound the death knell 
for traditional society. An indication of the
49» R. Wilmot, A Cape Traveller's Diary, p.62.
50. Grey Coll.G.33.C.145 Wesleyan Missionary Notices, 
25 January 1857*
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authority exercised by government agents among the
Xhosa was given early in 1855 when first Maclean and
then Major Gawler, magistrate to Mhala, were able to
51interfere in 'smelling out' ceremonies.
There is little doubt that the Cattle Killing was to 
give Grey an undreamed of opportunity and success in 
his attack on the fabric of Xhosa society, but it is 
probably also true that, given time and his charac­
teristic determination, Grey would have struck a 
hard blow at traditional chieftainship even without 
it. He showed this determination right at the 
beginning when he refused to discuss his plans with 
the British Kaffrarian chiefs. Grey also held 
high hopes for the mission schools, and intended that 
in a few years (he was writing in 1857) they would 
exercise a great effect on the Xhosa people. But 
although education was important to him, the educa­
tional institutions were not large and by 1856 had 
had little impact. Nor were they to have in the 
near future. So, while education could possibly
51. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.321.
-52-
draw people from the chiefdom and provide them with 
new values and loyalties, it was Grey who was to 
provide the most potent attack, at the very heart 
of the Xhosa system - the position and authority of 
the chief, if not among his counsellors, then 
certainly among his people.
After the Cattle Killing, events were to move fast.
52By January 1857 a village system had been established 
and in April Grey reported to the Cape Parliament that 
this, coupled with the introduction of special magis­
trates, salaried chiefs and the appropriation of
fines for the Crown had begun to break down the 'worst
53parts of the Kafir polity'.' It was in this speech 
that Grey first broached the subject of a strong 
white settlement in Kaffraria Proper to control the 
people there. This was said soon after the first 
horrors of the Cattle Killing were becoming known.
Grey's 'grand design' for British Kaffraria was, how­
ever, something more than just the extension of 
British influence. He was interested in the Science
52. C.0.48/380: Grey to Labouchere, No.6, 19 January 1857.
53. C.0.48/381: Grey to Labouchere, No.45, 8 April 1857- 
Speech at the opening of the fourth session of the 
Cape Parliament, 7 April 1857.
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of Man, and regarded British Kaffraria as an area in 
which he could put his theories into practice - an area 
in which he could experiment. Like the Benthamites, 
he seems to have believed that Man could be civilized 
by legislatively changing his environment. He also 
believed that the 'civilization of the savage' could 
be reduced to a few natural laws, the most important 
of which was the drive towards food. The mission­
aries would have their part to play in the multi­
pronged prosecution of his theories; they would be 
the instruments of conversion to Christianity and 
the educators; white immigrants would be living 
examples for the Xhosa to follow; and the military 
'might' of the Colony would provide strong persuasion. 
Grey's approach to the problem was coldly clinical 
and authoritarian (he had more than a passing acquain­
tance with Carlyle and believed himself to have been 
influenced by him), and at times he seems to have 
forgotten that he was dealing with people and that 
Man, primitive or otherwise, can not be reduced to a 
'few natural laws'.
Whenever possible, Grey utilized frontier 'agents' to 
his advantage. Of these the missionaries, because 
of the nature of their work and their relative
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prominence in frontier society, have been linked 
most closely with Grey in Xhosa tradition and 
recent historiography. Because of this, it is 
important to analyse their work more closely and 
to investigate the extent of their interaction 
with Grey and other local colonial officials.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE MISSIONARIES AND GREY 1854-6
Of all the 'collaborating' groups that were involved 
in Grey's frontier plans, the missionaries have been 
singled out for the most criticism in after years. 
Radical historians have accused them of paving the 
way for the extension of colonial authority and of 
co-operating with Grey to break the power of the
Xhosa as a nation. In the sense of Atmore and
1 ;* Marks , they have been called a collaborating group,
and at times have been considered the most effec­
tive collaborators of all.
There is little doubt that the missionary bodies 
were more than willing to assist Grey in his plans 
for the extension of Christianity and for the 
'civilizing' and educating of the Xhosa, but before 
a blanket judgement from the hindsight of the 20th 
Century can ’ passed, one needs to investigate
their motives for 'collaborating' and to look at
their view of the role they were to play in Grey's
1 . A. Atmore & S. Marks, 'The Imperial Factor', p.111
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frontier plans. To answer the accusation that the 
missionary bodies were the most effective collabora­
tors of all, it is necessary to examine their con­
tribution in real terms to Grey's overall scheme and 
to assess the success of the part they played.
As part of his 'civilizing' programme Grey planned to 
extend the existing missionary establishments, es­
pecially in the field of education. He hoped not 
only to encourage the spread of Christianity but also 
to introduce the teaching of trades. Grey's emphasis 
on Christianity was not so much the result of a deep 
religious conviction on his part, but because he con­
sidered Christianity to be the 'highest moral system'
2that man had yet developed. Grey hoped, through 
Christianity and medical hospitals, to break down 
superstition and with the trade schools, to provide 
Xhosa youths with an entry into the capitalist cash 
economy of the Colony.
Grey introduced his plans to the Cape Parliament in the 
philanthropic terms which the missionaries could under­
stand and appreciate. According to him the Xhosa
2. J. Milne, Romance of a Pro-Consul, p.271•
-57-
could not be left alone without attempts to reclaim 
and. civilize them, as one could not ignore one's 
duty to one's fellow man. He proposed to make ■unre­
mitting efforts to 'raise the Kaffirs in Christianity 
and civilization' by establishing and using missions 
connected with industrial schools. In order not to 
be misunderstood by the members of parliament, Grey 
spelled this out more clearly, underlining the ad­
vantages to the Colony itself. His course of action 
would pacify the frontier and bring the Xhosa into 
an economic relationship with the Colony.
It is necessary to consider just how successful Grey 
hoped the missionaries would be and, therefore, how 
large a role he expected them to play in his plans.
The Colonial Office spoke in sweeping terms of Grey's 
success at the Cape opening up 'vast territory' to
the influence of Christianity and, therefore,
3civilizing 'savage tribes'. Eut Victorian adminis­
trators sometimes had difficulty in distinguishing 
between the spread of Christianity and the extension 3
3. C.O.48/365^ Draft George Grey (Bart.) to Grey
(Governor), No.23, 3 June 1855*
-58-
of the British Empire. Grey, himself, spoke enthu­
siastically of the work to be done by the missionaries, 
so much so that the residents of King William’s Town, 
in an address to Sir George on the 11 June 1856, 
thanked him under Providence for peace, for opening 
a source of wealth and security to them, and for the 
cheering prospect of thousands of heathen being 
'brought to that light where salvation is to be
4found'. This was before the Cattle Killing raised 
their hopes even further.
Grey was a persuasive speaker and not above distorting 
the truth when it suited him. He must surely have 
been aware that the missionaries in their thirty or 
so years on the frontier had had little visible 
success and that little short of a miracle would bring 
the impact that Grey was suggesting within the next 
few years. What, then, did Grey really want? In 
pushing forward a vigorous, multi-pronged attack on 
the Xhosa social system, he viewed the missionaries 
as forming but one of the tines. It remains to be 4
4. C.0.48/375: Address from the European Residents
of King William's Town to Grey, 11 June 1856, Encl.1 
to No.oO, 14 July 1856.
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seen how important a tine. To the missionaries,
Grey’s suggestions appeared to be the opportunity
they so desperately needed to be able to make a
significant impact on the Xhosa. He was not the
. 5first governor to consult the missionaries,' but 
he seemed to promise more than other governors be­
fore him. The future seemed brighter than it had 
been since their first years in South Africa, and 
they hailed Grey as a great Christian governor.
The Evangelical Revival in Britain in the 18th Cen­
tury led to the establishment of several missionary 
societies based on Christ's injunction to go out in­
to all the world and preach the Gospel. By the 
1850s the most active of the missionary societies on 
the frontier, and the longest in the field, were the 
Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society and the Scottish 
Missionary Societies (by the 1850s, the Free Church of 5
5. M. Ashley, 'African Education and Society in the
Nineteenth Century Eastern Cape', in C. Saunders &
R. Derricourt (eds.), Beyond the Cape Frontier, (Long­
mans, 1974), p.202; R.H.W. Shepherd, Lovedale South 
Africa 1841-1941, (Lovedale Press, 1940), p.130.
Sir Harry Smith sent out a circular in 1848 asking 
missionary advice on how best to achieve his aim of 
'civilizing' frontier tribesmen. This was followed 
by gifts to various mission stations of a plough, a 
trek tow, five yokes, one muid each of wheat, barley 
and oats as seed, and in some cases, spades and axes 
were added.
- 6 0 -
Scotland). They typified the Victorian ideals of 
'Protestantism and Improvement'^ and the work-ethic 
which permeated the outlook not only of the British 
administrators at Westminster, but also of the Cape 
administrators battling to maintain stability on the 
frontier. It was in some respects unfortunate for 
the success of missionary work that both missionaries 
and administrators thus viewed the Christian religion 
and 'civilization' as two sides of the same coin.
In discussing the relationship between the mission­
aries and the colonial authorities (in this case,
Grey) it was found both convenient and appropriate
for the above reasons, to concentrate research almost
7entirely upon these two societies.
Methodist Missionary activity began rather haphazardly 
in southern Africa in the early 19th Century, but by 67
6. D. M. Schreuder, 'The Cultural Factor in Victorian
Imperialism: a case study of the British 'civi­
lizing mission'', in The Journal of Imperial
and Commonwealth History^ 4(1975-76), p.285*
7. German missionaries and the London Missionary 
Society were both active on the frontier at this 
time, but to a lesser degree. The Anglican Church 
only entered the mission field in response to Grey's 
offer of aid to missionary societies.
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1826 Barnabas Shaw, the first really active Methodist 
minister at the Cape, had established a thriving 
station with a permanent Christian community. From 
this station grew other centres for evangelism.
The real period for Methodist growth started after 
the arrival of the 1820 Settlers. William Shaw had 
been invited to the Cape as chaplain to a group of 
Methodist families. Once on the frontier, he under­
took to care not only for the whole region, but for 
all races. He planned a chain of connected stations 
from the Cape frontier region to Natal. Wesleyvi'lle 
was established in 1823, Mount Coke in 1825, Butter- 
worth in 1827, Morley 1829, Clarkebury and Bunting- 
ville in 1830 and Shawbury and Palmerton a little 
later. Shaw had laid the foundations for the first 
coherent systematic missionary expansion right into 
the heart of Xhosaland across the Kei River.
Education was one of the major interests of the 
Scottish missions. The first two missionaries to 
arrive in the Eastern Cape, William Thomson (paid by 
the government) and John Bennie, both of the Glasgow 
Missionary Society, established themselves at Chumie
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between the Pish and Kei Rivers. They joined John 
Brownlee, former London Missionary Society missionary, 
who was now a government missionary agent. In 1823 
John Ross of the Church of Scotland arrived at Chumie, 
bringing with him a small printing press. As Xhosa 
was developed into a written language, so books were 
printed in Xhosa. With this went the necessary 
education to make the people literate. The main pur­
pose of their education was evangelization and the 
training of so-called native agents and teachers. The 
Presbyterian system of church government through lay 
committees also made it necessary in all new mission 
fields to offer a comprehensive education. In the 1850s 
African converts sat regularly on the Lovedale Presbytery 
meetings as Elders of the Church.
By the end of 1824 Bennie and Ross, as the representa­
tives of the Glasgow Missionary Society, established 
a stations about 12 miles south east of Chumie and 
named it Lovedale. The heart of Lovedale was to be 
its seminary. Ecclesiastical disputes in Scotland 
split the work in South Africa in two: partly a 
missionary undertaking by the Free Church of Scotland 
and partly the work of the United Presbyterian Church. 
Lovedale became the responsibility of the Free Church 
of Scotland. The seminary established there was
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open to all races and denominations and by the 1850s 
was providing a sound education.
The missionaries on the frontier found themselves 
caught in a dilemma: on the one hand they could co­
operate with the colonial authorities and survive; 
on the other, raise obstacles and run the gauntlet of 
officialdom. Because they never quite solved this 
problem, they were not wholly trusted either by 
colonists or by the Xhosa, and the more they were seen 
to co-operate with Cape administrators, the more they 
were regarded with suspicion by their would-be con­
verts. Col. Maclean typified the sort of reserve 
felt by those in authority towards the missionaries.
He was willing to accept the general principles of 
missionary institutions and any ’safe' plan for the 
promotion of Christianity and civilization, but 
distrusted the discretion and motives of certain 
individuals and was a little jealous of the influence 
the missionaries seemed likely to gain -under Grey.
He kept a close watch over the working of different 
institutions so as to 'obviate any danger to the
Osafety of the Queen's territories'.w He drafted
8. B.K.90: Letter dated 30 September 1854
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a letter to the Rev. Richard Birt of Peelton, which
included an assurance of his full support for all
g'good missionaries' and was very abrupt when he
considered a missionary to be interfering in general
1 0governmental preserves. Most of the criticism
from officials and colonists arose when missionaries
attempted to protect the interests of their converts
or possible converts. The criticism levelled at the
missionaries by the colonists was at times more
vicious than the authorities*. In 1854 the military
chaplain at Keiskamma Hoek espressed his opinion of
the danger which resulted from the 'missionaries
being permitted to assemble together under pretence
11of converting the heathen'. He pointed out that
not a fraction of the Xhosa in Kaffraria had become 
Christians, nor had the others any intention of 
becoming so, and he acidly remarked that the mission­
aries would have far more success if their influence 
were confined to moral influence alone. This comment 910
9. B.K.90: Draft of a letter written in 1855*
10. Such as in the matter of the settlement of Mfengu and 
Xhosa in the Crown Reserve in 1856. The Lovedale 
missionaries tried to protect the interests of the Mfengu 
in the area; B.K.90: Laing to Maclean, 20 December 1854; 
Maclean to Laing, 24 July 1856; Minutes of the Lovedale 
Presbytery, July 1856.
11. B.K.90: Military Chaplain to Maclean, 22 September 1854.
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also highlights the conflicts which existed not only 
within the missionary movements themselves (by now 
more or less resolved), but also between the different 
religious denominations and between missionaries and 
colonial ministers.
The mid-19th Century was a period of stagnation for
1 2frontier missions, especially for the Methodists.
They had, perhaps, over-extended themselves with 
their rapid expansion into the Transkeian territories 
and frontier wars had resulted in the destruction or 
abandonment of several stations. The Methodist Church 
as a whole had also been disrupted by controversies 
in the 1840s. Had the missionaries been able unre­
servedly to throw in their lot with the Xhosa, they 
might well have had more success, but they needed 
the sanction of the colonial authorities to set up, 
or to re-occupy, stations in colonial territory, and 
on occasion, had to rely on the strong arm of the law 
for help in difficult times. The Rev. Richard Birt 
expressed this clearly when he ’acknowledged with 12*
12. P. Hinchliff, The Church in South Africa. (S.P.C.K.,
London, 1968), p.48.
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thankfulness' the support he had obtained from 
Maclean when required for 'the enforcing of order
1 3or the expulsion of the refractory' from Peelton.
The missionaries had needed government protection
on occasion and even went so far as to ask for
government help in eradicating what were to them,
1 4obnoxious customs among the Xhosa. At least
three missionaries had turned government agent:
John Brownlee and William Thomson in the 1820s, and 
Henry Calderwood in the 1850s. This certainly 
identified the missionary movement more closely with 
the colonial administration.
This obvious connection with governmental authority 
and the attempt made by the missionaries to bring an 
entire 'system', rather than simply the Christian 
message, to their would-be converts made the Xhosa 
reluctant to accept Christianity. In spite of the *235
13. B.K.91: The Rev. R. Birt to Maclean, 4 October I860.
14» B.K.91: Rev. Greenstock to Maclean, Keiskamma Hoek,
23 March 1859; requested that a stop be put to cir­
cumcision among Mfengu in the Reserve; Ibid. Memorial 
from Anglican missionaries to the Lt. Governor, K.W.T.
25 February 1861, requesting that the government 
actively discourage Xhosa customs, especially 
inton.jane.
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slow erosion of their traditional social system by 
the 1850s, the Xhosa polity was still strongly re­
sistant to the missionary onslaughts. Many chiefs 
accepted missionaries, but seldom for religious 
reasons. The political advantage of using 
missionaries as mediators between themselves and the 
colony was a strong incentive to having a missionary 
residing near by. Some minor chiefs accepted 
missionaries in order to improve their own status 
among their people. The two groups which more 
readily accepted Christianity, the Mfengu and 
Gqunukhwebe, both existed outside the mainstream of 
Cape Nguni life and did not possess the same degree 
of social cohesion as the other Xhosa people.
Not only were there few converts, but acceptance of 
a missionary, therefore, did not necessarily mean 
acceptance of the Gospel. This is not made clear 
in missionary conversion figures themselves. There 
was a deep suspicion of their secular motives and of 
the attack launched on Xhosa customs. Some 
missionaries considered the Xhosa to be sunk in a 
'state of the lowest wretchedness and the vilest
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1 8wickedness' ' and aimed to 'uplift' them by bestowing 
upon them all the benefits of a superior civilization.
It is perhaps relevant to point out here that, for the 
missionaries of this period, the issue was a cultural 
one, not racial. Once Christianity and education 
had been absorbed, the new convert was accepted on the 
same terms as any other Christian.
The missionaries' main targets were some of the Xhosa's 
most fundamental social institutions such as witchcraft, 
polygamy and initiation. They could also not under­
stand the missionaries' objections to dancing and nudity. 
The traditional religion of the Xhosa was so bound up 
in all phases of Xhosa life that, as long as that sys­
tem maintained some sort of coherence, there was little 
likelihood of great numbers accepting a new religion.
This was clearly recognized by J. C. Warner, 'Tambookie 
Agent', when he wrote:
'... the political and religious govern­
ments of the Kaffir Tribes are so inti­
mately connected that the one cannot be 15
15. G. Brown, Personal Adventure in South Africa, 
(London, 1855)> p.143»
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overthrown without the other - they must 
stand or fall together1D
The Xhosa could see no reason why they should believe
the missionaries' message. ’How did those words get
in the book you tell us about? How did the first man
17who wrote them know them?’ they asked.
The reaction to the missionaries and their work by 
both colonists and the Xhosa was strong, in spite of 
the fact that the missionaries were relatively few 
in number. The Xhosa chiefs, rainmakers and witch­
doctors were deeply concerned about the threat of 
Christianity to their position in traditional 
society. If unconvinced about the Gospel itself, 
Xhosa people were, nevertheless, prepared to utilize 
certain aspects of Christianity if it seemed appro­
priate to the occasion. From time to time 
missionaries were consulted as potential rainmakers 
and missionary Young once told a group of Xhosa who 
were reluctant to leave their ploughing for his 
preaching that God would send a crop failure. The 16*8
16. Col. Maclean, A Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs, 
(1856). Part of the concluding remarks of the contri­
bution of J.C. Warner.
17» Quoted in J.B. Peires, ’A History of the Xhosa ci700- 
1835' (unpublished thesis, Rhodes University, 1976), 
p .146.
18. Ibid. Footnote 52.
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threat succeeded - which left a deep impression on 
those around the station.'
There was also predictable concern among the chiefs 
about the habit cultivated by the missionaries of 
gathering their converts around the mission stations 
and of the converts then transferring their loyalty 
to the missionary and local government. This would 
result in a steady erosion of their, power by a whitt­
ling away of their followers. Sandile expressed a 
wish that the teachers among his people would go to 
the people and not gather them around mission stations 
where they were beyond his influence. He expressed 
this fear clearly when he asked of the missionaries:
'Are they not men who at home have no 
people of their own, and they come here 
to take my people from me? .... They only 
take my people and give them to the 
government ... only teach men that they 
are not to fight even although their 
chief be in danger ....'^9
The accusation is, of course, true, as Christian con­
verts generally stayed out of frontier wars. It was 
precisely this which appealed to Grey, who hoped that 
an extention of mission work would increase the numbers 19
P-154.19- Quoted in G. Brown, Personal Adventure in S.A.,
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of Xhosa who would become ’loyal' to the colony and
passive during any frontier disturbances. The
missionaries, for their part, considered it a distinct
drawback for their teaching not to have their people
20 .living on mission land. The reasons for this were
not only the practical difficulties of itinerating 
among scattered communities (at least for Methodists), 
but also the probability of the converts slipping back 
into 'heathen' ways if left without the guidance of a 
missionary among their own people.
The lifestyles of the converts living around the 
mission stations also changed radically as their 
needs altered and their material demands became more 
sophisticated. Subsistance cultivation and communal 
ownership of land was superseded by individual land 
tenure and increased agricultural production as the 
Xhosa became inextricably bound up with the colonial 
cash economy.
The reaction and resistance of the chiefs to Chris­
tianity might seem to indicate that the missionaries *
20. B . K . 9 1 : A. McDiarmid to Col. Maclean, 15 March 1859*
-72-
were having at least some success in converting large 
numbers of Xhosa. But an analysis of their converts 
prior to 1856 clearly shows that this is not true.
The largest number of converts were Mfengu and 
Gqunukhwebe who were regarded as inferior by the 
Xhosa. They were the 'social misfits' on the fron­
tier. The Xhosa proper living on the mission sta­
tions were, for the most part, refugees from their 
own society and mainly women. They had chosen to 
live on the mission stations because they were seeking 
protection for various reasons. They were young
girls escaping from forced marriages; widows who had
21fled the levirate; those accused of witchcraft and 
condemned to death.
In fact, missionaries counted their success in small 
numbers. In the annual report of Kamastone Methodist 
Mission station for 1855 it was mentioned that at only 
one of the five outstations could a class be formed, 
and that class consisted of five - one member and four 
on trial. The number in the society on the main 21
21. Levirate: the custom by which the brother or next of 
kin to a deceased man was bound under certain circum­
stances to marry the widow and raise children in the 
dead man's name.
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station at Kamastone was:
Whites 
Coloured 
On trial
95
18
7
Reports from the Free Church of Scotland stations
were little different. The Rev. John Ross noted in
his journal in March 1853 that on one Sunday he had
visited three outstations. He had twenty adult
hearers at the first station among the Mfengvj and
twelve at another. There was no gathering at the
22third, but he spoke to some individually. Once
peace returned to the frontier after the 1850-53 
War, attendance did increase, and at some services 
attendance could even be counted in the hundreds, but 
of these few were converts, and the numbers given for 
converts can seldom be taken at face value.
With this missionary record, what success did Grey 
hope the missionaries would have in the overall scheme 
of things on the frontier? And given his critical 
attitude towards the 'political1 role of the missionary 
bodies in New Zealand, why did he here place such em­
phasis on the influence for the colonial good that the 2
22. Ross papers, Gory Library, MS 3274: The Journal of 
the Rev. John Ross, March 1853.
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missionaries would gain over the Xhosa people? 
Certainly, by using missionary bodies Grey was giving 
substance to his 'philanthropic' speeches about the 
Xhosa and giving credibility to the image of a 
'Christian' governor that he was carefully fostering.
He was trusted by the missionaries who had access, 
however limited, to the^Xhosa on a non-official level 
and the missionaries were the only agents of education 
on the frontier to groups other than the whites.
Grey was practical about his use of the missionaries: 
at no time did he allow them free rein. They were 
watched closely and upbraided when considered to have 
stepped out of line. Grey was also determined to 
carry through his proposals as soon and as vigorously 
as possible and the missionaries provided an additional 
opening into Xhosa society, increasing the scope of his 
attack. The missionaries would supply a more sub­
versive and subtle approach than his resident magis­
trates, undermining Xhosa society from within, while 
he took issue with the chiefs themselves. In this 
instance, then, the missionaries could well be 
accused of opening the way for colonial advance, 
however small the opening may have been.
But most important was Grey's firm belief in the
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efficacy of education in the 'civilizing' process. He 
was sure that education would be the answer to the 
frontier problems, especially the education of the 
sons of the chiefs, and he was later to found Zonnebloem 
in Cape Town for this purpose. The missionaries were 
the best people to offer this education. Not only 
were they already established on the frontier, but their 
views (particularly those of the Scottish missionaries) 
on the importance of education in the process of civili­
zation coincided with his own. Both considered the 
extension of Western learning to be the surest way of 
breaking down tribal custom and superstition and of 
drawing the black man into the colonial society on 
various levels. They agreed on the desirability of 
destroying the tribal system, but on the 'level' of 
entry into colonial society Grey and the missionaries 
differed. Grey wished to educate the Xhosa into a 
subordinate role in colonial society, something which 
cannot be said of the missionaries,, at least until 
(perhaps) the late 1860s.
Grey was also interested in forming as large a group 
as possible of 'loyal' subjects. Education intro­
duced a new 'class' distinction in Xhosa society 
between pagan 'red' Xhosa and 'school' people. An 
educated person was willy-nilly alienated from his
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former interests and comrades, and drawn towards 
colonial society and values. He tended, therefore, 
to stand aloof from the Xhosa in times of war. Un­
fortunately for the convert, as far as the colonists 
were concerned, he was not accepted as an equal and 
at the same time was now rejected by his fellow Xhosa.
Thus, Grey saw missionary education as a means of
spreading his influence over the Xhosa a little
further, though in the wider 19th Century context,
humanitarians on the whole were convinced that the
salvation of the ’benighted' heathen in this world,
and the next, could be attained only through religious
23instruction and education. Unfortunately for the
missionaries and for the immediate success of Grey's 
plans, the schools were made the focal point of 
pressure on those aspects of traditional Xhosa culture 
which they considered most obstructive to the advance 
of Christian civilization. For this very reason the 
Xhosa as a whole rejected missionary education, and 
would continue to do so for a number of years to come.
Chiefs found 'school' people as unamenable to their
23* J.S. Galbraith, 'Myths of 'Little England' Era', in 
American Historical Review, 67(0ct. 196l),p.45»
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authority as the Christian converts, and again, the
Mfengu and Gqunukhwebe formed the main focus of the
educational efforts in the first half of the 19th
Century. They remained the hope on which the
missionaries pinned their faith for a breakthrough
among the Xhosa as a whole. The Rev. William
Govan in 1854 wrote of the Xhosa:
'Whether we look at the social position of 
these peoples just beginning to emerge from 
barbarism and in that state thrown among 
and mixed up with an energetic, progressing 
and encroaching Colonial population; or at 
their spiritual interests - the establish­
ment and advancement of the Gospel among 
themselves; or whether we advert more to 
the propagation of the Gospel through the 
great Continent of Africa, into which the 
Cape Colony forms one, and perhaps the most 
important outlet - in every view, Education 
- sound and effective Christian Education
is the great desideratum.'24 
This statement succinctly sums up the emphasis the 
missionaries placed on education. The Wesleyan 
Missionary Society went even further in recognizing 
that the Xhosa youth should be their prime target, for, 
as they said, it was only in the raising of a class of 
young persons who would be better instructed and more 
thoroughly imbued with the principles of Biblical 24
24. Church of Scotland Archive^ National Library of
Scotland, South African Papers, Acc.7548: The Rev. 
William Govan to I. Hawkins, Esq., 16 February 1854.
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truth than the adult converts, that there would be any
25hope for the future. However, in spite of Xhosa
opposition, education had, by the 1850s, more effec­
tively begun to nibble at the edges of the pre-literate 
Xhosa society than Christianity alone had, and Grey and 
the frontier missionaries might be forgiven for thinking 
that doubling the effort would bring significant numbers 
to the schools.
One of the biggest problems for the missionaries prior 
to 1854 (especially the Methodists) had been the lack 
of funds and suitable teachers. Grey’s proposal to 
provide grants to extend existing institutions and es­
tablish new ones, would mean new opportunities for the 
societies. It is, perhaps, to the credit of the Free 
Church of Scotland that their Synod did not immediately 
accept the grant. It was opposed in principal., to 
government interference in religious matters, and felt 
that it could not at the same time accept money from 
friends of the Missionary Society and from government 
authorities. The majority of the Synod, however, were 
not against the use of government aid to advance the 
secular education and well-being of their converts. ^  *26
25* Papers relative to the Wesleyan missions and the state of the heathen countries, No.CLlII (S.A. Library): Report oi 
the Wesleyan Mission Station at Salem, September 1858.
26. Church of Scotland Archives, Edinburgh, MS156-80: A. 
Somerville, Sec. to the Rev. J. Cumming, 31 May 1856.
L ovedale - t ra d e  departments
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Thus, Grey’s proviso that the grant should be used to 
establish and extend trade schools no doubt provided a 
loophole.
In the 1850s under William Govan's guidance, the curri­
culum at Lovedale followed the ’classical’ lines of 
Scottish education, and several students completed 
their education in Edinburgh. Tiyo Soga, the first 
Xhosa missionary, was a product of Lovedale. Though 
the emphasis at the Seminary was later to change, Govan 
was convinced that the Africans’ future lay in an inte­
grated society and that they should get the highest 
form of European education they could cope with. In 
other words, the Xhosa, Mfengu or any fully educated 
person should be fully assimilated into white society. 
But Grey was not interested in a classical education, 
nor in assimilation on equal terms. It was agreed 
that the education offered at Lovedale would be extended 
to include several trades, but without losing sight 
of the primary aim. Grey advanced £2 200 for building
and £600 to start waggonmaking and blacksmiths'
27departments. 27
27. Church of Scotland Archives, S.A. Papers, Acc.7548: 
Report on Foreign missions submitted to the General 
Assembly, May 1858.
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The Wesleyan Missionary Society had no major educa­
tional institution until Grey's time. Evangelism 
rather than education had been the main emphasis, 
and its men were not as highly trained as those of 
the Free Church of Scotland. The Society was given 
a donation of £3 000 from the Imperial Treasury and 
an industrial school was opened at Healdtown with the 
Rev. John Ayliff in charge. The emphasis at Heald­
town was on religion and the teaching of useful 
trades, with some basic instruction in subjects in 
the ordinary school curriculum given in the morning.
The Methodists with their educational institutions 
thus fell more in line with Grey's provisos. In 
the first year at Healdtown there was a total of 
63 pupils, both boys and girls. Projects for 1857 
included the establishment of trades such as carpenters, 
wheelwrights and blacksmiths, and, if possible, tailors 
and shoemakers. This was, as Ayliff wrote, in order
to carry out fully the 'benevolent plans of the govern­
. , 28 ment'.
Grey's financial support and encouragement led to the 28
28. WMMS, Archives, Cape Town, A80: Report of the Healdtown 
Industrial Institution, 1856.
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establishment of industrial departments not only at 
Lovedale and Healdtown, but also at Salem, Lesseyton, 
D'Urban, Shiloh and Goshen. Healdtown was estab­
lished mainly for the Mfengu as it was situated in 
Mfengu territory. Even though this group had a 
tradition of 'loyalty' to the government, they, too, 
were initially suspicious of the institution, because 
they believed that the government intended making the 
boys soldiers. However, by the end of the first 
year (1856), Ayliff was able to report that the 
Mfengu regarded Healdtown as one of the 'richest boons 
conferred upon them and their children by the govern­
ment.29 30
Ayliff was perhaps the one missionary who gave the 
Governor his full support, but with the realism of 
one long in the mission field, he was not too opti­
mistic about quick results. He ended his report
for 1856 by saying that Grey's scheme would have to
30be carried out with energy and perseverence.
The smaller schools established in other parts of 
the country had more limited aims than Lovedale and 
Healdtown.
29. Ibid.
30. My italics.
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The success of the new educational institution in pro­
moting Grey’s plans depended in the first instance on 
the missionaries and their teachers, but Grey left 
nothing to chance. He had a genuine interest in educa­
tion and children, and in testing his theories on the 
’native races’, but he had an even greater interest in 
maintaining a check on the work of the missionaries 
while keeping an eye on frontier developments. Grey 
was determined not to give the missionaries the chance 
to assume a political role or to be able to take any
31independent action in any situation which might arise.
In fact, the Free Church of Scotland Synod had been
offended by the implication that they might have any
32political objectives on the frontier. Grey visited
the schools as often as he could, listened to lessons 
and examinations, distributed prizes, talked to pupils 
and teachers, and generally tried to 'win friends and
31 . Both Grey and Maclean were determined to curtail any
’political' activity of the missionaries and were quick 
to let them know if they had. stepped out of line; cf.
B.K.90: Letter from Private Secretary's Office,
Grahamstown, 4 February 1854; B.K.90: Maclean to Birt,
draft of a letter written in 1855; B.K.91: Maclean to
Kayser, 19 December 1857* The Rev. Thomas Jenkins, 
missionary with Faku in Pondoland, was thanked by Maclean 
for his services as peace maker between Chief Umdumbi and 
the government without assuming the character of a poli­
tical agent.
32. Free Church of Scotland Archives, MS156-80: A Somerville 
to J. Cumming, 31 May 1856. The Synod instructed the 
Rev. J. Cumming to lodge a complaint, and decided against 
setting up a new station with the Thembu because of 
Grey's insinuations.
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influence people’ by distributing largesse from his 
private purse. The institutions, for their part, were 
required to submit an annual report of progress as well 
as copies of their accounts.
Whatever Grey and the missionaries had hoped, there was 
no immediate increase in the numbers of those wanting 
education. The Xhosa remained as slow to accept 
education as they had been to accept Christianity, one 
of the major problems being that the missionaries were 
not prepared to offer education without religion.
After all, one of the basic aims of missionary education 
was to enable the converts to read the Bible. It was, 
in fact, only in the 1870s and 1880s that a general 
demand for education came from the Xhosa themselves, not 
only from mission people and their connexions, but also 
from a tribal elite. In the 1880s there was a growing 
level of hostility among whites towards African educa­
tion, and a swing, even at Lovedale, towards Grey's 
notion of educating blacks for a subordinate role in 
white society. The demand from the Africans was for 
a return to the original education offered by Lovedale 
in the early years and was a response to the closer 
contact with whites in the new industrial situation
in South Africa
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Though not government spies in the conventional 
sense of the word, by the 1850s the missionaries 
had more or less been forced to accept their depen­
dence on the colonial government. Their work 
seemed, therefore, more and more to support colonial 
aims. On the frontier the missionaries were the 
link between two worlds, reluctant to relinquish ties 
with the old, or to make concessions to the new. 
Inevitably they were caught between the two. It is 
clear that the missionaries hoped that Grey's support 
would at least herald a new age of success in the 
field, but what measure of success in his terms the 
Governor himself hoped for from the missionaries and 
from the extension of the educational establishments 
is not clear. The Rev. H. Calderwood, for one, was 
convinced that Grey's use of missionary bodies as 
agents of civilization was essential to the success of
*? 'Z
his plans,^ but Ayliff, Grey's most ardent supporter,
knew that perseverence would be necessary if significant
34results were to be seen. The programme of 'civiliza­
tion' relying on missionary education would be a long, 
slow process, and Grey must have known it. Certainly,
33. H. Calderwood, Caffres and Caffre Missions, (London, 
1858), p.139.
34. See p.81.
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these long-term results would be likely to correspond to 
what Grey wanted, because the missionaries were first 
and foremost Englishmen (or Scots) with similar 
beliefs in order and good government, and Christian 
converts were notorious among the Xhosa for their 
alienation from their old loyalties. But it was the 
Mfengu who were 'government people' and the most 
likely candidates for education, and it was the Xhosa 
as a whole whom Grey wanted under his control. It 
was also clear to the missionaries that the most 
likely progress would be among the Mfengu. McDiarmid 
in a letter to Maclean mentioned that the Mfengu 
were 'desirous to stand well with the government' and 
that gentle pressure on those near the station would 
fill the schools.^
There is little doubt that the missionaries aimed 
to make 'loyal' subjects out of all of their converts. 
This aim was clearly stated by the Rev. R. Birt of 
Peelton, and could stand as a representative comment 
from nearly all the missionaries:
'... my ambition as an Englishman, as well
as a Christian teacher is, that the govern-
35* B.K.91: A. McDiarmid to Maclean, 15 March 1859*
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ment may have on this station a community 
on which it can^look with approval and 
satisfaction.'3°
So far so good. Grey would have approved. But 
there just were not that many Xhosa on the stations, 
as Grey must well have known.
The missionaries did help Grey in other, less specific, 
ways as well. In 1855 the Rev. William Shaw, 
travelling in British Kaffraria and Kaffraria Proper, 
prepared the residents for a visit from Grey and 
furnished the Governor with somewhat optimistic infor­
mation when he mentioned that the 'great numbers' of 
people under the influence and control of the mission­
aries amounted to some '10 000 souls' between the
37Mbashe and Umzimvubu Rivers. Shaw had the grace to
admit that they were not all Christians, but still 
insisted that they submitted to the missionaries.
Perhaps Grey was led astray by such optimistic accounts, 
having himself a penchant for accepting only what he 
wanted to hear. But it is this sort of exaggeration 
which could only too easily have given rise to the accusa-
36. B.K.91: The Rev. R. Birt to Maclean, 4 October I860.
37• C.O.48/367: The Rev. William Shaw to Sir George Grey, 
10 July 1855, end. to No.101, 17 July 1855.
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tion that the missionaries were followed by the 
British government, and the extravagant use of num­
bers could easily make it seem that the missionary 
work was more successful than it was.
A sober look at the facts of missionary advance on 
the frontier must have shown Grey that if it was 
quick results he was looking for, he could not rely 
too heavily on the missionaries. Education had, 
certainly, made a slow but steady advance, but the 
same could not be said for Christianity. Anthony 
Trollope, writing some twenty years after the Cattle 
Killing that was supposed to have given the mission­
aries their breakthrough, commented that the simple 
teaching of religion had never brought large numbers 
of 'natives' to 'European' habits, though he had no
doubt that European habits would bring about reli- 
3 8gion. Robert Wilmot, in 1856, expressed similar
sentiments when he suggested that missionary efforts 
had been useless and would continue to be so unless 
the Xhosa were first 'civilized'. In a pre-indus­
trial er^ Wilmot hoped the 'civilizing schemes of
38. Quoted in Schreuder, 'The Cultural Factor in 
Victorian Imperialism', p.309.
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the farmer and mechanic' would prepare the way for
39Christianity. Even Ayliff thought that much of
the resistance to him might be broken down if he
40could offer the Xhosa employment. These remarks
highlight a debate, which will be discussed more 
fully later, about religious expression in society.
The most familiar writers in this field are Durkheim 
and Max Weber. Durkheim's proposition, in general 
terms, was that religious belief synchronized with 
the network of social relations in a primitive 
society; Max Weber, on the other hand, was interested 
primarily in the ways in which different types of 
social experiences were related to different modes of 
religious expression and belief, and he believed that, 
in the Protestant Ethic, religion provided the 
rationalization for social actions.
In the final analysis the missionaries on the Cape 
eastern frontier formed just a part of Grey's pro­
gramme for pacification, but in taking any part at all, 
they laid themselves open to some of the later accusa-
39* R* Wilmot, A Cape Traveller's Diary, p.126.
4'0. C.0.48/368: Ayliff's report on Healdtown for 1855» 
Enel, to No.129 of 28 November 1855»
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tions against them. Given missionary fortunes at 
the time, it is a moot point whether they could have 
remained aloof from any government plans in the 1850s. 
In any event, they were not to play the most effec­
tive part (Grey's system of resident magistrates 
would probably have done that), nor were they to be 
the most spectacular part of the scheme (Dr. Fitz­
gerald and the new hospital at King William's Town 
were that), but by associating themselves with Grey 
in however minor a role, they linked their reputa­
tions to his in the years which followed. The 
government agents, or resident magistrates, usurped 
much of the chiefs' power; the public works pro­
gramme opened up British Kaffraria to the colonial 
military forces; the hospital attempted to show 
up 'witch doctors' as charlatans, and the granting 
of land titles was to take the place of the chief's 
delegation of communally held land. To complete 
the picture, the patchwork of European settlers in 
British Kaffraria was to act as an 'example' to the 
Xhosa - civilization by osmosis.
If the missionaries in their collaboration with Grey 
were intended only for a minor role, what then did
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Grey see as the key to his plans? Perhaps the clue 
lies in the speech he addressed to the Cape Parlia­
ment in March 1856. In making a plea for military
pensioners to assist in his defence arrangements he 
went on to say that those acquainted with 'barbarous 
tribes' knew that unless there was a force available 
sufficient to:
'... coerce and punish them if they break 
into revolt, it is almost hopeless to 
attempt to elevate and civilize them.
He continued that barbarians attribute kindness to 
fear and generosity to 'timid apprehensions'. As 
usual, one has to be careful about accepting Grey's 
words at face value, especially if he was after some­
thing - in this case, support from the Cape Parliament - 
but the thought is worth mulling over. Did Grey in­
tend to use force if necessary to carry out his re­
organization of the frontier districts? He wanted to 
extend British rule to Natal and would certainly have 
needed a force in reserve to overcome possible resistance. 
Nearer at home, and more immediately, he probably felt 
that he needed strong backing for the introduction of
41. C.0.48/373: Speech delivered by his Excellency the 
Governor at the opening of the Third Session of the 
Colonial Parliament, end. to No. 18, 14 March 1856.
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his new system of administration among the Xhosa, 
for both Maclean and Brownlee had told him to expect 
opposition. When Grey spoke of British Kaffraria 
supporting a large population, he knew that in order 
to introduce European settlers, space would have to 
be made by removing the Xhosa already living there.
Grey's actions in the first months of his governor­
ship lend weight to this theory. He early set out 
to convince the Colonial Office that troops should be 
retained at the Cape at a time when the same Colonial 
Office was hoping to reduce expenses at the Colony.
Grey did this in typical Grey fashion - by pursuing 
his cause with a doggedness which at times exasperated 
those receiving his despatches. Long before his
'chiefs' plot' was set in motion after the Cattle 
42Killing Grey had introduced the idea of a Xhosa 
'threat' to the Colony.
In January 1855» a month after arriving e.t the Cape, 
Grey reported a deathbed 'confession' of a Xhosa/Mfengu
42. See J. Peires, 'The late great plot: The official delu­
sion concerning the Cattle Killing 1856-1857', a Paper 
delivered at the biennial conference of the S.A. 
Historical Society, 17-19 January 1983* Grey maintained 
that the Cattle Killing was the result of a plot by 
Sarhili and Moshoeshoe to involve the Xhosa in a war 
with the Colony.
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4 3 .  .alliance against the Colony. Vigilance, he said,
would be necessary. In March of the same year he
/ 44again reported a possible Xhosa/Mfengu alliance.
The Colonial Office was, at first, receptive to the
suggestions, even seeing war preparations when Grey
did not. Grey reported the frontier districts to be
in a state of complete tranquility in June 1855, with
chiefs turning their attention to agriculture, but the
men in London were not satisfied, having had the seeds
of doubt sown by Grey in previous despatches. A
note on the despatch pointed out that the Ngqika could
be deceiving Grey and that the sowing of crops could
4 5just as well be a preparation for war. This was a
point forgotten by them when, a year later, it was 
frequently suggested that destroying crops was a pre­
paration for war. However, as Grey's threats of war 
turned up with monotonous regularity in the following 
despatches and changed into the 'chiefs' plot', the 
men of the Colonial Office became somewhat terse in 
their reactions, not only to his war scares, but to 
other aspects of his administration as well. Their 
comments illustrate clearly the methods used by Grey
43. C.0.48/365: Grey to Grey, No.17, 27 January 1855.
44. C.O.48/365: Grey to Grey, No.35, 7 March 1855*
45. C.0.48/366: Note on despatch No.14, 11 June 1855*
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to beat down resistance to his actions:
'Nothing can be more ingenious than the 
number of arguments Sir George Grey -
deduces from the same premises of fact.'4b
And later:
'This despatch is merely one of the running 
fire of commentary and argument which Sir 
George Grey loves to keep up ....'47
So, from the first months of his governorship, Grey
was making sure that he had a strong force available.
It will probably never be knoxvn if he intended using
it to force his plans onto the Xhosa in British
Kaffraria, but he certainly was prepared to use force
after the Cattle Killing, against Sarhili in Kaffraria
Proper as well as against several other chiefs.
Before he had time to implement his plans fully, the
Cattle Killing removed the need for coercion and left
the way open for him to 'conquer' without resistance.
To the missionaries, the Governor seemed to be in their 
terms a genuinely good man. He appeared to have the 
interests of the Xhosa sincerely at heart, spoke in
46. C.0.48/385: comment on despatch No.212, Grey to 
Labouchere, 30 December 1857*
47* C.0.48/395: comment on despatch No.82, Grey to
Lytton, 14 June 1859.
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terms which they recognized and welcomed, and 
apparently came with a sheathed sword. Because 
Grey never had to use force against the Xhosa nation 
as a whole, his image as far as the missionaries in 
South Africa were concerned was never tarnished as
it had been in New Zealand after his pacification of
4 8the South. It was only on relatively minor issues
that the aims of Grey and the missionaries in South 
Africa clashed. The missionaries, for their part, 
genuinely thought that they were doing their best for 
the Xhosa. In the mid-19th Century they were moti­
vated by a desire to give rather than take. That 
this was accompanied by a paternalistic attitude is 
more the fault of the age than of individual mission­
aries. Their aim was to spread the Good News without 
which they believed no man could attain a state of salva­
tion. Their methods would not receive 20th Century 
approval but, given their convictions, their motives for 
the most part cannot be questioned. To say that they 
paved the way for colonial advance, at this stage, is 
to attribute a greater success to their work than 
facts will allow. To absolve them, however, is not
48. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.99 ff.; George Clarke, 
Notes on Early Life in New Zealand, (Hobart, 1903), p.97.
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to deny that, given greater success, they would pro­
bably have been more effective in encouraging pre­
cisely this colonial advance. But to see it again 
in a Victorian light: the missionaries like all
'good' Englishmen (or British) of their age implicitly 
believed that the British culture was next to God and 
considered it a benefit to anyone falling under Bri­
tish administration. Together with the Gospel, they 
felt that they had a mission to carry that civiliza­
tion to those less fortunate than themselves. A 
20th Century judgement of these values would perhaps 
be too harsh.
The missionaries certainly provided a point of entry, 
though small, into some aspects of Xhosa life, and it 
remains to be seen whether or not their influence was 
to increase after the Cattle Killing. But co-opera­
tion with Grey did not always mean wholesale approval 
of all Grey’s actions. The Rev. Richard Ross noted 
in his report to the Free Church of Scotland in 
Edinburgh that he had constantly to act on the defen­
sive for ’the natives who are always being aggrieved
49by the government'; the Lovedale missionaries
49* Grey Coll., S.A. Library: Home and Foreign Record of 
the Free Church of Scotland, August 1858, p.60.
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were concerned about the rights of the Mfengu in the
Crown Reserve; and even Ayliff was troubled by some
of Grey’s measures and considered questioning a
’peremptory* instruction from the Governor not to
allow any Xhosa to enter service with Mfengu after
50 .the Cattle Killing. The letter, which m  the end
he could not bring himself to send, highlights two 
things: the first is the light in which missionaries
viewed their converts, and the second the realisation 
that it was not wise to antagonise the Governor.
Ayliff, in asking that the Xhosa be allowed to enter 
service with the Mfengu, made a plea that the Mfengu 
be regarded as British subjects with equal rights to 
their fellow colonists; and at the end of the letter 
he anxiously noted that he did not wish to appear 
troublesome, or desirous to interfere with Government 
arrangements. Perhaps Ayliff had by this time 
experienced another facet of Governor Grey's charac­
ter '<■ he demanded implicit obedience. This was 
recognized clearly by a young man well disposed towards 
Grey, who declined Grey's offer of a position as 
special magistrate in Kaffraria. Apart from the fact
50. WMMS, C.T. Archives, A80: Healdtown diaries, Ayliff 
to Southey, Government Secretary, 30 September 1857.
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that he wanted to get married, John Blades Currey 
also turned down the position because of Grey's 
attitude:
'As long as you were what he called one of 
his fish he would look after you, but he 
had more than once told me if his fish got 
into another man's pond he had done with 
them. '‘51
The missionaries could ill afford for Grey to liave done 
with them', and Ayliff in the end preferred not to send 
the letter. What is clear is that, at this early 
stage, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
missionaries deliberately plotted with Grey to sub­
jugate the Xhosa and bring them into an inferior 
relationship with the Colony. They certainly wished 
to destroy many aspects of the Xhosa social system, 
but they genuinely believed that they were offering 
something better in return.
The new schools had hardly opened their doors when 
the first signs of the Cattle Killing became evident. 
Xhosa tradition lays the blame for this tragic
51. John Blades Currey, 'Half a Century in South Africa
1850 - 1900', Phillida Brooke Simons (ed), unpublished 
manuscript in the South African Library, p.168.
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event squarely at the feet of Grey and the mission­
aries on the frontier, who both stood to gain from 
the downfall of the Xhosa nation. Because this 
tradition is still very much alive, it is important 
to take the accusations seriously and investigate 
the roles played by the missionaries and Grey in 
the Cattle Killing, and to assess what each gained 
at the end. The prophecy lasted less than a year, 
with sporadic outbreaks after the first prophecy 
ended in catastrophe, but its results were 
enormous for the Xhosa people themselves and for 
the advance of colonial influence if not for 
Christianity.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CATTLE KILLING 1856/57
The Cattle Killing which lasted for several months 
over 1856 and 1857 did more than any other single 
event to bring about the collapse of the Xhosa as 
a nation. For the next twenty years or so it 
brought the peace on the frontier that the colonists 
so eagerly sought and which would allow for the con­
solidation of the new parliamentary system at the 
Cape. It opened the way for the extension of Grey's 
frontier plans, and tradition has it that it sparked 
off an unprecedented advance of Christianity among 
the Xhosa.
Historians such as Majeke have accused Grey of 
deliberately instigating the prophecy for his own 
Machiavellian purposes. He has suggested that, in 
apportioning blame, one should be guided by the 
results, and he asks the question: who gained the 
most from the prophecy? His answer? At one stroke
N. Majeke, The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest, 
(Johannesburg 19 5 2), p.74 ff.
1 .
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Grey was given the opportunity to realise all his 
plans (or, in Marxist terms, all his labour require­
ments to build up the embryo Cape capitalist system). 
Grey was said to have been helped in his designs by 
the missionaries, in that the form in which the 
prophecy expressed itself, in Majeke's opinion, was 
the direct result of missionary teaching. His 
argument is that the desperate situation in whi.oh the 
Xhosa found themselves made them seize upon the 
elements in the Christian Gospel most likely to offer 
protection - the belief in miracles, the resurrection 
of the dead, the promise of peace and plenty after 
tribulation and sorrow. He feels that the impact of 
the white man's religion was capable of producing 
such a blind act of faith as the Cattle Killing 
demanded . Here was an appeal to the supernatural 
to which the Xhosa were all too ready to respond in 
the hopes of deliverance from the intolerable situa­
tion in which they found themselves. Mutwa, a Zulu 
historian, takes the argument further by claiming 
that the concept of the resurrection had never entered
the minds of the Xhosa at any previous stage in their 
2 ,history. According to Mutwa, it was the part of 2
2. Quoted in E. Moorcroft, 'Theories of Millenarianism
considered with reference to certain southern African 
movements', (unpub. B.Litt. thesis, Oxford 1967), p.69.
- 101 -
Nongqawuse's message that chiefs would rise up from 
their graves which most caught the imagination of the 
people, as did the figures which appeared to her in the 
reeds who were obviously physical but from their 
graves.
The belief that Grey deliberately destroyed the Xhosa 
through the prophecy of Nongqawuse and Mhlakaza is 
still strong among them, and because of this, it 
cannot be dismissed out of hand. The most specific 
accusation the writer came across was that Grey 
actually drugged Nongqawuse to induce the visions 
because he knew that the Xhosa were a superstitious 
people and would be likely to believe her. The fact 
that Nongqawuse was afterwards given colonial protec­
tion and that Grey did not really do all he could to
stop the progress of the Cattle Killing is also
3offered as proof of culpability. This oral tradi­
tion deserves perhaps a moment's consideration when 
one realises that Grey was reportedly constantly in 
pain from wounds sustained as a young man in Australia 
and that he supposedly relied heavily on drugs (lauda- 3
3. Informant was a graduate of the University of Fort 
Hare.
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num) for relief. Rutherford treats the suggestion
. 4that Grey might have been a drug addict with caution , 
but mentions a certain amount of evidence in favour 
of the opinion. His moods fluctuated rapidly 
between depression and elation and he made a highly 
suggestive remark when he reportedly said that, when 
one felt downhearted, a little medicine would always
5set you right. There is, however, no positive 
confirmation that Grey was a drug addict, though his 
behaviour might, at times, lend credence to the 
suggestion.
In the light of these accusation the roles of Grey 
and the missionaries in the Cattle Killing crisis 
justify investigation, as does the assertion that 
the prophecy reflected Christian teaching rather than 
traditional practices.
As the main features of the Cattle Killing are generally 
well-known, it will be necessary only to give a broad 
outline. Nongqawuse, a young initiate, was visited 
by messengers claiming to be from the ancestors. 45
4. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.vi.
5. Quoted in J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.573.
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They appeared in the reeds of a river pool when she 
went to draw water. She was directed to call her 
•uncle, Mhlakaza, who was senior prophet to the para­
mount chief, Sarhili, of the eastern senior branch of 
the Xhosa. The Xhosa, through Mhlakaza, were 
directed to sacrifice all their cattle and destroy 
their crops and, on an appointed day, a whirlwind 
would then drive the English and unbelievers into 
the sea, new and healthy herds of cattle would re­
place those killed, and grain would fill the newly 
prepared grain pits. Old people would be made 
young again and ancestors would arise. Help was 
to be expected from the Russians who had been 
fighting the English in the Crimea and who were 
believed to be black warriors, and the Xhosa would 
be restored to their former power and to their 
lands.
Although the Cattle Killing is generally considered 
to have started in about June 1856 among Sarhili’s 
people in Kaffraria Proper across the Kei, there 
were indications as early as February 1856 that some­
thing was afoot in British Kaffraria just beyond the 
colonial frontier. In that month Grey was raising one 
of his periodic 'war scares' by emphasizing fears of a com-
-1 04-
bination of Xhosa, Mfengu and Khoi. As evidence of
this, he quoted Lt. Gen. Jackson's report that the
Xhosa denied that they had ever been conquered.^
Rather than being a pointer to the war-like designs
of the Xhosa, this could well have been the first
stirrings of the prophecy that would soon gain such
force. In March 1856, while Grey was reporting
that the Xhosa seemed to have accepted his special
magistrates, rumours were rife among the chiefdoms
of British Kaffraria that the Russians were defeating
7the English m  war. '
Lt. Gen. Jackson, who was immediately in command of 
frontier defences, also had a penchant for war scares. 
In April 1856 he took up the oft-repeated fear that 
a war was brewing on the frontier and cited as evi­
dence a belief among the Xhosa that 'Lynx, Gaika and 
Umlangeni', their old prophets and paramount, were
fixating for the Russians and that the Russians were
ftblack warriors who had died in frontier wars.' In
6. C.0.48/372: Sir G. Grey to the Rt.Hon. G.Grey, Bart., 
No.8, 8 February 1856.
7. C.0.48/373: Grey to Labouchere, No.12 (High Commi­
ssioner), 22 March 1856.
8. Ibid. Lt. Gen. Jackson to Grey, Encl.1 to No.32,
15 April 1856.
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reality Jackson had thereby, unwittingly, reported the
beginnings of the prophecy. In a further enclosure
to the same despatch Walter Currie reported a similar
rumour of the resurrection of warriors and great men
who were on their way to join their respective chief- 
odoms.' In June Jackson was again harping on the
threat of war and supporting it with the news that
the Xhosa believed that Britain had been defeated in
the Crimean War and were now expecting the Russians
to come to their aid. He also reported that Phato1s
people were not cultivating and were killing their
cattle every day, and that a rumour was spreading
that a number of men had arrived from beyond the
1 0seas and that Moshoeshoe had begun to fight. In
an elaborately worked out explanation of the crisis 
Grey later accused Moshoeshoe of planning an attack 
on the Colony in conjunction with Sarhili.
It is generally accepted that the Cattle Killing 
originated with Nongqawuse and Mhlakaza, but accord­
ing to these earlier reports, similar beliefs were
9. Ibid. Enel.8, 19 April 1856.
10. C.0.48/374^ Grey to Labouchere, No.50, 6 June 1856; 
also end. to No. 50, Fort Beaufort, 3 May 1 856.
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rife in British Kaffraria some time before the great 
prophecy. Unless Nongqawuse's prophecy began earlier 
than has been thought, it seems that she probably 
drew on rumours already circulating on the frontier. 
This view is corroborated by the missionary John Ross, 
stationed at Pirie in British Kaffraria, when he wrote 
in November 1856 that the ’delusion' had started some 
six months previously when several of those 'people 
who peep and mutter gave out various and diverse
• t 11sayings'.
In June 1 856 Grey x^ as on the frontier arranging for 
arrival of his German military settlers. Whether one 
accepts that the prophecy began in the early months of 
1856, or in June with Nongqawuse, it was in any event 
in full swing while Grey was visiting the frontier 
districts. Yet Grey did not mention it to the 
Colonial Secretary until 16 August, the first date 
set for the fulfilment of the prophecy. By this time 
he had already decided that it was a plot against the 
Colony hatched by Sarhili and Moshoeshoe and that his 
response would be to take up a defensive position. 1
11. Cory Library MS3236: The Rev. John Ross to Alex 
Thomson Esq., 24 November 1856.
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The question that needs answering is why he took so 
long to report the prophecy and, indeed, why he had 
done so little at that stage to stop it. Officially, 
Grey maintained that Mhlakaza was a tool in the hands 
of Sarhili who was using him to work on the supersti­
tion and ignorance of the common people to drive them 
1 2to war. There is, however, some reason to believe
that Grey did not really believe in Sarhili's guilt 
and with the help of Col. Maclean fabricated the
13evidence against the chief to suit his own purposes. 
This brings us back to the origins of the prophecy:
Grey blamed Sarhili; and the Xhosa blame Grey. Where 
did the truth lie?
As far as Grey is concerned two issues are relevant: 
first, did Grey engineer the prophecy; and, second, 
given the fact of the prophecy, did he do everything in 
his power to stop it? By June 1856 when Grey was on 
the frontier, the prophecy was centred around Nongqa­
wuse and the pool in Kaffraria Proper (i.e. beyond 
the Kei River and, therefore, beyond formal 
colonial influence). In February of that
12. Br♦Pari.Papers XL of 1857/8 (2352), p.15: Grey to 
Labouchere, No. 4, 21 August 1856.
13. see J. Peires, 'The Late Great Plot', passim.
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year, when the first stirrings of the prophecy were 
felt in British Kaffraria, Grey was in Cape Town.
He had contacts in Kaffraria Proper through mission­
aries and traders, but there is, as yet, no evidence 
that he himself visited the area during the time of 
the Cattle Killing. The actual logistics involved 
in organising such a fraud, either personally or 
through subordinates, would have been enormous and 
there would have been a good chance of the secret 
leaking out. That it has not leads to the 
necessity of a verdict of 'not proven' against 
Grey. But because of the lack of concrete evidence 
either way, the case cannot be closed.
The next question to be asked is: did Grey really 
want to try to stop the Cattle Killing? Historians, 
both sympathetic and antagonistic towards Gre^ have agreed 
on one point: that the Governor did what he could to 
try to halt the spread of the prophecy and thereby 
stop the sacrifice of cattle. But closer examination 
of the facts leaves several questions unanswered. Two 
months elapsed before he officially reported the pro­
phecy to the Colonial Office, and the date of his 
despatch was that of the expected fulfilment of the 
prophecy. In this despatch Grey maintained that every
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measure was being taken to encourage the chiefs of 
British Kaffraria in their opposition to Mhlakaza's 
message. Yet no attempt was made to visit Kaffraria 
Proper. As the heart of the prophecy lay there with 
Sarhili, it would surely have been more effective to 
tackle the problem at its source?
An investigation of Grey's measures in fact shows them 
to have been more 'defensive' than 'offensive'. He 
ordered grain to be stored against the famine which 
he knew would come, and he planned employment for the 
Xhosa in the colony when the excitement had died down. 
He also placed the Colony in a state of military 
preparedness. All these actions point to the fact 
that he was not only not expecting an early end to 
the Cattle Killing, but was aware of what it would 
mean to the Xhosa in terms of famine, and was pre­
pared to allow it to run its course in order, if 
possible, to bring the Xhosa to their knees. Grey 
explained his defensive stance as a measure to avoid 
provoking war, and this excuse was used successfully 
throughout the crisis to explain his lack of any posi­
tive action. Given the strength of the Xhosa belief
14
14« C.0.48/376: Grey to Labouchere, No.76, 16 August 1856.
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in Mhlakaza, perhaps Grey could not have effectively 
halted the Cattle Killing, but it does seem that he 
made little honest effort to do so.
Grey's actions and instructions during the months of
the Cattle Killing give weight to this suggestion.
Magistrates with the chiefs were instructed to do
what they could to halt the prophecy, yet Grey kept
tight control of their actions and sharply reprimanded
anyone who appeared to be taking any independent
action. Charles Brownlee, Ngqika Commissioner, rode
tirelessly among the Xhosa to urge them to forsake
Mhlakaza and to insist that the prophecy would never
be fulfilled, but when he wanted to visit Sarhili,
and begged Grey to return to the frontier, the
Governor's reply was terse: Brownlee was to stay at
1 5his post and obey Maclean's orders implicitly. '
Brownlee had been convinced that if chief Sandile
visited Sarhili with him, it would strengthen the
resolve of those who were wavering to stand firm against
the prophecy, and it would afford Sarhili the oppor-
16tunity of undoing what he had so far done. Maclean
15. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.352.
16. Br.Pari.Papers XL of 1857/8 (2352), p.23: Brownlee to 
Maclean, 18 August 1856, sub-encl.2 in Enel, in No.6, 
27 August 1856.
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himself was not spared Grey's displeasure when it
became known that he had communicated with Sarhili
17without the Governor's permission.
Grey did visit several of the chiefs in British
Kaffraria, but not Sarhili beyond the Kei; letters
only were sent to the latter to warn him against
Mhlakaza and against contact with Moshoeshoe, but
any personal contact was actively discourage. .
Grey early warned Sarhili that he would hold him
personally responsible for any disturbances on the
frontier and would punish him accordingly. He
further warned Sarhili that he would make a better
enemy than he had friend if he were forced to take
action against the chief - a fact he was to prove 
1 8later. Had Grey truly wanted to end the prophecy,
a visit to Sarhili would have been the logical action 
to have taken. It therefore seems that the Governor's 
'defensive' policy was little more than 'letting the 
situation develop' before moving in to reap whatever 
advantages were offered. In fact, Grey and Maclean
18. Br.Pari.Papers XL of 1857/8 (2352), p.30: Grey to
Sarhili, 27 September 1856, end.7 in No. 8, 27 Septem­
ber 1856.
17* J* Rutherford, Sir George G r e y , p.352.
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made no secret of their desire to use the prophecy to
encourage fission among the Xhosa chiefdoms, with the
former actually wanting to give the chiefs who defied
him every opportunity to discredit themselves in the
eyes of their people and to deplete their resources
1 9before he intervened.
Rather than preventing the chiefs from following 
Mhlakaza, the presence of the special magistrates 
with the chiefs encouraged the divisions, and in 
some instances actually contributed to the spread 
of the prophecy when the Xhosa who were not parti­
cipating in the Cattle Killing were urged to buy 
cattle and corn from those who were. Much more 
time and effort was spent in stockpiling food and in 
preparing for the coming famine than in taking posi­
tive steps to halt the prophecy. Magistrates were 
instructed by Grey to offer unbelieving chiefs and 
counsellors advance payments of their pensions to
invest in stock and seed as well as to buy as much
20as possible from the people of Kaffraria Proper.
20. Br. Pari. Papers XL of 1857/8 (2352), p.16: Maclean to
Grey, 18 August 1856, encl.1 in No. 4j 21 August 1856.
19» J* Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.359*
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These actions divided the believers from un-believers
and made the latter more firmly dependent on the
21colonial government.
Maclean also recognised that the presence of magis­
trates at times encouraged undecided chiefs to join
22the believers, but made no effort to remedy the 
situation. Grey seems thus to have viewed the Cattle 
Killing as an unlooked-for opportunity to advance his 
plans for the frontier, and he was not going to lose 
it. Ke hoped to step in at the last moment, ’philan- 
thropically’, to save a destitute nation from famine 
and thereby discredit the chiefs and draw the majority 
of the Xhosa into a closer relationship with the 
government. He repeatedly emphasized the danger of 
war, but it does not appear that he really did believe 
that full-scale war would break out. This was cer­
tainly true in September 1856 when Grey talked with 
the principal chiefs in British Kaffraria. He wrote 
to Labouchere:
'I have now visited personally the location 
of each of the principal chiefs, and have 
seen and conversed with all the leading
21. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.357.
22. B.K.14: Barrington to Maclean, 20 June 1857.
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natives in the country. I have been every­
where received with respect and considera­
tion .... I have failed, after the most care­
ful observation, to detect ... any hostile 
intentions on their part.'23
Charles Brownlee had also been unable to discover any 
such intentions in the movement. In fact, he felt 
that the killing was wholly confined to the chief- 
doms which had the least reason for war. He thought 
that Sarhili might be planning a war, but if so, that 
he had little hope of success as wars were not usually 
fought in seasons of scarcity. Should faming ensue, 
then, Brownlee felt, the Xhosa were much more likely
24to want to take service in the Colony than to fight.
This, of course, is exactly what Grey was hoping for.
He seemed so determined to maintain a low profile in 
the crisis that he spent the months of increased 
killing and growing tension (October 1856 - January 1857) 
in Cape Town and not in the troubled area where one 
would have thought his presence would have been 
essential.
23. Br.Pari.Papers XL of 1857/8 (2352), p.24: Grey to 
Labouchere, No. 7, 20 September 1856.
24. Ibid, p.13: Brownlee to Maclean, 2 August 1856, 
sub-encl. 6 in end. 2, No. 2, 16 August 1856.
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Though the Governor kept a close watch over the
actions of his magistrates, one of them was given a
relatively free hand in his dealings with the Xhosa.
This was Major Gawler, the hated special magistrate
with Mhala. For personal reasons (Mhala had got the
better of Gawler on several occasions), the magistrate
was determined to destroy Mhala and virtually organized
25a revolution among the chief's people. * Not sur­
prisingly, this received the approval of Grey and 
Maclean, which hardly makes it less surprising that 
Gawler was so disliked by the chief. This latter 
fact must have been generally known, as Sophy Gray, 
wife of the Bishop of Cape Town, in 1856 expressed 
anxiety for the safety of Mrs. Gawler and was of
the opinion that the Gawlers had treated Mhala
2 6haughtily and unkindly. All things considered, it
must surely be said that Grey's actions in the months 
of the Cattle Killing encouraged, rather than slowed, 
the progress of the prophecy.
Although the missionary bodies had been given a special
26. T. Gutsche, The Bishop's Lady. (Howard Timmins, 
Cape Town, 1970), p.159*
25* J* Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.357.
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place in Grey's frontier plans, he did not particu­
larly need them at this point. He had a widespread 
system of intelligence operating to keep him informed 
of the progress of the prophecy, but this relied more 
on magistrates, and in Kaffraria Proper on a trader, 
Crouch, than on individual missionaries, though they
did occasionally supply Col. Maclean with informa-
27tion about their areas. But Grey did foresee a
role for them once the prophecy had taken its toll 
and therefore included them in his plans to combat 
the envisaged famine. Mission stations were given 
special assistance in the form of money and supplies 
of seed corn to stimulate food production, and the 
construction of village 'out-schools' was subsidized 
with a view to their being used as relief-centres for 
the Xhosa children. The mission stations were also 
to care for orphans and the children of Xhosa who 
sought work in the Colony. As far as possible, the 
missionaries attempted to carry on as normal, though 
the disturbed state of the country sometimes made it 
difficult to visit the outstations. *3
27. Br.Pari.Papers XL of 1857/8 (2352),p.48: Ayliff to
Maclean, 11 October 1856, end.2 to No.14, 20 October 
1856; Ibid. p.35: Birt to Grey, 3 October 1856, end.
3 to No.11, 3 October 1856.
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Rather than having engineered the Cattle Killing, the 
missionaries expressed their general sentiment towards 
it in their writings in the form of bewilderment.
They were at a complete loss to understand the pheno­
menon, and it seemed inexplicable that a ’shrewd* people 
like the Xhosa could reject the Gospel and yet accept 
Mhlakaza*s prophecy. Ayliff described the prophecy 
as 'absurd nonsense' and could not comprehend how the
Xhosa could believe something which was leading to
28their own destruction. John Ross thought the
29Xhosa 'poor dupes’. ' The prophecy was even regarded
as the work of Providence (not that of the missionaries),
and God's 'set time to favour the race' by humbling the
30Xhosa and making them receptive to Christianity. In 
an appreciation of the situation which is astounding 
to the 20th Century mind William Holden of the Metho­
dist Missionary Society wrote:
'God has turned the Counsel of Ahitophel into 
foolishness; so that that which we could not 
accomplish by our troops ... He has accom­
plished by the breath of his mouth; destroy­
ing them (the Xhosa) without hands making 
their own delusion and wickedness the instru­
ments by which he has inflicted self-chastise-
28. Grey Coll.G.33«c.14’ Wesleyan Miss. Notices, 25 November 
1857, Henry Dugmore's report of 18 July 1857; Healdtown 
Journal, 7 January 1857.
29* Cory Library, MS3236: The Rev. John Ross to Alex Thomson 
Esq., 24 November 1856.
30. The S.A. Evangelical Magazine and Church of England 
Recorder, March 1858.
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ment upon them.'31
While it is difficult for us to accept these senti­
ments, they were then generally expressed, and there 
is little reason to doubt that they were sincerely 
expressed. The work of the missionaries has been 
criticized with 20th Century hindsight, and, indeed, 
many of their actions appear to have been misguided, 
but it is difficult to question the sincerity of 
their religious motives. Certainly many expressed 
the hope that ultimate good (in their terms) would
come of the movement and that the Xhosa would be moved
32to receive the Gospel. Only Charles Brownlee came
close to understanding why the Xhosa were acting as
they were when he noted that the Xhosa 'have always re-
33garded their chief doctors as inspired' and, thus, 
that it was not really surprising that they believed 
in Mhlakaza's prophecy.
During the months of mounting crisis the missionaries 
were, therefore, superfluous to Grey's plans. His 
system of magistrates gave him the information and, 
more important, the control he wanted, and the
31. WMMS Archives, SOAS, S.A.XXIV, Kaffraria File 1858: 
William Holden to the Gen. Secretaries, 13 January 1858.
32. Cape Town Archives, A80: Healdtown Journal, 7 January 
1857.
33* Br.Pari.Papers XL of 1857/8 (2352), p.13: Brownlee to
Maclean, 2 August 1856, sub-encl. 6 in end. 2 in No. 2, 
16 August 1856.
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missionaries were used only when it suited him.
Apart from the Governor’s plans, the missionaries 
did what they could to help the situation, and 
their stations became places of refuge for unbe­
lievers - on one occasion even for the cattle of the
Ngqika chief, Sandile, during one of his bouts of in-
34decision about the truth of the prophecy. The
missionaries also encouraged extensive cultivation to
help relieve the coming famine, but in some cases the
knowledge that their work was directed towards feeding
the believers led the mission Africans to show some re­
. 35luctance over planting too much. The missionaries
themselves, however, felt that they had made a signifi­
cant contribution towards checking the spread of the 
prophecy' and claimed that it was the knowledge of 
the Gospel which had exposed the folly of Mhlakaza's 
words to unbelievers. This claim may have been 
valid for their own mission converts, but not for all 
those who refused to follow the prophet. There was 
a significant number of pagan Xhosa who refused to
34. Br.Pari.Papers XL of 1857/8 (2352), p.18: Brownlee to
Maclean, 16 August 1856, sub-encl.2 in No.4>21 August 1856
35* Cory Library, MS3236: The Rev. John Ross to Alex 
Thomson, Esq., 24 November 1856.
36. WMMS, SOAS, Box 336: Methodist Missionary Society 
Report for Annshaw, 1856.
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kill their cattle. Kama and Siwani stood firm
against the prophecy, and Siwani was supported by
a number of his chief counsellors. In both cases,
though, followers living some distance from the
37chiefs took part in the Cattle Killing. Although
chiefs Maqoma and Botomane followed Mhlakaza, cattle
and goats brought down by the Gcaleka were bought
5^8by their people.' Chief Toise remained steadfast 
against the prophecy, and chief Oba was particularly 
opposed to Mhlakaza and^  although a number of his 
followers joined in the killing, more of his people 
than any others supported their chief’s stand.
A number of Sandile’s older counsellors took a firm 
stand against the call from Sarhili to join the 
sacrifice, chief among them being Anta, the half­
brother of Sandile. He took the opportunity afforded 
by the confusion over the prophecy to disassociate him­
self from Sandile and attempt to set himself up as an
39independent chief under government protection.‘ ' Mhala
37. Br. Pari. Papers XL of 1857/8 (2352), p.7: Brownlee to 
Maclean, 30 July 1856, sub-encl.1. in encl.1 in No.2, 
16 August 1856.
38. Ibid, p.8: H. Lucas to Maclean, 1 August 1856, sub- 
encl.2 in encl.1 in No.2, 16 August 1856.
39. Ibid, p.20: R. Robertson to Maclean, 20 August 1856, 
sub-encl. in encl.1 in No.5, 25 August 1856.
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who finally joined the Cattle Killing, was not supported
by one of his chief counsellors. The Ndlambe were
divided in their support for the prophet, as were the
Thembu. In October 1856 Grey gave the list of chiefs
who were cultivating and, therefore, resisting the call
of Mhlakaza as Anta, Oba, Kona, Namba, Kama, Siwani,
Tshatshu and Toise. All were supported by several of
40their followers.
Overall, it must be conceded that there is little 
concrete evidence to prove that either Grey or the 
missionaries deliberately plotted the Cattle Killing, 
and certainly the latter had little hand in helping 
the prophecy along. But, going beyond this, Majeke 
has argued that the prophecy was directly influenced 
by Christian teachings, and Mutwa goes so far as to 
claim that the aspects of Christian teaching found in 
the prophecy, such as the resurrection of the ances­
tors, were never before present in the Xhosa tradition.
This brings us to the next point: if the Cattle 
Killing was not the work of Grey, what then were the 
origins? Grey, with the help of Colonel Maclean,
40. Ibid. p.49: Grey to Labouchere, No.15> 23 October 1856.
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worked out an elaborate case for the Cattle Killing
having been a ’chiefs' plot' -• the brainchild of
Sarhili and Moshoeshoe in an attempt to force the
Xhosa to attack the Colony. This is denied by
Majeke, and even more vigorously denied by J. Peires
in his paper attempting to expose the 'official de-
41lusion concerning the Cattle Killing', and there 
is no reason to doubt this conclusion. Peires main­
tains that the Xhosa had never thought of making war 
on the Colony, and this view was certainly corroborated 
by Maclean himself in August 1856, though the Chief 
Commissioner was to forget it later when he was com­
piling evidence against Sarhili for Grey. He wrote 
at the time that the Xhosa were waiting for something 
to happen, rather than expecting to make something
happen, and that the war-like rumours had all come
42from European sources. This inadvertantly backs
up the theory put forward by E. Moorcroft, that the
Cattle Killing was a millenarian movement and, as
such, was sincerely believed in by the Xhosa who
43followed the prophet.
41. J* Peires, 'The Late Great Plot', passim.
42. C.0.48/376: Maclean to W.F. Liddle, Esq., end. 1 in 
No.76, 4 August 1856.
43. E. Moorcroft, 'Theories of Millenarianism', passim.
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In fact, the Cattle Killing was not the first prophetic 
movement in the Eastern Cape with millenarian over­
tones. Nxele (Makana) in 1819 led a Xhosa attack 
against the Colony with promises that the colonial 
bullets would turn to water. His prophetic tradition 
ran through Mlanjeni to Nongqawuse. On close exami­
nation it would indeed seem that the Cattle Killing 
bears a close relation to other millenarian movements.
The early studies of the phenomenon of millenarianism
44have dealt largely with the Melanesian Cargo Cults
and the famous Ghost Dance of the Indians of the
45 -American North-west. ' Later, Norman Cohn investi­
gated the European millenarian movements that first 
arose in the Middle Ages and found that they appeared 
among the dispossessed and, particularly, among
people who had no recognised secular means of asserting
46their claims and pursuing their interests. Many of
the manifestations of millenarianism have been found
44* By performing certain rites a 'cargo' would arrive 
generally by steamer but later by aeroplane. The 
cargo was to consist of all the most desired 
European goods, not for the white man who would 
soon disappear, but for the Islanders.
45* The prophet of the ghost dance preached that if the 
proper ritual., which included a dance, was performed, 
then the Europeans would vanish, the ancestors would 
be resurrected and the buffalo would return.
46. L. Mair, An introduction to Social Anthropology,
( o . u . p .  1965),  p . 2 25 .
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in territories under colonial rule and, significantly, 
the destruction of the oppressors has had an impor­
tant part to play in such manifestations. During 
the early stages of the Cattle Killing prophecies 
foretold the destruction of the English by a whirl­
wind. It is interesting to note that the Dutch 
colonists were not included. In 1856 the British 
were not only the masters of the Cape, but their 
arrival had initiated 'total war' against the 
Xhosa in 1811, a situation unknown when the Cape 
was under Dutch administration and the frontier dis­
tricts were, to a large extent, left to work out an
existence, and, of necessity, a co-existence for 
47themselves. This was a time when the frontier was
48'open' and when there was a measure of political 
and social fluidity and a greater mobility of peoples. 
Very little formal control was exercised over the area 
at that stage, and a certain amount of racial co-opera­
tion was found. Indeed, Monica Wilson has made out a 
strong case in the Oxford History for the frontier 
situation producing co-operation between white, Xhosa
47• J.B. Peires, 'Nxele, Ntsikana and the origins of the
Xhosa Religious Reaction', Journal of African History,
20,1(1979), p.53. '
48, H. Giliomee, 'The S.A. Frontier: A theoretical framework'. 
(unpublished), pp.5-7»
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and Khoi on the Cape eastern boundary. -
From 1811 the boundary of the Colony was thrust in­
exorably eastwards, thereby depriving the Xhosa of 
land and tending towards a ’closed' frontier along 
which the freedom of action possessed by the fron­
tiersmen of both sides of the border gradually dis­
appeared. John Galbraith has also described this
region as a 'turbulent frontier', as,the boundaries
50were almost perpetually disturbed. He points out
that this type of frontier acted as an irresistible 
magnet to the extension of white power. Such a 
situation of cumulative coercive control could clearly 
give rise to a millenarian movement where a sense of 
oppression is an important element. The essence of 
millenarian beliefs is that a perfect state of the 
world is about to be brought into existence by some 
miraculous event. The event itself depends on the 
performance of appropriate rituals, and when it 
happens^ those who have performed the rituals will enjoy 
the perfect world, while the people who, by refusing
49
49* M. Wilson, ' CoT-operation and Conflict: The Eastern
Cape Frontier', in Oxford History of S.A. (O.TJ.P. 1971). 
p.233 ff.
50. J.S. Galbraith, 'The Turbulent Frontier as a Factor in 
British expansion', Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, II, 1959-60. ’
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to do so, have delayed its coming, will be destroyed.
As the Cattle Killing progressed and the first date 
set for fulfilment passed, the unbelieving Xhosa were 
included among those who were to be swept into the 
sea. Often the new age includes the return to life 
of those who are already dead, as was to happen in 
this case, and the myth is activated when a prophet 
appears with a message that the promised time is as 
hand.^
The weakness in Majeke's and Mutwa*s theories about 
the Cattle Killing is their belief in the extent to 
which the movement was influenced by 'foreign' - 
Christian - teachings and by the statement that these 
elements had never before entered the minds of the 
Xhosa. E. Moorcroft has pointed out that as early 
as 1814 a prophet near van der Kemp's mission station 
had attempted to raise the dead. J. Peires in his 
paper on 'The Late Great Plot' agrees with Majeke that 
the idea of the resurrection was taken directly from 
the Christian religion and further maintains that the
51. L. Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology, p.225
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traditional Xhosa cosmology had no place for the white 
man, or a formula for dealing with the threat posed, 
and so looked for the solution to that threat among 
the white man's beliefs. Moorcroft, on the other 
hand, believes that the Cattle Killing was a tradi­
tional response on a national scale to propitiate the 
ancestors and restore the old world order. Faced with 
these contradictory viewpoints, the investigator will 
find it both relevant and profitable to assess, even 
briefly, the extent to which the Cattle Killing pro­
phecy relied on traditional beliefs and rituals and 
thereby reflected the traditional Xhosa cosmology.
The belief system of the Cape Nguni, to which the
Xhosa belong, can be divided into four domains: those
of the Supreme Being (a very loose belief), the ances-
52tral shades, the River People, and of the witches.
The ancestral shades (or spirits of the ancestors) 
were the effective spirits in the Cape Nguni world 
view and were believed to be able to affect the living 
directly. In accordance with their beliefs, the 
Xhosa explained their existing misfortunes in terms of
52. Most of the information about Xhosa beliefs is from W.D. 
Hammond-Tooke, 'The symbolic structure of the Cape 
Nguni Cosmology' in M.G. Whisson & M. West (eds), Rejig? 
ion and Social Change in Southern Africa, (David Philip,
C.T., 1974), p. 1 5 ff.
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alienation from their ancestors, who communicated with
them through dreams. Such visitations were usually
occasioned by a neglect of a custom. The cosmological
system of the Xhosa included a strong interest in the
explanation of and dealing with misfortune. As the
ancestral shades were the prime cause of misfortune,
it was they who needed to be propitiated. If the
cause of the misfortune was not clear, the people
53turned to the priest-diviner' for an explanation.
In fact, Mhlakaza was the priest-diviner of the 
senior Xhosa chiefdom, the Gcaleka, which in turn made 
him senior priest-diviner of the entire Xh.osa nation. 
Because the entire nation was now in distress, it was 
obvious that the national ancestors had been offended.
As national priest-diviner, Mhlakaza had the responsi­
bility of advising on the action to be taken.
Among the Xhosa, men and cattle lived in a symbiotic 
relationship, and the latter were regarded as the 
appropriate blood sacrifice to the ancestors. The 
goat, the other traditional domestic animal, was also 
an acceptable offering, but not horses or poultry, which
53» A term used by Moorcroft in preference to ’witchdoctor*.
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even now have not been incorporated into the symbolic
system. It is, therefore, significant that during the
Cattle Killing the ancestors demanded the sacrifice of
cattle and goats - and a pathetic irony that in his
attempt to assemble proof of Sarhili's intent to
cause a war, Maclean used as part of his evidence the
54fact that horses had not been killed.' Had he but 
known it, Maclean was offering confirmation of Sarhili’s 
'innocence'.
That group of beings called the 'people of the river' 
are believed to live in the deep pools of certain water 
courses, where they have beautiful homesteads and keep 
dark-coloured herds of cattle. Although they are not 
generally regarded as official ancestors, some Xhosa 
groups equate the River People with their forebears. The 
River People can be both baleful and benevolent and are 
intimately connected with the initiation of diviners. It 
was not surprising, then, that such people should appear 
to Nongqawuse, who was herself an initiate diviner. And 
at certain times during the prophecy herds of cattle were 
allegedly heard lowing beneath the water in the pool and 
waiting to rise. Thus, it is possible that it was the 
cattle of the River People which were to have arrived
54. B.K.373: Maclean to Grey, 25 March 1857; J. Peires,
'The Late Great Plot'.
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with the resurrected ancestors to replace the diseased 
herds of the Xhosa.
Rather than relying on Christian beliefs to deal with 
the new situation, the prophecy seems to have incor­
porated a good deal more of the traditional Xhosa 
rituals and to have leaned more heavily on their tradi­
tional world view. What 'foreign' elements there were 
bore close resemblance to other millenarian movements 
and were not on that account particularly remarkable.
It has also been pointed out that the idea of the 
resurrection was not a new one. That the Xhosa should 
have appealed to their ancestors in the situation in 
which they found themselves was also not surprising. 
Indeed, that they should have sacrificed their cattle was 
not unusual. But what was surprising was the extent of 
the slaughter. There was one contemporary witness of 
the Cattle Killing who unwittingly gives weight to the 
'traditional' argument. F. Reeve, special magistrate 
stationed at Middle Drift, actually used the word
'sacrifice' when he reported that the Xhosa there were
55killing their cattle in defiance of Kama's orders.
55• C.0.48/376: F. Reeve to Maclean, 2 August 1856, end. 
to No. 76j 16 August 1856.
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The death toll resulting from the Cattle Killing was 
formidable. The official census returns of British 
Kaffraria showed a decrease in the black population 
of both sexes and all ages between 1 January and 31 
July 1857 from 104 721 to 37 229- This was m  the 
territory adjoining the Colony which had King William's 
Town as a substantial administrative centre where food 
was supplied to some 29 000 people. The death rate 
must have been far greater in Gcaleka and Thembu 
countries. Mrs Brownlee, wife of the Ngika Commi­
ssioner, has left an eye-witness account of the distress 
after the failure of the prophecy:
'Those who reached us were most pitiable 
figures, breathing skeletons, with hollow 
eyes and parched lips. The innocent 
children looked like old men and women in 
miniature, some only a few days old. Day 
after day, day after day, as these spectres 
came in crowds and crawled along, one might 
have imagined that the prophet's prediction 
had come to pass, and the dead had indeed 
risen from their graves.*57
Thousands fled to the Colony in search of work, where the
56. G.M. Theal, A History of S.A. from 1795 to 1872, Vol.III 
(Vol.VII of the series), (Allen & Unwin, 1904), p.206.
57• C. Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History,
(Killie Campbell Africana Library Reprint Series - Univ. 
of Natal Press), p.137*
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farmers were only too eager to employ them. A table 
of Xhosa registered and sent into the Cape from 1 Jan­
uary to 31 July 1857 shows that 19 239 men, women and
COchildren entered service in the Colony. Mhlakaza
died of starvation. Nongqawuse fled across the 
Mbashe River. In March 1858 she was handed over to 
Major Gawler by the Bomvana chief Moni. She was sent 
into the Colony, where she afterwards lived, but apart 
from making a brief statement to Colonel Maclean, 
could never be induced to speak of the Cattle Killing.
Government measures alone were insufficient to cope 
with the distress which followed, so mission stations 
and private charity had a role to play in alleviating 
the famine. Grey did not approve of the latter form 
of support. As before, he tried to keep tight con­
trol of the situation. The news of the suffering in 
Kaffraria was more than Bishop Gray could endure; and
in defiance of Grey’s express wishes he preached an
SQimpassioned sermon and opened his own relief fund.'' 
On the frontier, groups of believers had organized
58. C.0.48/383: Government Notice No.265, end.2 to No. 124, 
21 August 1857*
59. T. Gutsche, The Bishop’s Lady, p.164.
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themselves into bands of robbers who were preparing to 
plunder the unbelieving Xhosa and the whites. Several 
mission stations in fact found themselves in a pre­
carious position and had to apply to Maclean for guns 
and ammunition to defend themselves.^  The mission 
stations formed supplementary centres of relief. A 
German missionary, Rein, actually reinforced Grey's 
plans for attracting as many labourers as possible to
the Colony when he promised to look after the children
61of those seeking work at the Cape. This scheme
also had the effect of safeguarding the mission sta­
tions. Grey later encouraged the chiefs to send 
their sons to his educational establishment in Cape 
Town, 'Zonnebloem*, where they, too, could act as 
hostages for the good behaviour of their fathers, some 
of whom had been sent to serve sentences on Robben 
Island. The mission stations were also asked to look 
after as many orphans as they could, with the financial 
help of the government.
Neither Grey nor Maclean were altogether happy to have 
to enlist the aid of the missionaries in relieving the
60. B.K.91• H. Lucas to Maclean, 14 November 1857; Maclean
to Kayser, 19 December 1857­
61. E. D'A. Dowsley, 'An investigation into the circumstances 
of the Cattle Killing delusion in Kaffraria 1856-7’, 
(Rhodes University), p.76.
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famine. Maclean was insistent that any general 
relief would be neither 'politic nor true charity'.
Such, he said, would simply assist the chief, en­
courage the able-bodied to live idly without labouring 
to support their families, and would, if large numbers 
of children were maintained, lead to the return of 
their parents as soon as their immediate wants were 
satisfied. Magistrates and missionaries were in­
structed to report cases of destitution, but Maclean 
preferred to rely mainly on the information from the
62magistrates who 'were more likely to learn the truth'.
In other words, both Grey and Maclean were afraid 
that general relief would diminish the labour supply 
to the Colony.
The 'Kaffir Relief Society' formed by the people of 
King William's Town, proved also to be a source of 
irritation to Grey. The demand for labour was still 
greater than the supply, so he did not want to con­
centrate relief in King William's Town or enable the 
Xhosa to avoid taking service. Because Grey was thus 
insistent that relief should be controlled by the
62. Ibid, p.88
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magistrates rather than by private initiative or 
missionary bodies, his actions leave him wide open 
to the Marxist interpretation of the crisis - that it 
had been engineered to supply the colonial labour 
market. In fact, Grey made no secret of his hope 
that the Xhosa people (or labour) would contribute to 
the greater development of the Colony.
Radical historians may label one of the results of the 
crisis as the ’proletarianization’ of the Xhosa people 
and maintain that their introduction into the 'capita­
list' labour market was forced. In such an interpre­
tation the conflicting modes of production and the 
demand for labour were the ultimate motivating forces 
behind British Cape frontier policy. Capitalism 
everywhere seeks the cheapest labour possible. In 
South African circumstances labour cheap enough for 
the needs of a struggling .sub-metropole of capitalism 
could be obtained only by coercion. Whether it was 
intentional or not, one supreme consequence of the 
Cattle Killing was thus to be the detribalisation of 
the Xhosa and the creation, over time, of a 'blurred 
frontier'. As a result of this 'closing' of the 
frontier, a horde of 'exploitable' black labourers
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was introduced onto a market where their bargaining 
position was weak from the beginning. Grey's relief 
measures certainly appear to have been directed ex­
pressly towards that end.
It is the success which Grey had in breaking up the 
Xhosa people after the Cattle Killing which has led 
Majeke to accuse him of engineering the crisis. The 
missionaries were also said to have had an unprecedented 
breakthrough after the prophecy had ended, and their 
work in Kaffraria as a whole is supposed to have 
flourished as never before. While there is in fact 
no question that the Cattle Killing dealt a severe blow 
to the Xhosa polity and opened the way for colonial 
advance, there is certainly more doubt about the sub­
sequent success of missionary work. A closer look at 
the facts and figures in missionary reports surprisingly 
gives a picture at variance with the generally accepted
beliefs.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CATTLE KILLING (TILL 1860sJ
Sir George Grey had deliberately allowed the Cattle 
Killing crisis to develop to the point where the Xhosa 
would be completely within his power. When the crisis 
was over, he went even further. Ignoring the fact 
that the results of the Cattle Killing were such that 
no dangerous power could still possibly remain in 
British Kaffraria, Grey instituted a purge of the 
remaining chiefs and any possible Xhosa leaders in 
that territory. He was determined to have complete 
and visible submission; and when there was nothing 
substantial to warrant an arrest and trial, Grey 
invented the crimes.
The measures against the chiefs were sweeping. Chief 
Maqoma was convicted of receiving stolen cattle and guns 
and was transported for life. Mhala, the second 
ranking chief in British Kaffraria, who was now old and 
ill, was convicted on a trumped-up charge of conspiring 
to levy war. The Cape Attorney General, William 
Porter, felt constrained to voice his opposition to
-138-
Mhala's trial. He disagreed with the verdict and 
maintained that, given the jury, the verdict had 
been a foregone conclusion. However, Grey was de­
termined to 'punish* the old chief and refused to 
call a mistrial. He did at least make a signifi­
cant concession in the face of Porter’s criticism 
by providing for the remission of Mhala's sentence
if it were subsequently found that the Attorney
1General had been right and he, Grey, wrong. Mhala 
was given a sentence of five years transportation 
rather than life.
The court convened to try chief Phato found him inno­
cent of the charges against him. Grey was not pre­
pared to accept this and immediately called a 
mistrial, whereupon Phato was found guilty of receiving 
stolen goods. By the time that Grey had finished,
900 prisoners had been sent to Cape Town, the chiefs 
to Robben Island, and the others into service. In
British Kaffraria Macleari gaol returns showed 75 - 100
. 2prisoners per month serving sentences of hard labour. 12
1. E. D'A. Dowsley, 'An investigation into the circumstances 
of the Cattle Killing', p.104.
2. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.380.
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Chief Sandile was forced to make a public confession 
and submission and as a reward was made a paid officer 
of the government and allowed to retain part of his 
location, with a much reduced chiefdom.
Grey now felt that he was in a position to administer 
his coup de grace to the chiefdoms. The system of
direct rule that he instituted over the Xhosa in 
British Kaffraria meant that the Xhosa would be com­
pletely under Colonial control. The 'friendly* chiefs 
were pensioned off with farms and government salaries. 
New regulations strengthened the authority of the 
magistrates over traditional Xhosa authority. Villages 
were created from the scattered homesteads and each was 
placed in the charge of a paid headman and assistants. 
With the new system of village police, Xhosa movements 
would be more effectively monitored. Taxes were also 
imposed, so that the Xhosa would be able to pay for 
their own administration. The magistrates selected the 
sites for the villages, to which the people were re­
quired to move when their crops had been harvested.
And so began the juggling of the population of British 
Kaffraria to create Grey's 'checkerboard' settlement 
of blacks and whites. Not unnaturally, it left the
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. 3Xhosa with feelings of suspicion and distrust.
Whatever the outward signs of acceptance, Grey must
have known that the Xhosa people were unwilling parti-
pants in the revolution of their lifestyles. This had
been made clear even before the Cattle Killing in a
letter to Grey from chiefs Maqoma and Botomane, in
April 1856, when they asserted that they had not
granted land; rather, it had been taken by compulsion
for if they had refused it, Grey would have thought
4that they wished to fight. This was written at a 
time when Grey was reporting the success of his 
measures in British Kaffraria. It would also seem 
that at least these two chiefs had recognized the 
Governor's ability to discover 'conspiracies' where 
none existed.
The interpretation of Liberal and Afrikaner historians 
of the effects of British Imperialism in southern 
Africa, though differing on certain aspects, agree 34
3. Free Church of Scotland Archives, Cory Library MS9039* 
Minutes of Lovedale, 7 July 1858.
4. Grey Coll. G.10.c.13(16): Letters from Kafir Chiefs to 
His Excellency Sir George Grey KCB, letter dd. 27 April 
1856 signed with marks of uMakoma and uBotman.
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on one thing: that British intervention was generally
to the benefit of the African people. Radical histo-
5rians have rejected this, and Atmore and Marks have 
made a case for British intervention seeking nothing 
more than the protection of Britain's own interests, 
whatever the 'humanitarian' justification. They 
insist that economic interests played a major role in 
Imperial policy, and it was precisely these economic 
interests that Britain was seeking to protect by sus­
taining the white colonial economy at the Cape at the 
expense of blacks. As a result of this intervention, 
they claim, the white colonist society gained in 
economic and political power.
How do the actions of Sir George Grey and the missionary 
bodies on the Cape eastern frontier reflect these 
arguments? Grey was, to a considerable extent, moti­
vated by economic considerations. In the years prior 
to 1870, Britain enjoyed a freedom of access to the 
markets of the world which was to be limited after that 
time, and her commerce was flourishing. Though the 
Empire grew steadily, it was also the so-called 'Little
5. A. Atmore and S. Marks, 'The Imperial Factor in South 
Africa in the 19th Century', p.105 ff.
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England' era, when certain Colonial Office authorities 
felt it would be expedient to limit the political 
extent of the Empire, and colonial administrators 
were directed to ensure the colonies paid for them­
selves. Grey was not prepared to limit British 
interests in southern Africa, but he did attempt to 
make the Cape pay its way. Unfortunately, he seemed 
to think that the only way to do this was to exploit 
the Xhosa and create a reservoir of cheap labour.
This, then, touches on the second point made by
Atmore and Marks, that the white colonial economy was
sustained at the expense of Africans and that the
colonial society gained in economic and political
power. Grey’s actions in British Kaffraria certainly
did not benefit the Xhosa. Because he couched such
actions in his 'humanitarian' terms and hedged them
around with obscure and confused reasoning, he would
have us believe that the Xhosa people were the ultimate
beneficiaries. Thus, Grey has left behind him in
South Africa, the myth of a 'just and humane' governor
who wished to 'elevate* the Xhosa nation and confer
upon it the 'benefits of civilization'. The fact
that this resulted in the destruction of Xhosa
society was applauded by contemporary white society, mission-
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aries included, as 'bringing the Xhosa out of their 
barbarous state'. That Grey's sole desire was to 
ensure stability for the Colony to develop politically 
and economically, and the extension of British power in 
southern Africa, was delicately overlooked.
By the time of the opening of the Cape Parliament on the 
7 April 1857, Grey had his plans well laid for the reor­
ganisation of British Kaffraria and the introduction of 
white settlers into the now 'empty' space. He was 
also setting his sights on Kaffraria Proper beyond the 
Kei and a settlement in Sarhili's territory similar to 
that in British Kaffraria. In the latter territory, 
land was confiscated from Phato and Mhala and sold, with 
the best land being kept for the future white settlers. 
The best part of the Crown Reserve was also to be set 
aside for whites. Grey, ingeniously enough, con­
sidered it not only his duty to fill the 'vacant' land 
with prosperous white settlers, but also considered that 
he was not neglecting the interests of the dispossessed 
Xhosa. He reasoned that many Xhosa had perished of 
starvation, disease and recent fighting among themselves; 
others had joined more distant chiefs and had no inten­
tion of returning; thousands more had settled across the 
Kei in what he considered better territory than their own
SIR GEORGE GREY 'ROMANTIC IMPERIALIST'
(Cape Archives - AG 7391)
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and thousands had gone to work in the Cape, so he was 
not in fact doing them a disservice by making use of 
their land.' The Governor conceded that some Xhosa 
might in the future return from the Colony, but he 
was sure that the training that they had undergone 
while in service would render them useful to the new
g
white settlers of British Kaffraria.
Grey’s biographer, Rutherford, has described him as a 
romantic imperialist, and there is indeed little doubt 
that he wanted to extend British influence in South 
Africa. British Kaffraria, which he hoped the Cape 
would agree to annex, and Kaffraria Proper would be 
the starting point for the consolidation of territory 
on the eastern seaboard. He hoped to extend indirect, 
or preferably direct, rule over the people in the Trans- 
keian territories. His plans took the Colonial Office 
somewhat by surprise, and he encountered a measure of 
resistance, but for the most part, a feeling of resig­
nation. What was, however, more surprising 
than his plans to extend British possessions was 
the fury that Grey unleashed on the chiefs in the
6 . J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.381.
-145-
areas he wanted for his extension - in particular, on 
Sarhili, beyond the Kei. The Transkeian territory 
had been badly ravaged by the Cattle Killing, and 
from the reports of destitution in the area, the 
chiefs there could hardly have put up much effective 
resistance to colonial forces in any case.
In order to equalize as far as possible the black/white 
ratio in British Kaffraria, Grey wanted to resettle 
Xhosa and Mfengu from that part of the country along 
the Mbashe River. This meant clearing the area of 
proposed settlement of people already there. An 
opportunity offered itself in July 1857 when a minor 
Thembu chief, Vadana, plundered the Queenstown and 
Albert districts. A force under the enthusiastic 
leadership of Walter Currie, who was given carte 
blanche to proceed against the chief as he saw fit, 
captured Vadana, as well as the elderly chief, Quesha. 
In the process Currie’s men shot down 49 Thembu apart 
from those wounded, captured 120 horses, 22 goats and
78 head of cattle, and set fire to the homesteads.
Currie was elated and hoped that at last the opportu-
7 . C.0.48/384: Grey to Labouchere, No.148, 3 October 1857;
J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.384.
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nity had arrived to keep the Xhosa as an entire nation
8binder the colonial thumb. Grey was full of admira­
tion for such actions, and Currie himself was knighted.
. gCurrie was now 'itching to go m  at Kreli', as was 
the Governor himself. From the ensuing action against 
Sarhili, it would appear that Grey had lost all sense 
of proportion as far as that chief was concerned. In 
order to justify his actions in the eyes of official­
dom, he returned to an old and trusted theme - conspi­
racy, war and the danger to the Colony. With the aid of 
Maclean, Grey concocted an elaborate case to prove 'that 
the Cattle Killing had been a conspiracy between
Sarhili and Moshoeshoe of Basutoland, against the 
1 0Colony. Now Grey mentioned in a despatch to Labou-
chere that Sarhili was using the news of the Indian 
Mutiny to revive the desire for war against the colony. 
The elderly chief, Mhala, was in the same despatch
11accused of trying to foment a rising within the Colony.
In other words, threatened by the enemy from within and *1
8. W. Currie, 23 September 1837, quoted in Rutherford,
Sir George Grey, p.371*
9. Ibid, p.385.
10. See previous chapter.
11. C.0.48/388: Grey to Labouchere, No.9, 11 February 1858.
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without, Grey would be ^ forced5 to drive Sarhili from his 
country and deal with Mhala in order to secure the 
safety of the colony. The man chosen to rout the 
already-destitute Sarhili was none other than Walter 
Currie.
Grey complained frequently of broken health. The 
Cattle Killing crisis had taken its toll both physi­
cally and mentally, and he was, in 1858, close to a 
1 2breakdown. He was a man of uncertain temper,
querulous in the face of criticism or opposition,
• • 13vindictive towards his enemies, real or imagined, 
and,as his despatches show, a master of emotion­
laden reasoning and justification. His attitude to­
wards Sarhili seems to have been tinged with an hysteria 
which was almost aberrant. He was determined to have 
Sarhili's land and the chief's submission at all costs.
Grey's resolve was bolstered by Maclean who, just as 
much as the governor, wanted control over the frontier 
chiefdoms. He urged that the removal of Sarhili
beyond the Mbashe was absolutely necessary for the
12. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.391.
13. Private correspondence, Prof. B.J. Dalton to Dr. 
T. Gutsche, 14 February 1975*
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future peace of the Colony, as that chief was the 
'incenter and promoter' of all wars. He maintained 
that the British Kaffrarian chiefdoms looked to 
Sarhili for leadership and that to remove him would 
break the unity of the chiefdoms, leaving those in 
British Kaffraria to their 'own resources'. They 
would no longer have 'a depot in that (Sarhili's) 
country ... and we could take them both on the flanks 
and in the r e a r ' T h e r e  is no doubting that 
Maclean was a military man. The Chief Commissioner 
had lived at the Cape and on the frontier long enough 
to have known that he was employing faulty premises 
in attributing the strength of leadership that he did 
to Sarhili. One can only assume that he was giving 
Grey all the encouragement he could in order to 
bring Sarhili 'under control'. Not that Grey needed 
it.
Currie's expedition against Sarhili was highly success­
ful in colonial terms. He drove that chief across 
the Mbashe river, using 'experienced riflemen' to deal 
with any resistance. He reported that Sarhili had
14* Grey Coll. MSB 223: Maclean to Grey, 12 October 1859-
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suffered 'considerable losses' and that the territory
from Clarkebury down the Mbashe to the sea and back
to the River Kei had been 'well swept, the gardens
and huts destroyed and the country really cleared of
1 5its former inhabitants'. • The Rev. V/. Impey, on a 
tour of mission stations in Kaffraria Proper, was 
constrained to remark that Currie had been most effec­
tive in clearing the country, but that the service he
had rendered Grey had not been performed 'without 
. , 16unnecessary vigour'.
The Governor had hoped to repeat the British Kaffrarian
pattern of settlement in Kaffraria Proper, but the land
remained in an unsettled state for the rest of his term
of office. Certain resettlements were carried out,
and 'Thembuland' and 'Fingoland' were thus created out
of former Gcaleka territory. A mixture of Ndhlambe,
Ngqika, Gqunukwebe, Mfengu, Khoi and Gcaleka were
settled according to Grey's village system at Idutywa
1 7and Butterworth under the supervision of Lt. Colley. '
15« C.0.48/388: Currie to R. Southey, Secretary to the
Governor, 1 March 1858, end. to No. 18, 9 March 1858.
16. WMMS Archives, SOAS, Box 378: The Rev. W. Impey to the 
Secretaries of the Wesleyan Missionary Society, 7 June 
1 8 5 8 .
17. C.0.48/398: Wynyard to Newcastle, No.22, 8 October 1859.
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The vacuum created by Sarhili's expulsion was imme­
diately attractive to people other than Grey, and by 
October 1859 one of Moshoeshoe's sons had moved into a 
portion of the territory, with some of his followers, to 
claim the land on behalf of his father. Unfortunately 
for Grey, his plans to annex Kaffraria Proper were 
scotched by bankruptcy and official disfavour. Al­
ready impatient with the Governor's growing disobedience, 
Fortescue, in the Colonial Office, reacted testily when 
the Acting-Governor, Lt. Gen. Wynyard, urged the perma­
nent occupation of the Transkei. He noted on the 
despatch that the country between the Kei and Mbashe
Rivers had anyway been occupied in 1857 without the
1 8Home Government being consulted.
The final stage of settling parts of the Transkeian 
territories in the village system was carried out in 
1861, after Grey's departure to New Zealand. The 
indefatigable Currie first moved into the territory 
with two detachments of Mounted Police, to support 
the authority of the magistrate who had been de­
puted to place the local people into villages. In 
a sudden rush of 'concern' for Sarhili and his people,
18. Ibid. Note by Fortescue.
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who were destitute and starving in the small area now
allowed to them, Currie then urged the annexation of
the Transkei in the interests of 1 humanity 'j to 'put an
1 9end to such wholesale destruction of life'. As
Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, commented
that this same famine among Sarhili's people would
help the new governor, Wodehouse, to carry out his
20instructions with regard to Kaffraria.
After the destruction caused by the Cattle Killing, 
Grey's actions against the chiefs came like a death 
blow. Reaction manifested itself in fresh outbreaks 
of the prophecy. Official reports between 1855 and 
I860 mentioned several prophets between the Mbashe and 
Umzimvubu Rivers. A revival of the prophecy occurred 
in Thembuland and in Sarhili's new location beyond the 
Mbashe. There, a new prophet, Bombo, prophesied the 
destruction of the whites and a fresh outbreak of cattle 
killing took place, though Sarhili refused to partici­
pate. It can only have been a deep sense of frustra­
tion and desperation which led thus to the revival of a
19* C.0.48/408: Currie to Acting Colonial Secretary, 9 
November 1861, end. to No. 51* 22 November 1861.
20. Ibid. Duke of Newcastle, comment on No. 51, Wynyard to 
Newcastle, 22 November 1861.
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prophecy which had already proved so disastrously 
ineffective.
Grey, and with him the Cape Colony, had apparently 
emerged from the crisis with undreamed-of gains.
True, the Colonial Parliament was hedging over the 
question of the annexation of British Kaffraria to the 
Colony, and the Colonial Office was doing the same over 
absorbing Kaffraria Proper, but Grey had got the Xhosa 
nation where he wanted them, and the Colony itself 
looked forward to the prospect of stability and economic 
growth and the fulfilment of at least some of their 
labour demands.
But what of the missionaries? Contrary to Majeke's 
assertions, they were in fact the poor relations of 
Grey’s schemes and therefore gained very little in real 
terms from the crisis. This is not to exonerate them 
completely from having cherished certain ambitious in­
tentions towards the Xhosa people. They wanted to des­
troy what to them was barbarous in Xhosa society and thus 
co-operated willingly with Grey's plans. They applauded 
Grey's aims in British Kaffraria and hoped that he would 
be able to create a stable society which would then give 
them a more closely-knit population with which to work.
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But the myth of the great advance of missionary work 
after the Cattle Killing is nothing more than that.
There was certainly the hope that the experience would 
humble the Xhosa and bring them within the Christian 
fold in a way that missionary effort alone had not 
been able to do. That this hope was not fulfilled 
is clearly shown in an analysis of conversion figures 
in the years after the Cattle Killing and in evidence 
of positive hostility towards Christianity and a 
return to 'nativism' in the 1860s.
Both the Free Church of Scotland and the Wesleyan Metho­
dist Missionary Societies kept yearly conversion and 
attendance figures. The ratio of converts to overall 
population surrounding the stations were similar, as 
were the figures indicating increase in members. These 
figures need to be treated with some caution and are an 
indication, rather than an exact reflection, of the 
status quo at the time. In some instances, there is no 
way of knowing how many white members were included in 
the returns, and in the late 1850s the Mfengu still 
formed the bulk of the Christian communities. Among 
other converts, the dividing line between true conver­
sion and a conversion-of-convenience to gain refuge from
-154-
tribal custom was very thin. After the Cattle Killing
the economic stress and social tensions were a stimulus
21 . . .to at least temporary conversion. The missionaries
were well aware that a distinction existed between the 
genuinely converted and these others, but made no 
attempt to distinguish between the two groups in their 
annual returns. Even if one does, however, accept 
the missionary records at face value, the numbers are 
not impressive.
Take the example of a single mission station: in 1859 
Tiyo Soga of the Free Church of Scotland reported that 
there were 490 men, women and children living at Mgwali, 
a Church of Scotland mission station. Of these, 20 
were catechumens and 61 were baptised. By December 
I860 the number of those living on the station had 
dropped to 442. At the end of 1866, the population 
totalled 508. There were 7 000 Xhosa in the surrounding
district. Of the station people, there were 167 commu-
22nicant, 35 catechumens and 27 newly baptised. There
is no breakdown of these figures which might have
21. D. Williams, Umfundisi: A biography of Tiyo Soga 1829­
1871, (Lovedale Press, 1978), p.68.
22. Ibid.
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indicated new converts, transfers, or Mfengu. It is 
also difficult to gain a completely accurate impression 
of the years immediately following the Cattle Killing 
because of the movement of the population in British 
Kaffraria and the Transkeian territories. Many of 
the new members of the stations were in fact trans­
ferred members from other societies within the colonial 
boundaries.
The Methodist Missionary Society recorded annual overall 
figures for British Kaffraria and Kaffraria Proper.
The following figures were recorded between the years
1857 and 1868. The^include both Xhosa and Mfengu and
23in some cases, white members.
Year Members
1857 1 386
1859 1 662
1862 2 601) (includes the new
) Thembu location made
1863 2 563) up of colonial Thembu.)
This indicates an increase of 1 177 people living on the 
mission stations over 7 years, but not all of those on
23. WMMS Archives, SOAS, Box 337: Synod minutes, passim
-1 56 -
the stations were full members of the church.
By 1868, the numbers had increased to 4 678, but this
figure included the new Mfengu villages at T'somo and
Butterworth (613 people) and 598 Thembu who had been
moved to Lesseyton and Mt. Arthur. The returns for
the Peddie district within the colony, a prosperous
area in terms of peasant farming, gave the numbers
for mission station members as 400 - 500 in a total
24population of ca. 40 000. An official census was
taken in British Kaffraria and the Transkeian terri­
tories in 1858 and 1859* The figures for the
25’Native Population’ were given as follows: ■
Year Population
1858 43 813
1959 58 317
In 1859 the Methodist Missionary Society figures were 
1 662, i.e. 2,8% of the total black population. The 
Methodists were somewhat more active in the Transkeian 
territories than the Free Church of Scotland, so re­
presented the higher proportion of members. Even
24. WMMS Archives, S0AS, Box 313: I. Start to the Rev. E. 
Hoole, 26 November 1861.
25« C.0.48/403: Chalmers to Chief Commissioner, sub-encl. 
to No.77, April I860.
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with a combined 4% of the population living on mission 
stations, this does not constitute an ’unprecedented 
breakthrough' in missionary work, especially as the 
figures recorded by the societies are not reliable.
By 1859 the Xhosa were returning to British Kaffraria 
and the Transkei in significant numbers. Membership 
of the missionary societies did increase in the 
following years, but the Methodist returns of 1863 
actually showed a decrease in membership. This 
reflects the growing antagonism towards Christianity
Where, then, did the myth of the 'great break-through' 
originate? Certainly not with the majority of the 
missionaries at the time. Without exception, they 
realised in 1857 that the time was ripe for increased 
efforts in the mission field. There was a sense of 
urgency in their letters, a feeling of 'now or never', 
but the realities were, nevertheless, clearly spelt 
out. They had neither the men nor the money to 
make use of the opportunity opening before them.
There was no money to send more teachers even to chief
2 6Kama's people, when he requested them. It was not
26. WMMS Archives, SOAS, Methodist Missionary Conferences 
1858-1860: The Rev. V/. Garner to the Rev. G. Osborn,
6 December 1858.
which began to be felt in the early
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only the missionaries themselves, who were aware of
the lack of men in the field. Part of Grey's plans
for the civilization of the Xhosa depended on the
spread of missionary institutions. It was clear that
those who had accepted life on the stations were not
averse to the introduction of colonial law, but there
were just not enough mission institutions to make a
significant impact. Warner, Government Agent with
the Thembu, thought that the number of missionaries
and their agents would have to be doubled before a
27general impression could be made on heathenism.
The missionaries themselves, were not very optimistic 
about their prospects. The Methodist Missionaries, 
so long in the South African field, were particularly 
realistic about the little influence one minister 
could expect to exert on the large populations 
surrounding the stations of British Kaffraria and 
Kaffraria Proper. In I860 William Holden disagreed
completely with the remark made by the Bishop of 
Grahamstown that the Xhosa were turning to Christianity
27. C.0.48/401 : Warner to Southey, 2 January I860, end.2
to No. 7* 16 January I860.
28. WMMS Archives, SOAS, Box 313-' The Rev. W. Gedye to the 
General Secretaries, 30 July 1859*
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»in masses'. ' Perhaps the missionaries who were new 
to the field, (the Anglican Church only entered the 
South African mission field in 1854), thought and wrote 
more enthusiastically and optimistically than the others, 
and this may have been the germ of the myth of the 
great advance.
An analysis of missionary correspondence of the Wesleyan 
Methodist Missionary Society and the Free Church of 
Scotland, showsfar more complaints of slow progress of 
conversion and actual antagonism towards the Gospel 
and a reversion to traditional customs, than reports of 
advances. Certainly, some stations did report satis­
fying increases in membership and signs of the out­
pouring of the Holy Spirit, but these were isolated 
cases and the increases were not sustained.
The 1860s brought what D. Williams, in his biography of 
Tiyo Soga, has called a reversion to 'nativism’.^
This was expressed in an antagonism towards the 
missionaries and an upsurge of traditional customs among 
mission people. It is true that some chiefs, the most
29. Ibid. W.C. Holden to the Gen. Secretaries, 9 hay I860.
30. D. Williams, Umfundisi. p.1 9 .
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notable being Sarhili, requested resident missionaries 
after the Cattle Killing, but it was generally in an 
attempt to rescue some shreds of what they had lost in 
land and to place a 'buffer' between them and the 
colonial authorities. Tiyo Soga, a Xhosa himself 
and first missionary to his own people, attributed 
Sarhili's request for a missionary to political 
motives. The request was made when he was allowed
to return to portion of his former territory in 1864* 
With most of his land divided between Mfengu and Thembu, 
Sarhili was in a weak position and a missionary would 
thus have been a form of protection against further 
colonial demands.
For the most part, missionary prospects were bleak.
When they returned to stations which had been abandoned 
during the crisis, it was to find that many former 
converts had not maintained their Christianity, but 
had slipped back into their old customs, using blankets 
instead of clothes, and smearing themselves with the 
red clay that was the mark of the pagan Xhosa. This 
happened on a number of occasions and was( a reflection 
of how superficial the conversion experience often was.
31. Ibid, p.77•
- 161 -
In I860 there were complaints from the Buntingville 
station in the Transkeian territories about the 
heathenish influences acting on the minds of people
who had previously been thought to have accepted
32 .Christianity.' On another station two 'native'
preachers joined a sacrificial feast to the spirits
33of the departed and ate some of the meat. There
were complaints about beer drinking and Sabbath
34- i ,desecration, about polygamy, witchcraft and the
35smoking of dagga. * The circumcision rites proved 
almost impossible to eradicate, with the young men 
on the mission stations defiantly taking part in 
the ceremony. The greatest opposition to the 
missionaries came from the Amaqira, or 'witch doctors', 
whose 'religious' position among the people was 
threatened.
By 1863 the heathen reaction in the Transkeian terri­
tories had become particularly strong, and in fact 
hindered the work at the mission stations themselves.'"
32. WMMS, SOAS, Methodist Missionary Correspondence Kaffraria, 
incoming, 1858-60: The Rev. J. Longden to General Secretaries, 29 May I860.
33* WMMS, SOAS, Box 313: Briggs to Gen. Secs, 8 January 1859,
34. Free Church of Scotland Archives, Cory Library, MS9039: 
Minutes of Lovedale, October 1857.
35» WMMS, SOAS, Box 313: Gedye to Gen. Secs, 24 May 1864.
36. Ibid. J. Longden to Gen. Secs, 25 August 1863.
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The missionary on the Morley station in that territory
complained bitterly a year later of being surrounded
37by Xhosa utterly resistant to the Gospel message.
The population of Kaffraria was still unsettled, and 
the missionaries had to accept that removal of indi­
viduals from their personal influence invariably
3 8meant loss of converts."
The position towards the end of the 1860s had not
improved at all. The Xhosa converts in the Transkei
were widely scattered, and the danger was still very
real that the heathen Xhosa would convert the Chris-
39tians rather than vice versa.' * Many Christians 
had, indeed, already reverted to heathenism. As 
always, the strongest belief was still in 'witch­
craft '
The myth of the unprecedented missionary advance has 
remained strangely resistant in the face of contrary
evidence. Twenty years on, in the 1880s, the Chris-
37. Ibid. W.D. Rayner to Gen. Secs, 26 March 1864.
38. Ibid. W. Hunter to Gen. Secs, 12 April 1864.
39. Ibid. E.J. Barrett to W.B. Boyce, 24 January 1868.
40. Ibid. Gedye to the Gen. Secs, 3 June 1868.
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tians among the Xhosa were still very much in the minority 
and break-away groups had begun to form what became known 
as 'separatist' or 'independent' churches. Inherent 
in the movement was a desire to be independent of whites 
in church matters. Some of the churches, notably the 
Zionist groups, borrowed heavily from traditional rites 
and customs.
As far as the mainline churches are concerned, there
is even today a larger proportion of Christians among
the Tswana and South Sotho peoples than among the
Nguni, of which the Xhosa is a branch. B.A. Pauw,
in an article on the 'Influence of Christianity', has
suggested that the explanation might lie in the fact
that the former have a less elaborate and virile
41ancestor cult than the Nguni people. The distinc­
tion between 'red' or pagan Xhosa and 'school' people 
still persists and the Christian Xhosa are still in 
the minority.
Although success in terms of Christian conversion was 
limited, the missionaries fostered other innovations
41. B.A. Pauw, 'The influence of Christianity', in W.D.
Hammond-Tooke (ed), The Bantu Speaking Peoples of Souths 
Africa, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974).
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which were relatively far-reaching. In one sphere, 
especially, they instituted changes on their stations 
among the mission people which were to revolutionize 
their way of life. The missionaries on the Cape 
eastern frontier believed that Christianity and 'civi­
lization' went hand in hand. They also subscribed to 
the Protestant work ethic. They needed cash contri­
butions from their flocks and with all this in view 
encouraged participation in the cash economy of the 
colony in the form of peasant farming. On the insti­
gation of Sir George Grey, this was extended to the 
teaching of trades. However, missionary emphasis on 
the dignity of labour did not mean that the Xhosa 
people were to be pushed willy-nilly into the colonial 
cash economy in a position disadvantageous to them­
selves (which Grey may perhaps have wanted). As far 
as the missionaries were concerned, education and 
Christianity brought equality, and they hoped that, in 
at least some instances, men educated at mission 
schools would compete with whites on their own terms. 
With representative government instituted at the Cape 
and the 'colour blind' franchise as part of that consti­
tution, mission-educated blacks were able to vote on 
equal terms with whites and at times influence the 
elections in certain areas.
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Participation in peasant farming particularly offered
a welcome alternative to working for white farmers at
low wages. C. Bundy in The Emergence and Decline of
a South African Peasantry also considers that it was
a positive response by African agriculturalists to the
42expanding market opportunities in southern Africa.
With the expropriation of grazing lands by colonial 
expansion, the mission stations offered an alternative 
mode of access to the means of agricultural production, 
and thus became the centres of the earliest peasant 
communities. The Mfengu were not only among the first 
converts, and in the 1850s still the largest element, 
but they also formed the first sizeable group of pea­
sant farmers around the stations. The Bundy thesis 
has, of course, not been without critics such as 
Jack Lewis, who has seen it as resting upon too-narrow- 
a base of empirical data and an incorrect theoretical 
understanding of the pre-capitalist mode of production
in traditional Xhosa society and the effects of conquest 
43on it. But the issue of the black response to white
42. C. Bundy, 'The Emergence and Decline of a South African 
Peasantry', in African Affairs. 71(1972), p.370.
43. J. Lewis, 'The rise and fall of the South African 
peasantry A critique', Paper delivered at the 
Africa seminar, Centre for African Studies, University 
of Cape Town, 13 April 1983.
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market forces in the form of peasant farming commu­
nities with a mission station as a generating-point 
nevertheless remains.
The Cattle Killing stimulated peasant production in
certain areas. Mission stations were issued with
extra seed and production was increased to meet the
expected demands of the starving believers. The
impetus given was impressive. Peasant cultivation
around Healdtown increased to such an extent that
during the ploughing season of 1857 the demand for
ploughs in Port Beaufort was so great that almost
every plough brought in by the traders was bought by
the mission people. The price was £6 each. Traders
bought up the surplus grain to sell to the government.
The Healdtown area produced an excess of 15 000 bushels
of grain.^ In the same year the Peddie district
reported an increased 'temporal prosperity', and at
Annshaw twice as much land as in 1856 came under the
plough. Kamastone had an excess yield of grain of 
4520 000 bushels. * However, some mission residents
44. Grey Coll. G.33»c.14: Wesleyan Missionary Notices, 
25 October 1858, p.185»
45* WMMS, SOAS, Box 337 : Synod minutes for 1857*
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sold so much grain that they experienced shortages in 
the following year.
The building of a watermill at Healdtown for grinding
corn led the cultivators there to grow wheat at the
expense of Indian and 'Kaffir' corn. This was
46bought by the traders in the area. Grey encouraged
this increased production. In the short term, he 
needed food to relieve the famine after the Cattle 
Killing, but his long-term plans included not only a 
supply of labour, but also the creation of a small­
holding class of Xhosa and Mfengu settled in villages 
as a 'buffer' in the frontier region. Land titles 
were made available, and both Xhosa and Mfengu 
availed themselves of the opportunity to purchase land. 
In 1858 Lovedale, too, was given an extra 500 acres for 
cultivation. Although Healdtown had been issued with 
land titles by 1859, many Mfengu from there left the 
district to purchase farms in British Kaffraria.
Members of the King William's Town circuit bought land 
in the neighbourhood of Keiskamma Hoek, and many Mfengu 
also bought land in the Royal Reserve.^
46. Ayliff Papers, C.T. Archives, Item 80(4)t Address from 
Mfengu of Healdtown to Grey, 1 August 1859.
47. WMMS, SOAS, Box 537: Synod minutes for 1859.
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The government notice permitting Xhosa and Mfengu to
purchase land in freehold at £1 an acre was issued
in King William's Town early in 1858. Within ten
days of the notice, 11 'Kaffirs' (as opposed to
Mfengu) purchased 336 acres of land in British 
48Kaffraria. Both Christian and heathen Mfengu
near Healdtown increased their ploughing in 1858/9,
and one young man who had been rewarded with land in
the Kat River settlement after the previous war, sold
his land to an Afrikaner colonist for £1 250 and
purchased land in British Kaffraria instead. He
spent £500 on the land, and planned to spend £200 on
49the erection of a watermill. ‘
By I860 the Mfengu in the Peddie district were reportedly
50owners of very considerable property in cattle and land.' 
By the mid-19th Century wool had replaced wine as the 
Colony's major export. To meet the increased demand 
for wool, Acting-governor Wynyard encouraged sheep 
farming in British Kaffraria^ and the Thembu in Glen 
Grey area, who were to a large extent becoming settled
48. C.0.48/388: Grey to Labouchere, No.11, 13 February 1858.
49. C.0.48/396: Ayliff to Grey, end. to No.97, 22 June 1859.
50. C.0.48/402: Acting-gov. Wynyard to Newcastle, No.59a»
2 April I860.
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cultivators and sheep farmers, produced 6 000 lbs of
wool in 1859 and sold it to the local traders. The
Thembu Resident, Warner, estimated that much more had
probably been sold in the Queenstown district that 
51year.' The overall wool exports for the Colony in­
creased from £634 130 in 1855 to £1 680 826 in 1865*^
The Mfengu and Thembu resettlement in Fingoland and 
Emigrant Tembuland in the Transkei after 1864 led, 
according to Bundy, to the introduction of the inno­
vative farming methods into that area as well. These 
settlements were on the land formerly belonging to 
Sarhili and his people and cleared by Currie. Grey's 
confiscation and sale of land 'depopulated' by the 
Cattle Killing thus contributed to the development of 
a class of peasant farmers (already forming around 
mission stations) who in turn successfully responded 
to the growing market demands. However, Grey also 
created a deliberate shortage of land available to the 
Xhosa in order to encourage a labour force for the 
Colony.
51. C.0.48/401: Warner to Southey, end.2 to No.7,
2 January I860.
52. M. Wilson & L. Thompson (eds), A History of South 
Africa to 1870, (David Philip, 1 982), p.290.
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Bundy considers the height of peasant prosperity in 
the Eastern Cape to have been in the 1850s and 1860s. 
There must, however, have been an unequal spread of 
wealth in the frontier districts. Firstly, the Cattle 
Killing had left thousands of Xhosa with little other 
than their labour to sell. Secondly, in 1863 British 
Kaffraria and the Transkeian territories found them­
selves in the grip of a drought. Reports of poverty 
and distress, and the revival of the prophecy in 
several areas, came from the Healdtown and Alice
53districts, Kamastone, Mount Coke and Clarkebury. -
By the mid-1860s the Colony was also hit by a severe
depression, mainly because of the collapse of the wool
prices on the international market. The missionaries,
always ready to grab at straws, hoped that at last the
hearts of the heathens would be softened and they would
54be ready to receive the Gospel. That they still
found it necessary to voice such hopes, is yet another 
indication that the Cattle Killing had not brought the 
hoped-for results by drawing significant numbers into 
the Christian fold.
53. WMMS, SOAS, Box337 ’• Albany Minutes and Reports, 
18 November 1863.
54. Ibid.
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Grey and missionary example had thus opened the way
for the development of a South African peasantry in
55Colin Bundy's sense of the word. There is no
doubt that Grey, and to a lesser extent the mission­
aries, were hoping to develop new markets for British 
goods. The Xhosa in whom these needs and wants had 
been created and who had accepted the trappings of 
'civilization', would not only contribute to the 
creation of a more stable frontier, and prove more 
receptive to Christianity, but would also be a hither- 
to-untapped source for providing raw material for 
British industry and a market for British goods.
This link between missionaries and the economic in­
terests of the British Empire was succinctly expressed 
in the Home and Foreign Record of the Free Church of 
Scotland in 1858. The writer mentioned the new 
commercial interest in Africa developing among all 
classes of the British community and was sure that 
Africa would not be allowed to remain 'barbarous'.
The Dark Continent would have to be Christianized, 
he wrote, 'if not for the higher ends of Christianity,
55* C. Bundy defines 'peasant' as a rural cultivator en­
joying access to a specific portion of land and its 
produce and using family labour to meet not only the 
consumption demands of the family but also demands 
from a wider economic system.
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5 56yet for the lower interests of British commerce.
Grey was not to remain at the Cape much longer. He 
was recalled in 1859 but re-instated soon afterwards. 
In 1861 he left the Cape again to resume office as 
Governor of New Zealand. His work at the Cape and in 
the adjoining territories was not, as yet, finished, 
but his heart seemed no longer in it. He seems to 
have lost his driving force. But in his short years 
as Governor of the Cape he had, to all intents and 
purposes, achieved what no other governor had before 
him. His record as far as the colonists were con­
cerned was positive, and his reputation and their 
admiration for him has lived on, enshrined in tradi­
tional South African historiography. When weighed 
in the balance, however, the record leaves much to be 
desired.
The missionaries, on the other hand, can perhaps lay 
claim to being a little whiter than they have tradi­
tionally been painted. Sometimes with the religious
56. Grey Coll: Home and Foreign Record of the Free Church 
of Scotland, August 1858, p.58.
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fanaticism of the crusaders themselves, they had 
striven to destroy whatever seemed contrary to 
Christian ethics and Gospel teaching. (The fact 
that their success was limited was largely no fault 
of their own.) But, unlike Grey, the missionaries 
of the 1850s destroyed in order to rebuild, and an 
assessment of their work in fields other than those 
closely related to their evangelising activities 
may in due course show something more positive to 
relieve the negative picture of the present.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
Grey's recall from the Cape in 1859 was followed by his 
fairly rapid reinstatement. He returned to take up 
office in I860, after spending some months in Britain, 
mysteriously sans spouse. His years as Governor of 
the Cape and High Commissioner were drawing to a close, 
and in 1861 he departed somewhat precipitously for New 
Zealand to take up a second term of office as Governor 
of that colony.
Grey was a multi-faceted man, whose reputation had 
preceded him to the Cape. He was regarded as an in­
tellectual and a humanitarian who was interested in the 
'native races'. Most important for the colonists, it 
was hoped that he would repeat in southern Africa the 
success that he was said to have had in pacifying the 
Maoris in New Zealand. This view of Grey has, to a 
certain extent, survived the vicissitudes of time. He 
was admired by the white colonists of his day and has 
been lauded subsequently by many South African histo­
rians. More recently, however, doubts have been cast
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upon the veracity of this tradition, and a new and, 
perhaps, truer picture of Grey is emerging. It is 
more in line with the Xhosa tradition which has cast 
him as the architect of the downfall of their nation.
Grey's position as High Commissioner and his failure 
to promulgate the Letters Patent for British Kaffraria 
gave him a position of unrivalled authority in that 
territory and, concomitantly, unequalled authority 
over the lives of the people there. The man that 
he was tended, thus, to be of the utmost importance 
in his dealings not only with his superiors in the 
Colonial Office in London but also with his officials, 
the missionaries and the Xhosa in the frontier 
region.
Grey undoubtedly possess^an inquiring, intellectual 
mind which reflected the preoccupations of his time.
He was interested in the Science of Man, especially 
the origins of Man and his diversity. He believed 
that, through the study of language and religion, one 
could glimpse the unity of the human species.1 He
1. R. Thornton, 'The elusive unity of Sir George Grey's 
Library', African Studies. 42, 1-2(1983), p.86.
- 176 -
ass embled. a priceless collection of books which was to 
have aided him in his researches and which he later 
donated to the Cape Colony. In New Zealand Grey 
studied the Maori language, collected and preserved 
their traditions and songs, and attempted to preserve 
their literature - which was indeed an interest one 
would have expected him to pursue in southern Africa.
Grey was also regarded as an accomplished linguist and
was internationally recognized as such. A letter to
Grey from Baron de Bunsen in I860 clearly illustrates
this and, as praise from an authoritative source,
merits a quotation:
'You have heaped upon all scholars of 
African Ethnology and upon all friends of 
Comparative Philology, such rich treasures 
as new and true facts . ...'2
Grey's ^enlightened and indefatigable researches and 
collections' had, therefore, surpassed Baron de Bun­
sen's fondest expectations.
In collecting for his library Grey maintained an exten­
sive correspondence which kept him in touch with many
2. Grey Coll. MSB 223: Baron de Bunsen to Sir George
Grey, 2 October I860.
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leading intellectuals of the time. He attended 
scientific lectures, supported (in New Zealand at least) 
the Mechanic's Institute, and was interested in astro­
nomy. While at the Cape he maintained a long 
acquaintance with the astronomer Thomas Maclear. He 
was also attracted to horticulture and the study of 
acclimatization and, to this end, sent southern African 
seeds and specimens to England.
It could then, with some justice, have been hoped that 
Grey would use his substantial talents to the benefit 
of South Africa. To some extent he did, but the 
benefits were largely confined to the Colony itself.
His actions in British Kaffraria and Kaffraria Proper 
presented a very different picture. The inconsis­
tency of the character which Grey displayed there 
profoundly affected his work in this area: in his re­
lationship with the missionaries he tended to relegate 
them to the position of virtually impotent 'assistants'; 
as far as the Xhosa were concerned, they were to emerge 
from their contacts with him both broken and scattered.
In the preface to his biography of Grey, J. Rutherford 
has raised the possibility that the Governor might have
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3 .been a drug addict. He used this suggestion to
explain what at times seemed inexplicable fluctuations
of mood, which are in turn reflected in the Governor's
despatches. A reason for the taking of laudanum,
which contained opium, could have been the ill-health
that Grey was said to have suffered as a result of his
4 . .years in Australia. On his own admission, he spent 
much time on his back because of the pain from an old 
wound.  ^ But it seems that Grey, rather than suffering 
from 'delicate health', was something of a hypochon­
driac who at times of stress, particularly when the 
Colonial Office was being censorious, complained of his 
health having quite broken down because of hardships 
recently incurred in the course of his duty.
Professor B.J. Dalton of Queensland University has 
noted that the apparently wide fluctuations between 
optimism and apprehension, as suggested by the drug 
hypothesis, occur in despatches of identical date and
3. See above, Chapter four.
4. J. Rutherford, Sir George Grey, p.275: A contemporary 
in New Zealand thought that Grey's constitution had 
been so undermined that he was destined for an early 
grave; T. Gutsche, The Bishop's Lady, p.162: He was 
said to have been 'almost prostrate with pain and 
fatigue' when he returned from the frontier in 1856.
5. B. Warner, 'Sir George Grey, Lady Grey and the Admiral Sir 
Henry Keppel', Quarterly Bulletin of the S.A. Library, 
XXXIII, 1(September 1978).
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were, instead, clearly related to the impact which 
each was intended to produce upon the recipient.^
In fact, most of the contradictions in Grey's 
character vanish when the inner truth is appreciated - 
that it was largely impossible to accept his word on 
almost anything.
As far as the officials at the Colonial Office were 
concerned (and, at times, the members of the Cape 
Parliament), this meant that they were never fully 
in the picture about frontier affairs. Grey twisted 
facts and arguments to suit himself and used exaggerated 
and faulty reasoning to put forward his point of view.
An example of this was his speech to the Cape parlia­
ment in June 1856. He encouraged the economic co­
operation of all southern African states and, as an 
incentive to the members of the Cape parliament, he 
exaggerated the potential advantages of trade. Trade 
with the interior was now in its infancy, but, said 
Grey, who could estimate what its value would be 'when 
vast tracts of the interior to which Emigrants are 
daily proceeding, swarm with a large population of
6 . Private letter, B.J. Dalton to G. Weldon, 28 November 1984
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Europeans, or of almost civilized Native Tribes'? '
In much the same vein Grey urged the Duke of Newcastle 
in 1861 to extend British control to Natal. His 
arguments had a familiar ring. If left to themselves, 
the Transkeian chiefdoms would be rent with internal 
conflict, refugees would fly over the colonial borders, 
with 'pursuing barbarians' pouring after them, and so
Qon. Thus, his advocacy was always livened with a 
strong admixture of make-believe.
Grey was impatient of curbs to his independence of 
action, completely unable to accept advice or criticism, 
and inclined to meet opposition to his wishes with 
tantrums. This affected his relationship with the 
missionaries on the frontier. Although he had co-opted 
their help in his frontier plans, it seemed that he did 
not trust them and gave them only as much leeway as 
suited him. To some extent this could have been the 
result of the brush he had had with the missionaries in 
New Zealand. Here he had been determined to abolish
7. C.0.48/374: Grey to Labouchere, No.46, 5 June 1856.
8. Cape of Good Hope Annexures to the Notes and Preceedings 
to the House of Assembly, Vol.1, A122 - *"£1 : Grey to 
Newcastle, 9 February 1861.
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what he considered was their influence in the official 
conduct of Native Affairs.
Perhaps Grey wanted to prevent a similar situation 
arising in South Africa. Information about the progress 
of the Cattle Killing was gleaned from his magistrates. 
Indeed, neither Grey nor Maclean accepted missionary re­
ports of distress in the months following the crisis, as 
they found it convenient to believe that these sources ex­
aggerated the situation. The missionaries were not 
allowed to participate freely in the distribution of relief 
to the starving Xhosa, because Grey questioned their ability 
to judge the genuine cases of need. As far as Grey's re­
lief measures were concerned, it has been suggested that
these were directed solely towards the supply of labour
gfor the Cape. Be that as it may, Grey's control of 
relief also highlights the fact that he was apparently 
incapable of translating humanitarian sentiments into a 
genuine concern about individuals.
Grey remained obdurate over his relief measures. Not 
even so eminent a churchman (and, incidentally friend) 
as Bishop Robert Gray was able to persuade the Governor 
to give the churches free rein to succour needy Xhosa.
9. J.B. Peires, 'Sir George Grey versus the Kaffir Relief 
Committee', Journal of Southern African Studies,
10, 1(April 1984), p.145 ff.
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In two letters of June and August 1857, the Bishop 
urged him to do something more to relieve the starva­
tion on the frontier. In both letters, he offered 
his personal services. By August Bishop Gray was so 
sickened by the reports of distress that he proposed 
convening a public meeting to organize further relief 
aid. With sad irony he asked whether Sir George would 
like to chair the meeting.^ In fact, there was 
nothing that the Governor wanted less.
There is no doubt that Grey remained the dominant force 
in the interaction between the office of Governor and 
High Commissioner and the missionary bodies. He was 
prepared to use them, but not to trust their judge­
ment in instances which ran counter to his desires.
Even the extension of educational facilities was on 
his terms. The grants given to the missionary insti­
tutions were for industrial training - not to be used 
at missionary discretion where they saw fit. As far 
as the Xhosa were concerned, they were to be educated 
to serve the emerging colonial capitalist system.
What might best serve those seeking the education did
10. Grey Coll., MSE 223 : Bishop Gray to Grey, 12 June 
1857 and 9 August 1857.
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no t enter into Grey's calculations.
Indeed, an explanation of Grey's relations with the 
frontier communities may lie in the fact that he 
seemed to have a genuine streak of paranoia. This 
is no more clearly demonstrated than in the number 
of perceived conspiracies and plots which punctuated 
his career, not only in New Zealand, but also in 
South Africa. On numerous occasions these were used 
to justify the Governor's least defensible actions - 
in New Zealand his seizure of Te Rauparaha in 1846 
and his invasion of the Waikato; in South Africa, 
his seizure of part of Sarhili's land. But they 
also cropped up in comparatively trivial instances, 
suggesting that they were something more than merely 
attempts to find excuses for ill-advised actions.
While at the Cape Grey was unfortunately encouraged 
by Lt. Col. Jackson, who was in practical charge of 
frontier defence* On at least fifteen occasions 
from January 1855 Grey reported rumours of combina­
tions against the Colony, conspiracies, or intended 
uprisings. The last of these was just before he 
was due to leave the Cape for New Zealand in 1861.
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In the wake of the Zulu ‘unrest1 Grey was convinced
that the frontier chiefdoms would hazard another war
if it was obvious that colonial troops were being sent 
11to Natal. It is significant that Lt. Gen. Wynyard,
who was stationed as nearby as Grahamstown, was
sceptical about the rumours of a possible uprising, but
was, nevertheless, careful not to cross the Governor.
He hedged his bets by remarking that, of course, he was
not as likely to hear of rumours as Grey was because his
1 2information came from a 'far more indirect course'.
Grey proceeded to delay his departure to New Zealand 
because of this new 'conspiracy'. It did his reputa­
tion no harm with his mentor in London, Newcastle, who 
was the Secretary of State who had restored his 
Governorship.
It has, on a number of occasions, been suggested that 
the breakdown of Grey's marriage was the turning-point 
in his career that was directly responsible for his 
departure from the Cape. And yet, on closer examina­
tion of the facts, it would seem that Grey might rather 1
11. Cape of Good Hope Annexures, Vol.1, A122 - '61: Grey 
to Lt. Gen. Wynyard, 27 July 1861.
12. Ibid. Wynyard to Grey, 1 August 1861.
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have used the 'Keppel Affair' to rid himself of an 
unwanted wife and to escape from the frontier difficul­
ties which faced him on his return to the Cape. A 
faithful husband Grey was not. On much contemporary 
evidence, too persistent to be ignored, and on Lady
1 4Grey's own testimony, Grey was a notorious philanderer.
He publicly enjoyed the company of young ladies and 
their obvious admiration of him1 ^  and reportedly 
dallied with his wife's maid.1  ^ One particular in­
formant remembered Grey in New Zealand being constantly 
surrounded by young Maori women and mentioned meeting a
handsome and courteous young man who was rumoured to be 
17 .Grey's son. Faced with circumstantial evidence such
as this, it becomes more difficult to accept Grey's 
'distress' on the 'Forte'. The stalled situation in
13
13. Sir George and Lady Grey sailed for the Cape in the flag­
ship, 'Forte', which was also bringing Admiral Sir Henry 
Keppel to the Cape to assume office there. Grey spent 
much of his time on board on his back, and Lady Grey 
formed a friendship with the Admiral. She found in him 
a sympathetic confidant. Their cabins adjoined, and 
Grey found them exchanging notes. He made an hysterical 
fuss, threatening suicide, and the Captain agreed to 
return to Rio where Lady Grey and her maid were disem­
barked and sent back to England.
14. B.J. Dalton to T. Gutsche, private correspondence,
14 February 1975*
15* Life at the Cape a Hundred Years Ago, by A Lady.
(C. Struik 1963), p.13.
16. Wynberg Times, November 1898, Article signed by PAKEHA.
17. Ibid. But not Lady Grey's. Their only child died in 
infancy.
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British Kaffraria, coupled with his own inability to 
accept censure and setback, probably provided a much 
stronger incentive to leave the Colony.
The Governor's schemes for British Kaffraria had not
been as successful as he had hoped. His plans depended
on vast sums of money which were not forthcoming. The
Imperial grant had been drastically reduced, and he was
hard put to find alternative sources of revenue. Lung-
sickness and the Cattle Killing had made deep inroads
into the funds which could have been diverted towards
developing British Kaffraria. The Cape Parliament
contributed towards the Frontier Armed and Mounted
Police, but was jealous of their use beyond the frontier,
so Grey was criticized by some for using them to expel
Sarhili from his Kei-Mbashe lands and for posting a
1 8small detachment near Idutywa. Lt. Col. Jackson's
retention of as many British troops as possible at the 
Cape also militated against the Governor's call for 
imperial funds.
Grey's plans for the civilization of the people of British
18. A.E. du Toit, 'The Cape Frontier: A study of Native
Policy with Special Reference to the Years 1847-1866', 
in Archives Year Book for S.A. History, I, 1954, p.121.
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Kaffraria exceeded anything the Imperial Government had 
envisaged when creating it a separate province in the 
(non-promulgated) Letters Patent, and his call for the 
further extension of British authority across Indepen­
dent Kaffraria to Natal was made at a time when the 
Colonial Office was advocating retrenchment and with­
drawal. They refused to annex parts of the Trans­
keian territories which Grey had hopefully cleared for 
white settlement. In addition, plans for the federa­
tion of southern Africa had to be abandoned.
The German Military Settler scheme also threatened to 
become a costly failure, and further German immigra­
tion to British Kaffraria was being blocked by the 
Colonial Office. This seriously undermined Grey's 
plans for a buffer between black/white settlement on 
the frontier and his hope of 'civilization by cultural 
osmosis'.
Towards the end of his term Grey was, therefore, ex­
periencing a fair amount of opposition for someone who 
could neither accept the criticism nor admit to being 
wrong. As a man of independent action, it is unlikely 
that he would willingly have accepted the restrictions
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placed on him by the Colonial Office. The best way 
out of the dilemma facing him would have been to 
leave the Cape. He carefully prepared the way, both 
in the Colony itself, and at the Colonial Office, 
leaving his work on the Cape eastern frontier incomplete.
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
The Cape eastern frontier, the 'meeting place' between 
Xhosa and white colonists, has been the focus of much 
South African historiography. In fact, frontiers as 
a whole have received more than their fair share of 
attention from historians of all traditions.
Frederick Jackson Turner in the United States was one 
of the first historians to produce a significant study 
of the influence of the frontier in history. His 
hypothesis was that the frontier experience shaped both 
the American character and American institutions. He 
claimed that the American frontier experience was unique 
and that American frontiersmen had largely gained their 
faith in the equality of men from it. What Turner and 
others after him failed to bring out fully was that 
frontier processes involve at least two societies.
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Among the influential earlier works on the subject of
19the South African frontier were those of Eric Walker
20and the psychologist I.D. MacCrone. Both argued
that South Africa's prevailing race attitudes had 
originated on the frontier and that the Great Trek was 
seminal in the spread of these attitudes into the 
South African interior. Broadly speaking, this 
Liberal thesis was that the frontiersmen, in isola­
tion, developed a new way-of-life and this frontier 
tradition then left its mark upon the whole of 
South Africa. In due course the influence of the 
frontier, particularly on racial attitudes, resulted 
in the colour-bar in industry, urban segregation 
and opposition to the non-racial franchise in the 
Cape. The frontier was said to have bred indivi­
dualism and anarchism and a suspicion of, and hostility 
to, government authority, which resulted in such anti­
government action as the Rand Revolt of 1922. The 
frontier was also associated with land hunger and 
wasteful attitudes towards the land, which in their 
turn were accompanied by an indifference towards the
19- E. Walker, The Frontier Tradition in South Africa, 
(Oxford 1930); The Great Trek~| (A & C Black, Ltd, 
London, 1934 ).
20. I.D. MacCrone, Race Attitudes in South Africa, (O.U.P*1937
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land-rights and land-needs of the African.
21S.D. Neumark in his studies on the economic influence 
of the frontier, has criticized a frequent suggestion 
that frontier expansion was caused because the whites 
needed more arable land or because they desired free­
dom and independence from the Dutch East India 
Company. He has argued instead that the trekboers in 
fact remained closely linked to colonial markets.
In general, Liberal historians felt not only that the 
frontier process resulted in the gradual subjugation 
of the African people and the absorption of their 
land, but also, for the most part, that it was the 
missionaries and officials who were opposed to the pro­
cess of outright conquest. In short, the frontier 
stood for conservative reactionary ideas, while the 
Western Cape of the 18th Century and the input of 
enlightenment, rationalism and humanitarianism from the 
new 19th Century British metropole were seen as the 
source of Cape Liberalism. In these works the 'fron­
tier tradition' thesis has imposed a dichotomy, at
21. S.D. Neumark, Economic Influences on the South African 
Frontier 1652-T836, (Stanford, 1957 ).
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times of missionaries and officials against colonists,
at times of Afrikaner nationalists against their
(largely British) opponents, and at times of Cape
22Liberalism against Republican frontiersmen.
The classic frontier thesis as stated by Frederick 
Jackson Turner and as applied to the South African 
situation in considerably modified form by Liberal 
historians in this country, has been criticized by 
modern radical and revisionist historians, who have 
offered alternative interpretations of frontier. One 
of the first of these to do so was Martin Legassick, 
who argued that some of the least colour-conscious 
interaction between peoples of different societies 
occurred on the frontier and that for the origins of 
white racism one must look to ideas imported from 
Europe. Legassick critized Turner for seeing the 
frontier in isolation, as the outer edge of the wave, 
and for treating it as a one-sided process. To 
Turner, the Indians were a savage obstacle rather than 
a constituent element in frontier society. Legassick 
further suggested that much closer attention had to be
22. M. Legassick, The frontier tradition in South African
Historiography', in S. Marks & A. Atmore (eds), Economy 
and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, (Longman,1980) 
p.47 •
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pa id to the frontier itself, and in doing so, important
questions needed to be asked such as: 'What is the
frontier?; What are its special influences?; And
23how does it perpetuate them, if it does at all?'
Lamar and Thompson in The Frontier in History, define 
a frontier as a 'territory or zone of interpenetration 
between two previously distinct societies' 4 and offer 
three essential elements in a frontier situation:
1. territory
2. two or more initially distinct socie­
ties one of which is usually indigen- 
nous to the region
3. process by which the relations among the 
peoples begin, develop and eventually 
crystallize.
These elements were all part of the Cape eastern frontier 
situation in the mid-19th Century.
A frontier zone moves through various phases from an 'open' 
frontier to a 'closed' frontier, all stages displaying
23- Ibid, passim.
24. H. Lamar & L. Thompson (eds), The Frontier in History 
North America and Southern Africa compared, (Yale 
University 1981), p.7.
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different characteristics. Within this frontier pro­
cess Hermann Giliomee has distinguished three classic 
types of white frontiersmen: the first was the trans­
colonial frontiersmen such as the traders (and, 
perhaps, the missionaries); the second was the pioneer 
frontier society which coexisted on a frontier zone 
with other ethnic groups competing for the land and 
its resources (here, there were three or four decades 
of intensive Afrikaner/Xhosa contact on the Cape 
eastern frontier in the later 18th Century); and the
third, the settled frontier society living on what
28could be called the closing frontier.
Frontier expansion, or the moving frontier, is a 
dynamic from which it has been possible to generate 
contradictory hypotheses. Neumark's theory that the 
frontiersmen were largely self-sufficient (though 
responsive to market opportunities) and thus, that any 
expansion of white settlement was largely a response 
to the demand for the produce of the interior, has been 
criticized by Robert Ross, who feels that Neumark does
25* Hermann Giliomee, 'Processes in Development of the 
Southern African Frontier', in Lamar and Thompson, 
The Frontier in History, p.77 ff.
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no t sufficiently explain the rapid spread of colonial
2 Sstructures in Southern Africa.
Ross maintains that an explanation of frontier expan­
sion must be an attempt to analyze individual decisions 
to move out, and he identifies several motives for 
expansion in southern Africa. One reason behind early 
expansion at the Cape was the Roman-Dutch law of in­
heritance introduced into the colony. On the death 
of a father or husband, the estate would be divided 
among the heirs who would then cease to operate as any 
form of economic unit. Pastoral farming was more 
conducive to expansion that other types of farming, as 
sons, by moving on, did not have to wait till the 
father’s death to become independent. However, there 
were also those who moved out to the frontier because 
of the material advantages it offered, and after 1836, 
those who moved deeper inland for political reasons.
The frontier experience in southern Africa was differ­
ent for white and black. From the white point of view, 
settlement carried with it ideas of occupation of the
26. R. Ross, ’Economics of the Southern African Frontier’, 
in Lamar & Thompson, The Frontier in History, p.217 ff.
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land and control of its resources, of conquest and
27incorporation of indigenous peoples. For Africans,
as Martin Legassick has pointed out, the frontier was 
the first stage of a process in which their political 
power was eroded and in which their material and social 
bases were transformed as they were drawn into a capi­
talist market economy linked with Europe.
Each stage of the frontier process showed different 
characteristics. On the pioneering frontier (or 
opening frontier) there was a relative freedom of 
action. A power vaccuum led to endemic conflict with 
local commandos attempting to maintain control. There 
was an abundance of land and the farmers lived mostly 
on a subsistence level. According to Lamar and 
Thompson, this apparent availability of land led to an 
aggressive expansion into indigenous areas and per­
petuated hierarchical concepts of society and fostered
2 8forced labour systems. On the extreme frontier,
however, white and black frontiersmen shared similar 
lifestyles and white frontiersmen sought co-operation
27. H. Giliomee, 'The Southern African Frontier', p.78.
28. H. Lamar & L. Thompson, The Frontier in History, p.30.
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and aid from the Xhosa. ' Thus, the early frontiers­
man did not view the African solely as an enemy or a 
servant.
In the open phase of the frontier there was a rough
political balance between black and white: it was the
'closing' of the frontier that was to bring white
domination. This was essentially a process of multiple
closing on an economic, social and political level.
The economic closure manifested itself in a growing
scarcity of land and resources, a shift from subsistence
to commercial farming, and increasing control of the
30means of production of a specific class. In the
southern African context, the frontier closed when
control over the so-called 'means of production' passed
31definitely to the colonists. The closing of the
frontier was a time fraught with insecurity for the 
white colonists as they tried to adapt to the new econo­
mic imperatives. The Cape eastern frontier began to 
close rapidly after 1780 as further expansion in the
29» M. Legassick, 'The frontier tradition in South African 
historiography', p.66.
30. H. Giliomee, The Southern African Frontier', p.79.
31. R. Ross, 'Economics of the Southern African Frontier', 
p.223.
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ear ly 19th Century was resisted by the stronger con­
trol of the British government.
The closing frontier also brought with it a growing
social stratification as a plural society emerged with
32a given set of caste or class relationships.
Legassick insists that class structures did not begin 
on the frontier, but that the essential matrix of 
ideas from which racism grew already existed in Europe, 
especially Protestant Anglo-Saxon Europe. He feels
that the essence of the race attitudes were to be found
. 33m  existing class relations rather than race relations. '
This was in part the result of the new industrial 
society in Britain. In his study of Victorian England, 
G.M. Young pointed out that industrialization in that 
country resulted in the visible splitting of British 
society into possessors and proletariat, and the 
widening of the gap between classes.^ According to 
Legassick, these attitudes tended to harden in over­
seas societies generated by expansion, being there 
transformed into racist ideologies. Thus, class
32. H. Giliomee, 'The Southern African Frontier', p.79*
33. M. Legassick, 'The frontier tradition', p.49.
34. G.M. Young, Portrait of an Age. (London, O.U. P.j 1 966 ), 
pp.24 & 25.
-198-
attitudes became race attitudes. Although this was 
a phenomenon largely associated with industrializa­
tion, at the Cape the development of peasant 
farming, particularly in the 1850s, brought with it 
new forms of social and economic stratification.
By the end of the 1850s, especially after the Cattle 
Killing, there was a significant number of landless 
Africans, and this, together with the increasing 
social stratification, meant that the traditional 
economy was no longer viable. This in turn, added 
to the process whereby the African was forced onto 
the labour market.
The political closing of the frontier was charac­
terised by the imposition of a single authority over 
35the whole area. This was accompanied by the decline
of regional strife as the central government took over 
local administration. For the African this was 
accompanied by subordination to white colonial rule 
and economic incorporation into the capitalist system.
In the frontier process^R. Elphick has drawn parallels 
between the stages of transition from 'opening1 to
35• H. Giliomee, 'The Southern African Frontier', p.79*
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'closure' and the stages of the African response to 
missionaries. From the early 19th Century mission­
aries were an important component of frontier society 
and thus much interaction on the frontier was of 
necessity labelled 'religious'. Mission stations 
usually experienced all three main phases of frontier 
development: the open frontier; the closing fron­
tier; and the closed frontier with its unambiguous
56white rule. Elphick has analysed the African
response to each of these phases.
In phase one, the chiefs allowed, even encouraged, 
the setting up of mission stations. They hoped 
that the missionaries would bring western goods 
(guns and foodstuffs) and introduce new technologies, 
but, above all, would provide invaluable political 
and military intelligence upon which they could base 
their decisions for survival. Missionaries could 
also act as advisers, interpreters and plenipoten­
tiaries in dealing with colonial authorities. In 
this early phase, African rulers suspected mission-
36. R. Elphick, 'Africans and the Christian Campaign in
Southern Africa', in Lamar and Thompson, The Frontier 
in History, p.270 ff.
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aries of having privileged access to the power of the 
High God and hoped that they would thus be able to 
protect them from attacks from both black African 
and white enemies alike. Missionaries were 
patronised as though they were traditional prophets, 
rainmakers or healers. When accepting a missionary, 
the chief was more interested in the links of the 
missionary with Western civilization than in 
Christianity.
The African response to the closing frontier was one
of participation in the life of the mission station.
A small number settled on the station and a larger
number came regularly for instruction. Some
Africans came to the stations to learn to read and
write, but when the initial fascination wore off,
attendance figures declined. As illustrated by the
Xhosa response and corroborated by Norman Etherington's
37research among the Zulu, the majority of Africans 
distrusted the schools as agents of evangelization.
Most of the converts and those attending schools were
37. N. Etherington, ’Rise of the Kholwa in Southeast Africa: 
African Christian Communities in Natal, Pondoland and 
Zululand, 1835-1888', (PhD, Yale University, 1971).
-201 -
outcasts from Nguni society or children of mission 
people. It would not be until the full closure of 
the frontier that education would be seen to have any 
general relevance. The merely 'closing' frontier 
ensured that Africans would associate missionaries 
and Christianity with the colonial authorities, who 
were increasingly their enemies, and this therefore 
encouraged an indifference to missions which often 
turned to positive hostility. In many cases stations 
survived only because of the chief's dependence on the 
missionaries as links with the colonial officials with 
whom he had by that stage to interact.
In these circumstances the closing frontier often threw 
the more tradionally-minded Africans back on their own 
indigenous religion in search for forms of knowledge 
and power that could counter the white threat. The 
Cape eastern frontier was in the process of closing 
during the 1850s. In an attempt to restore the old 
world-order in the face of colonial pressures, the 
Xhosa turned to such traditional remedies. Seen in 
this light, the Cattle Killing assumes an added dimen­
sion as a phenomenon of a closing frontier.
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Elphick has suggested that just after a frontier has 
closed definitively, one might expect a period, how­
ever brief, when the indigenous peoples would be
attracted to mission stations because of their identi-
38fication with Western civilization. As an example
he suggests the positive response of the Xhosa to the 
missionaries in the 1860s after the Cattle Killing. 
However, the research carried out for this thesis has 
shown that the idea of a positive response in the 1860s 
is fallacious and that the 1860s were, rather, years of 
increased antagonism towards the missionaries. This 
hostility seems to suggest that the frontier was still 
in the process of closing, and that the true closure 
and the period of acceptance would be better placed in 
the 1870s and 1880s. It was in these later years that 
the Xhosa came to accept the benefits of education as 
a means of competing in the altered circumstances pro­
duced by the mineral revolution.
Though the overall turning-point in the process of the 
closing of the frontiers was reached at the end of the 
1870s, forces at work on the Cape eastern frontier
38. R. Elphick, 'Africans and the Christian Campaign', 
p.295.
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during the era of Sir George Grey indicate that the 
act of incorporating reached what was probably its 
point of critical acceleration at that stage. 
Christopher Saunders has further suggested that the 
subtle process of the substitution of magisterial 
for chiefly authority provides the best evidence 
that the frontier was speeding up into its final 
stages of closing. This was also part of the exten­
sion of 'British protection' which, as earlier 
suggested, was hardly to the advantage of the African 
people.
If Saunders is correct, then Grey certainly had a 
major part to play in imparting an uncontrollable 
momentum to the closing of the frontier. He 
settled the population of British Kaffraria under a 
system of resident magistrates and introduced white 
settlers onto land previously occupied by the Xhosa.
He maintained a military presence in the area and 
modernised the 'police force' under Currie to make it 
into the formidable Frontier Armed and Mounted Police. 
Taxes were then imposed on the newly settled Xhosa to 
draw them into the colonial labour market and economic 
system. Thus, Grey's actions markedly intensified 
those forms of white dominance over the indigenous
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people which especially characterize the 'closing' 
phase of the frontier process.
Grey's determination to extend British influence over 
the Cis- and Transkeian territories would have been 
considered by sociologist Max Weber to have been part 
of a natural process of state expansion. Weber 
believed that every powerful political community had a 
natural urge to expand and increase its sway over others, 
largely because its rulers and military leaders could 
best enhance their prestige and prosecute their own 
careers by aggressive expansion of state territory.
Within the state structure, Weber was also concerned with 
the subtleties of domination and the authoritarian power 
of command. Unlike the Marxists who were far more aware 
of the role of coercion and compliance within some states, 
Weber felt that only 'willing' obedience legitimised the 
domination of the leader. However, both the Marxist 
and Weberian notions of domination could be said to be 
relevant to the South African situation in the mid-19th 
Century. In the interaction between the missionaries 
and the Governor, the former offered more or less 
willing obedience to Grey, both to the man and to his 
official position. The Xhosa would have been far more
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aware of the threat of force (or coercion) in the 
process of their incorporation within the ambit of 
British domination and, ultimately, control. This is 
not to say that Weber did not recognize the role that 
force had to play in the varieties of social action^ 
even where order and harmony apparently prevailed.
What was notable to him was that the state (in this 
case it would have been Grey as the representative of 
the state) claimed a monopoly over the legitimate use 
of violence - the sole right to use force upon anyone 
and everyone living within its territorial jurisdiction.
Although Grey used this 'legitimate force' against 
Sarhili in Kaffraria Proper, it had not been necessary 
in British Kaffraria - the Cattle Killing had made 
coercion superfluous. In any case, Grey had hoped that 
the extension of religion and education with the help 
of the missionary bodies would begin to produce 'willing 
co-operation' from the Xhosa. It has earlier been 
suggested that the missionaries genuinely believed that 
Christianity was vital to the salvation of the heathen 
and were therefore willing to become partners, even if 
minor ones, in Grey's plans for the extension of 'civili­
zation' in British Kaffraria. Grey's aims for the use 
of religion and education differed from those of the
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missionaries, and would again find an explanation in 
Weberian, and, indeed, Marxist, thought. Grey hoped to 
use religion as a weapon of 'ideological control and 
pacification*. Thus, according to Weber, religion had 
become a tool in the hands of the beaurocratic classes 
to bring about mass domestication.
Marxist historians would see the processes of coercion 
and domination attendant upon Xhosa incorporation 
within the colonial sphere as further examples of the 
general process of the exploitation of one class by 
another. In fact, one of the'results of the closing 
frontier which has attracted much attention from social 
historians was the proletarianization of Africans and 
their incorporation into the colonial labour market.
Land and labour were major forces in the relationship 
between black and white on the South African frontiers. 
The arrival of the British settlers in the Zuurveld area 
intensified the labour demands, already acute, and the 
colony began to lend an increasingly institutionalized 
support to the techniques by which labour could be 
controlled. While the Xhosa still retained a viable 
alternative, they were reluctant to become wage- 
labourers in a situation which would be to their dis­
advantage. In fact, Landdrost Stockenstrom was
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prophetic when he maintained in the 1820s that only the
Xhosa driven into the colony by starvation would become
39useful servants. ' While the proletarianization of 
black labour in southern Africa is generally regarded as 
the result of the mineral revolution, it was also 
partially a pre-industrial process. Grey himself was 
very concerned about the colony's 'labour problem', and 
he certainly hoped to create a labour supply to fulfil its 
demands. To this end, the colonial parliament tightened 
up on the control which masters could exercise over 
their labour in 1856.^ Not only Grey's relief measures 
after the Cattle Killing, but also an aspect of his 
village system, were directed towards forcing a supply 
of labour into the colony.
However, Grey was not solely interested in the supply 
and repression of labour. Part of the motivation 
behind the issue of land titles to the Xhosa was the 
creation of a peasant class among the Africans to
39* Susan Newton-King, 'The Labour Market of the Cape Colony, 
1807-28',.in Marks and Atmore, Economy and Society, p.194.
40. H. Giliomee, 'The Southern African Frontier', p.106.
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act as a buffer alongside his German settlers on the 
frontier. This was also in the interests of the 
missionaries who gave their support to the measures. The 
amount of land was the key to Grey's plans. He felt 
that, if given too much land, the African would be pre­
vented from acquiring 'habits of industry' and from en-
41tering into service. However, the Governor's insis­
tence on such habits of industry must also be seen and 
considered against a wider context than just that of the 
exigencies of the frontier.
The Victorians had an almost universal faith in progress. 
Both Grey and the missionaries reflected the thinking of 
their age and must, thus, be seen against a background 
of the Evangelical theology which permeated the Victorian 
era. This rested on a profound belief that those not 
in a State of Grace were in a fearful position. Given 
the strength of their religious convictions and the 
narrow interpretation of Grace held by many contemporary 
Christians, the ideas and actions of the missionaries 
may perhaps become a little more understandable. But 
neither they, nor Grey, should be judged solely against 
a religious background either of Evangelical theology or
41. D. Welsh, Roots of Segregation, (1845^-1910). (O.U.P^1971 ),
p.26.
42. G.M. Young, Portrait of an Age, p.1.
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Weberian paradigms, for there were yet further factors 
that determined their way-of-life and, therefore, their 
political behaviour.
The mid-Victorian years were those of the Manchester School 
of thought or, in other words, the Free Trade era of Cobden 
and Bright. The Free Trade League was founded in 1839*
By the 1840s several members of the government itself sub­
scribed to their ideals, and by the later Victorian era
the new theories of political-economy had become a habit 
43of mind. There was an accelerating interest in the
economic and other sciences in the mid-19 Century, and in 
the midst of expanding industry and commerce, 'laws' were 
being discovered by the 'new science'. These seemed to 
govern capital and labour, profits and wages, the rela­
tions between states and between employers and employees, 
the use of land, the development of manufactures, the
44functions of government and the role of the individual. 
Fundamental to these emerging politcal-economical theories 
was the idea that trade needed to be as free as possible 
and government interference as small as possible - in other 
words, an attitude of laissez-faire.
A major belief of the Free Traders was that the opening
43. Ibid. p.47.
44. D. Read, Cobden and Bright A Victorian Political 
Partnership, (Edward Arnold, London, 1967), p.3•
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of wider markets would not only benefit British manufac­
turers, but would also improve the position of the workers 
and, most important, that international Free Trade would 
herald a new era of international fellowship and harmony. 
In other words, the spread of commerce would establish 
world peace. Peace, of course, in a local context, was 
what was anxiously sought in Southern Africa in the 1850s.
But it was not just colonial administrators who would have 
been imbued with the ideas of the Free Traders. There 
was a strong Christian element in the Free Trade vision.
As Cobden put it, Free Trade was the international law
45 . .of the Almighty. In August 1841 Cobden visibly
linked the Anti-Corn Law League (the institutional em­
bodiment of the Free Trade philosophy) to religion by 
organising a conference of 600 ministers in an attempt 
to prove that there was a link between Christianity and 
the repeal of the Corn Laws.
The missionaries, and, indeed Grey, in addition to a 
belief in Free Trade, would also have subscribed to 
the Protestant 'work ethic'. The other great Free 
Trade exponent, Bright, who was a Quaker, succintly
45. Ibid, p.33
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summed up this belief in 'industry' in a speech to
parliament in April 1849:
'... we shall discover ... that industry, 
hopeful and remunerated - industry, free 
and inviolate, is the only sure founda­
tion on which can be reared the enduring edifice of union and of peace.'46
It was firmly believed that work shaped the mind.
Although this 'Economic Evangelism' was no longer a
dominant philosophy in the 1850s, it had become a
47middle-class point-of-view. As such, it was un­
doubtedly part of the thinking of the missionaries 
and of many colonial administrators. According to 
Weber., this Protestant ethic not only gave rise to the
spirit of capitalism, but also to a distinctive
48'spirit of labour'. For the first time labour was
performed as if it were an end in itself, a 'calling',
which offered the employer 'sober, conscientious,
and unusually industrious workmen, who clung to their
49work as to a life purpose willed by God'. - Such a 
'work force for God' would clearly result in stability 
on the frontier. Although Weber has overestimated the 
impact of Calvinism in this sphere, the missionaries
46. Ibid. p.88.
47* G.M. Young, Portrait of an Age, p.87.
48. Frank Parkin, Max Weber, (Ellis Horwood Ltd., 1982), p.51.
49. Ibid.
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certainly held a genuine belief in the 'dignity of 
labour 1.
The expanding British commerce and its demand for 
markets was reflected in Grey's concern for the 
creation of local markets. At the same time, this 
aspect of his administration has offered Radical 
historians the ammunition with which to attack him.
It is an inescapable fact - and one which was decried 
by Cobden - that the 'Free Trade1 as practised by the 
Victorians not only encompassed the willing and peace­
ful exchange of goods, but also the use of force to 
open and retain markets to the disadvantage of the 
indigenous peoples.
As far as the desire for peace and stability on the 
frontier was concerned, Grey and the missionaries spoke 
as one man, and sought to attain such goals by similar 
means. Both were influenced by the Christian-based 
Free Trade ideas of Cobden and Bright and both encour­
aged the creation of a class of market-orientated 
peasants centred around mission stations. A side- 
effect of this was the encouragement of processes of 
stratification in African society. Missionaries made
- 2 1 3 -
a further contribution to this development. Around 
the stations, the 'red'/'school1 division among the 
Cape Nguni was an early manifestation of developing 
class formation (other than the traditional division 
of society). In later years, mission education united 
an emerging petty bourgeoisie and helped to organise 
them around the movement of individuals between mission 
centres such as Lovedale and Adams College (Natal) and 
the urban centres. At this more advanced stage, 
mission institutions also contributed much to the 
formation of working-class patterns of social organi­
sation and cultural expression. ^
Certainly, then, the emphasis laid by the missionaries 
on individualism and the dignity of work (which Atmore 
and Westlake have suggested meant only cheap labour) 
contributed to the expanding Cape economy. But the 
1850s were still largely the period of the pre-indus­
trial economy, and the labour demanded was, thus, 
mainly for the agricultural community. Bundy has 
pointed out that the missionaries did offer a viable
50. David Coplan, 'The emergence of an African working-class 
culture', in S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds), Industriali­
sation and Social Change in South Africa, ( Longman, 1 982 ), p.358 ff.
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and positive alternative to cheap wage labour in the 
Cape Colony in the shape of a developing peasant 
farming sector. Predictably, mission-educated Afri­
cans proved more ready to take up the challenges of 
a new system of agriculture as they would later be 
more capable of adapting to the new industrial society.
In this sphere, then, the missionaries made a positive 
contribution to a changing situation which was ultimately 
beyond both their, and the Africans', control.
A further aspect of Grey's own attempts to supply a 
labour force was the urgent need to make the Cape Colony 
pay its way. Part of the Free Trade ethos was the
general demand for retrenchment and the cutting down of 
colonial expenditure. Grey had to deal with increas­
ingly parsimonious Chancellors of the Exchequer, who 
had been only too glad to pounce on his early forecast 
of diminishing Imperial expenditure in British Kaffraria 
in order to halve the amount available to him imme­
diately after the Cattle Killing - when it was possibly 
needed the most. For men like Gladstone, economy was 
akin to religion. It was therefore imperative that 
Grey should find ways to make the Cape Colony as self­
sufficient as possible. And he was more or less sure
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that the Xhosa could be a means of expanding the 
colonial economy and of contributing thereby to this 
self-sufficiency in the long run.
The missionaries' role in the frontier processes,
especially in the closing of the frontier, has been
called into question. Certainly, the extension of
the 'missionary' frontier at times coincided with that
of the 'merchant' and 'trader', who have all been
classified as 'intruders' in the frontier zone by Lamar 
51and Thompson." These authors have suggested that the 
process of eroding traditional society was directly 
related to the number and category of intruders. How­
ever, one can not be too simplistic about the causes 
of the undermining of traditional society, and the 
importance attributed to missionaries in this process 
has perhaps been overrated.
The same has to be said about the claim that the Cattle 
Killing opened the way for a virtual mass conversion 
of the Xhosa to Christianity. Mission figures in the
51. L. Thompson and H. Lamar, 'Comparative Frontier History', 
in Lamar & Thompson, The Frontier in History, p.9.
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1860s and missionary writings show clearly the anta­
gonism towards Christianity and a reversion to 'nativism' 
and 'heathenish' ways. The detailed examination of 
missionary records of this period has also confirmed a 
similar suggestion made by Donovan Williams in his 
biography of Tiyo Soga. A simple judgement of the 
missionaries as the vanguard of colonial advance or 
as the 'fifth column of imperialism' just cannot be 
that easily made.
The reputations of missionaries and colonial officials 
have fared variously in South African Historiography.
Dr. George McCall Theal and Sir George Cory were both 
critical of missionaries and of the British government 
in London. Later Liberal historians have sought to 
rescue them - as well as local officials - from the 
onslaughts of Theal and Cory. In this Liberal view, 
missionaries and officials were the only committed 
opposition to the gradual colonial encroachment on 
African lands. These historians have also suggested 
that British rule at the Cape fostered among at least 
some Cape citizens a moderate or liberal approach to 
racial questions and politics in general. More 
recently the phrase 'Cape Liberalism' has come to be
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associated with the Western Cape, or more specifically, 
with Cape Town itself. What part did missionaries 
and officials on the distant eastern frontier have to 
play in it?
There has been considerable debate recently about the
nature of the 'Cape Liberal tradition'. Phyllis
Lewsen, in an article 'The Cape Liberal Tradition -
.Myth or Reality' has argued that by the early 20th
Century a somewhat conservative form of Liberalism had
taken root at the Cape, and while she has admitted some
defects in it, has been able to conclude that 'the Cape
did partially acclimatize a liberal system from abroad
. 52and develop ... a viable liberal tradition'.
Since then revisionist historians, notably Stanley 
Trapido, Colin Bundy and Martin Legassick, have ques­
tioned whether the conventional definition of Liberalism 
could be applied to conditions at the Cape, especially 
as these affected blacks. Trapido has maintained that
it is misleading to write of 'Cape liberalism' and that
53'liberalism in the Cape' would be more accurate.
52. P. Lewsen, 'Cape Liberal Tradition - Myth or Reality?', ir 
Race, XIII, 1(1971), pp.78-9*
53• S. Trapido, 'The Friends of the Natives', in Marks & At­
more, Economy and Society, p.247.
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Liberalism in the Cape is best known for its non-racial, 
qualified franchise. When British Kaffraria was 
annexed to the Cape, many mission-educated people 
qualified for this franchise.
Stanley Trapido has in fact identified two liberal 
traditions at the Cape, the 'great* tradition and the 
'small' tradition. Missionaries had a contribution 
to make to both. After I860, the major missionary 
contribution to the great tradition (which included 
leading financial and commercial enterprises and certain 
administrators) came from the Scottish missionaries at 
Lovedale. The small tradition evolved in consti­
tuencies where a combination of peasant and 'town'
voters could hold one of the two seats in the two-
• 54 .member constituencies. Such a constituency was
King William's Town in British Kaffraria, where the 
merchants and missionaries combined to determine the 
outcome of the 1873 election in that constituency.
Thus, missionaries and converts were able to exert 
a certain influence in Cape elections.
Liberalism at the Cape, however, showed little real
54. Ibid, p.259.
-219-
altruism. Revisionists have argued that it was closely 
aligned with the needs of a developing capitalist 
economy. In the districts of the small tradition 
(essentially the area of the Eastern Cape annexed be­
tween 1847 and 1865, i.e. the frontier districts) where 
prosperity depended to a great extent on the surplus 
produced by black cultivators, attacks on the rights of 
Africans were regarded as attacks on the peasant sector. 
This meant that defending the peasant sector came to in­
volve defending the rights of Africans as a whole. In 
this way, those who had interests in a healthy peasant 
community (who were the missionaries, merchants and 
administrators) were the ones who came also to be iden­
tified with the small tradition of liberalism. Thus 
it becomes clear that not merely ideology lay at the 
root of the colour-blind franchise and the creed of 
civic equality.
Trapido has described this support given by missionaries, 
merchants and officials to a black peasantry as 'a 
strategy developed by colonial administrators and settler 
politicians for the political incorporation of a part of 
the African population* in response to economic impera­
tives .
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The 1850s was a period of stalemate for Christian 
missions. Society was pre-capitalist, so Africans 
were able to some extent to maintain a degree of 
social cohesion. Peasant cultivators were responding 
to market incentives, although at the same time in­
creasing numbers of Africans were in the process of 
being forced onto the wage labour market. The 1860s 
brought little improvement for missionary fortunes; 
indeed there were times of definite setback. It was 
not until the mineral revolution in the latter part 
of the 19th Century that the situation changed 
aopreciably for them. The frontiers closed rapidly, 
and the demand for cheap labour intensified. This 
was accompanied by rising white resentment of black 
peasant cultivators who were opting out of the labour 
market. Thus began the systematic closing of options 
for blacks for a free participation in the capitalist 
economy.
The new economic system demanded a new response from 
the missionaries. With the upsurge of migrant labour 
and urbanisation of Africans, the old-style mission 
station was no longer viable. Africans began 
demanding education, and so it was that the missionary
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breakthrough, said to have taken place in the 1860s, in 
fact came only with the substantial proletarianization 
of Africans. J The new skills and needs of the rural 
Christians made the move to urban areas more attrac­
tive to them than to non-Christians. Mission churches 
were established on the mines and missionaries were 
forced to abandon their rigid approach and adapt to 
the new situation and emerging cultures. Africans, for 
their part, were now more willing to accept Christianity 
as part of the new society, which, perhaps, corroborates 
Trollope's observation, made earlier, that industria­
lisation would bring more people to Christianity than 
missionary labour in the field. J.C. Warner had been 
convinced in 1856 that civilization and religion would
never progress among the Xhosa until their traditional
56culture had been destroyed.' Industrialisation was
to do this far more effectively than the missionaries
could ever have done. Substantiating this fact is
J.K. Galbraith's argument that the very process of
labour migration is in itself a powerfully corrosive
57force upon traditionalism.
55• David Coplan, 'The emergence of an African working- 
class culture', p.367.
5 6. See p. 68.
57* J.K. Galbraith, The Nature of Mass Poverty, (Harvard 
University Pressj 1979)•
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Christianity in urban areas reflected the new ideas 
and values and bolstered the increasing stratifica­
tion of society. Archie Mafeje, in a survey carried 
out in Langa, found that religion and education were
c orelated to class differentiation. Those who had
acquired white Christian culture and education were
perceived as being something apart from, and above,
the pagans. Interestingly enough, Mafeje found that
while this was true of urban areas, it did not apply
to the rural areas where terms of reference were
intrinsically African rather than European, and
pagans were not necessarily poorer or politically
59less powerful than Christians.
Trollope's observations, together with Mafeje's 
survey, to some extent reinforce the observations on 
religion of Max Weber himself. His main field of 
investigation was in modern industrial societies, 
where he was primarily interested in the way in which 
different types of social experience were related to 
different modes of religious expression and belief.
58. Archie Mafeje, 'Religion, class and ideology in South 
Africa', in M.G. Whisson & M. West (eds), Religion 
and Social Change in Southern Africa, (David Philip, 
C.T. 1975), p. 168.
59. Ibid, p.177.
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He believed that religion rationalized culture and
that a certain set of religious precepts would inspire
61a predictable type of social action. Weber linked
Puritanism with the development of modern capitalism 
and maintained that Calvinist ethics served to dignify 
the accumulation of wealth. In the South African 
context, Christianity became, for the black African, 
part and parcel of a new social standing in an urban 
society. Christianity became the means of adapting 
to the new social system within an industrial frame­
work and provided an entry into a changing world.
But most of these developments lay in the future, not 
in the 1850s, and it would be wrong to read them back 
too far. Thus, if one is looking for a 'fifth column 
of imperialism’in the 1850s it is probably to be found 
in both the personality and the convictions of the 
Governor at the time, Sir George Grey. These were both 
idiosyncratic and related more generally to the cul­
tural assumptions he shared with the intellectuals and 
imperial administrators of his day. Grey, rather than 
the missionaries, was the essential cutting-edge creating
60. M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalisml (George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1976).
61. F. Parkin, Max Weber, p.55*
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opportunities for the missionaries which they were 
unable to exploit effectively until the two processes 
of final frontier closure and large-scale tribal meta­
morphosis took place with the mineral revolution.
In the course of the interaction between the mission­
aries of the Cape eastern frontier and the colonial 
authorities, which is the theme of this dissertation, 
it is therefore clear that Grey had assumed very 
much the role of senior partner. Given his force­
ful, if somewhat erratic, personality and with the 
resources of the colonial state at his disposal, this 
is not altogether surprising. He was Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Colony on one side of 
the frontier and High Commissioner for relations with 
the chiefdoms on the other side. Such cis- and trans­
frontier powers could therefore be used to channel the 
forces of European civilisation upon the set of targets 
in traditional society, not least the chiefly authority, 
which he had identified as inimical to various sets of 
interests within the colony. The main conduits along 
which these intrusive forces passed were those belonging 
to both colony and metropole - their magistrates, 
frontier agents, regular soldiers and policemen. These,
-225-
in turn, provided a system of reticulating-points that 
nourished the growth of the new European society that 
was growing up around them, on and beyond the Cape 
eastern frontier in its ’closing' phase.
Unavoidably, the missionaries found themselves obliged 
to live and work within this system. But that they 
were senior or even major partners in the symbiosis is 
to be questioned. Evidence of their impact in material 
if not spiritual terms reveals that they played an 
adventitious rather than a central role even after the 
Cattle Killing. This is at variance with the thesis 
which sees the missionaries as the main undermining 
force of indigenous Xhosa life.
The erosion of traditional Xhosa society had begun well 
before Grey's time. It is of course true that the 
cumulative set of sociological processes that were at 
work did reach, as we have seen, a climax in the Cattle 
Killing during his Governorship. No doubt missionary 
teaching played a part here, but, again, it was not 
as crucial as, for example, successive defeats in war 
and the land-deprivation that went with these. What 
is really significant was Grey's capacity to influence
SIR GEORGE GREY - CIVILIAN
(Cape Archives - AG 13027)
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the scale of social catastrophe consequent on the 
Cattle Killing and his ability to control the new 
nexus of frontier relations that followed it. But 
this formidable dual influence, it must be stressed, 
was not deployed mainly, or with overwhelming advantage, 
through the missionaries. Even after an interaction 
with the Governor and his officials which had been 
carefully designed to draw them more into line with the 
frontier plans of the colonial state, the missionaries* 
further interaction with the indigenous peoples in 
pursuance of this strategy can at best be called a 
qualified and limited success when looked at even from 
the most favourable angle. Ironically, in their main 
chosen field of converting the heathen, it remains an 
open question whether the missionaries gained intrinsi­
cally from their closer association and interaction 
(after 1854) with the agents and agencies of colonial 
government and especially with the most powerful of 
these - Sir George Grey in his capacity as Governor and 
High Commissioner.
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APPENDIX A
List of principal mission stations on the frontier in the 
1850s:
Wesleyan Methodist Missionary 
Society
Fort Beaufort
Healdtown
Queenstown
D'UrbanPeddie
Mount CokeWesleyville
Annshaw
Kamastone
Lesseyton
Butterworth
Clarkebury
Morley
Shawbury
Bunting/dlle
Church of Scotland
Lovedale
Pirie
Burnshill
Mgwali
Macfarlan
Ely
Church of England (after 1854)
St. Matthews 
St. Marks 
St. Lukes 
St. Johns
London Missionary Society
Peelton (The Rev. R. Birt)
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APPENDIX B
Wesleyan Methodist and Church of Scotland missionaries 
on the frontier in the 1850s and 1860s:
Methodist
Missionary Station
J. Allsopp Palme-rtonJ.W. Appleyard Mount Coke
J. Ayliff Healdtown
E. J. Barret Wodehouse Forests (after 1868)
W.B. Boyce Kamastone
A. Briggs Healdtown
G. Chapman Queenstown
E. Gedye Shawbury/C1arkebury/Mo r1ey/
P. Hargreaves
Butterworth
Clarkebury
W. Holden Fort Beaufort/King William’s
W. Holford
Town
Mount Coke
W. Impey Superintendent
T. Jenkins Palmerton
J. Longden Butterworth/Buntingville 
King William’s Town/AnnshawT. SargeantW. Shaw Albany
T. Wakeford Tyopos
J.C. Warner Thembu
Church of Scotland
Missionary Station
W. Chalmers Lovedale
W. Go van Lovedale
J. Laing Burnshi11
A. McDiarmid (Elder) MacfarlanB. Ross LovedaleJ. Ross Pirie
R. Ross Lovedale
Tiyo Soga Mgwali
J. Cumming
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APPENDIX C
List of magistrates and chiefs
Col. John Maclean Chief Commissioner at Fort 
Murray
J. Ayliff Superintendent of the Crown 
Reserve/Toise
C. Brownlee Sandile
J.C. Gawler Mhala
H. Lucas Maqoma
F. Reeve Kama
R. Robertson Anta
R. Taylor Resident Magistrate, Kind 
William's Town
H. Vigne Phato
J.C. Warner Thembu Agent
M.B. Shaw British Resident, Transkei
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APPENDIX D 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
ANTA, Chief, brother of Chief Sandile
ARMSTRONG, Bishop John (1813-56). Became first Bishop of 
Grahamstown in 1854.
AYLIFF, John (1797-1862), missionary. Came to the Cape with 
the 1820 Settlers and became a missionary in 1827.
Worked first with William Shaw in Grahamstown and then 
Salem and Somerset East before working in the frontier 
regions. Established Healdtown.
BROWNLEE, Charles (1827-90). Son of the missionary the Rev.
J. Brownlee. Considered an expert on Xhosa customs, 
traditions and languages. Appointed Ngqika commissioner 
in 1854 and resided at Dohne. When the Cape gained 
responsible government, he was Secretary for Native 
Affairs.
BROWNLEE, John (1791-1871). L.M.3. missionary. Settled
at Tyumie Valley as missionary and government agent in 
1820. 1825 resumed service with the L.M.S. and established
a station with Ian Tshatshu on eastern banks of the Buffalo 
River. 1838 became a member of the Glasgow Missionary 
Society.
CALDERW00D, Henry (18087-1865). L.M.S. missionary, became 
a government agent 1846/7. 1848 Supervised the settlement
of Mfengu between Oxkraal and Kamastone. Wrote 'Caffres 
and Caffre Missions'.
COLLEY, General Sir George Pomeroy (1835-81). Supervised 
the settlement in territory formerly belonging to Sarhili. 
Later became Chief of Staff to Lord Chelmsford on the 
outbreak of the Zulu War, and Major General in 1880.
Killed at Majuba.
CURRIE, Walter (later Sir) (1819-72). An 1820 Settler.
He became commandant of the Albany Burghers in the Eighth 
Frontier War, and of the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police. 
Led the expedition against Sarhili.
GAWLER, J.C. Appointed resident magistrate with Chief Mhala.
GRAY, Bishop Robert (1809-1872). Appointed first Bishop 
of Cape Town in 1848. With the financial help of Sir 
George Grey he established four mission stations beyond 
the colonial border in the mid-1850s.
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IMPEY, William (1818-1896), missionary. In 1856 he was 
superintendent of Wesleyan Missions in southern Africa.
He was chairman of a Native Affairs Commission in 1865* 
and from 1866 he was principal of Healdtown. In 1875 he 
resigned from the Methodist Church for doctrinal reasons.
JACKSON, Lt. Gen. Sir James. In charge of colonial troops 
in the 1850s. Cory said of him that he'seems always to 
have been quaking with fear and expecting immediate 
disaster1. (The Rise of S.A., vol.5»p»7»)
KAMA, Gqunukhwebe Chief - became the first Christian chief 
though he did not encourage his people to follow his 
example.
LUNG SICKNESS PIeuro-pneumonia, a highly infectious disease 
of cattle and horses.
MACLEAN, John (1810-74). Soldier, administrator and ethnolo­
gist. Appointed Chief Commissioner of British Kaffraria 
in 1852. His Compendium of Kafir Laws and customs, drawn 
up in 1858 for the guidance of special magistrates, was the 
first attempt at the systematic study of African law.
MAQOMA (1798-1873) The greatest of the Xhosa warriors and 
leaders. Eldest son of Ngikqaand in 1829 regent for the 
young Sandile. He was exiled to Robben Island after the 
Cattle Killing, allowed to return in 1869, and sent back 
in November 1871. In 1873 he died in prison.
MFENGU (Fingo). Scattered remnants of various Nguni groups 
broken up and disrupted by the Mfecane. The Gcaleka 
Xhosa gave them large herds of cattle to look after. John 
Ayliff, Wesleyan Methodist Missionary, led them into the 
colony in 1835. They were settled east of the Fish River 
as a buffer between the colonists and the Xhosa.
MHALA Chief. Son and successor of Ndlambe and the leader of 
the Ndlambe clan, rivals of the Ngqika.
MLANJENI A young diviner who gained a following among the 
Xhosa by his prophecies of war.
M0SH0ESH0E Sotho Chief (ca. 1786-1870). Successfully held 
his followers together during the Mfecane. He exploited 
the flat-topped mountains east of the Caledon especially 
that known as Thaba Bosiu. Accused by Grey of instigating 
the Cattle Killing together with Sarhili.
NGUNI A group of southeast Bantu languages spoken by Africans 
of the coastal belt from Zululand to the Ciskei. Divided
into the Cape Nguni or Xhosa-speaking people, and the 
Northern or Natal Nguni.
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NTSIKANA (died 1876) Early convert to Christianity in the 
Eastern Cape. He acquired a considerable following 
and began to compose religious songs, some of which are 
still sung. He was a visionary and prophet and opposed 
the prophecies of his contemporary, Nxele.
NXELE (Lynx) A prophet with Chief Ndlambe. His prophecies 
contributed to the attack on Grahamstown in 1819•
PHATO A Gqunukhwebe chief.
PORTER, William. Attorney-general of the Cape. He was highly esteemed and of great integrity. Porter opposed the court verdict on Chief Mhala after the Cattle Killing.
ROYAL RESERVE This comprised the country from which the 
Ngqika were expelled after the Eighth Frontier War. It 
was occupied by white settlers and by Africans who had 
proved their 'loyalty* and industry. No squatters were 
allowed or cattle herds not belonging to settled 
communities.
SANDILE (1820-78) Son of Ngqika and his great wife and thus 
heir to the Ngqika paramountcy. Indecisive by tempera­
ment, he was persuaded to participate in the Seventh and 
Eighth Frontier wars. This resulted in a considerable 
loss of territory by Sandile. After some hesitation, he 
joined the Cattle Killing movement. He was killed in 
1878.
SARHILI (Kreli). He was paramount chief of the Gcaleka 
and traditionally paramount chief of all the Xhosa.
He was accused by Grey of instigating the Cattle Killing 
and was expelled from a portion of his territory to 
beyond the Mbashe River.
TROLLOPE, Anthony (1815-82) British author and civil
servant. He toured South Africa in 1878 as an unofficial 
adviser on the question of federation.
WARNER, Joseph (1806-1871) Son of an 1820 Settler. He was 
ordained in 1833 and served as a missionary at Imvani, sout? 
of Queenstown with the Thembu. In 1852 he became resident 
Native Commissioner with the Thembu at Glen Grey. Contri­
buted a chapter to Maclean's Compendium.
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S E L E C T  B I B L I O G R A P H Y
1. Manuscript Sources
1.1 Missionaries
1.1.1 Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society
1.1.2 Church of Scotland
1.1.3 Missionaries - general
1.2 Sir George Grey
1.3 Unpublished Official Papers
2. Official Printed Sources
3. Unofficial Contemporary Printed Sources
3.1 General
3.2 Autobiographical
3.3 Newspapers, pamphlets, etc.
4. Bibliographies, Guides, Atlases.
5. General Secondary Works
6. Articles in periodicals
7. Unpublished theses, essays, seminar papers.
1. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES
1.1 MISSIONARIES
1.1.1 Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society 
Private Papers and Manuscripts
Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Archives, School of Oriental 
and African Studies, Malet Street, London.
South African - Biographical, MMS 605
a) Ayliff Papers
b) Jenkins Papers
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Methodist Archives Collection, Cory Library for Historical 
Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.
Allsopp, The Rev. J., 1837-1927 - collection of letters,
MS 15,305? MS 15,152.
Ayliff, The Rev. J. - Brief sketch of the history of the 
Fingoe Tribes to be presented to the Governor (Cathcart),
7 November 1853, MS 15,543.
- collection of papers, MS 15,380; MS 15,542.
- Methodism in the Albany District 1820-57, MS 15,278. 
Ayliff family - collection of papers, MS 15,529; MS 15,613*
Boyce, The Rev. W.B. - miscellaneous remarks on the state 
of the Eastern Frontier of the Cape Colony, MS 15,383.
Jenkins, The Rev. Thomas - private papers, including the 
Jenkins/Shaw correspondence, MS 15,011.
- private papers 1838-1880, MS 15,013.
Shaw, The Rev. William - Reminiscences and iournal, 
T 8 T S -1 8 1 9 , MS 1 5 ,9 0 2 .
Mount Coke Mission - Outline of history, MS 15,288. 
Archives, Victoria Street, Cape Town.
Ayliff papers, A80.
Mrs. C. Ayliff (8 vols)
The Rev. John Ayliff (1797-1862)
1. Diaries 1821-1851
2. Healdtown diaries 1855-1857
Davis, William Jefford, 1810-1883 - Wesleyan missionary journal, A558.
Correspondence - Official
WMMS Archives, SOAS, London.
Correspondence:
Albany - incoming 1825-1857 
Cape - incoming 1825-85 
Kaffraria - incoming 1858-64
South Africa, miscellaneous, Box 109 
South Africa VII - Albany 1834-57, Box 305
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Healdtown 1866, Box 309
South Africa XV, Queenstown, 1868-76, Box 313 
South Africa XXIV, Kaffraria 1858-64, Box 322. 
Grahamstown, Queenstown & Bechuanaland, 1864, Box 325•
Details of S.A. letters, Attitudes of 19th Century 
missionaries to other religions, N/T 100-144, MMS 582;
N/T 160-199, MMS 584; N/T 1-28, MMS 567.
Methodist Archives, Cory Library.
Calderwood, Shaw & Innes - memorandum on native education 
and land tenure - an enclosure to a despatch from Gov. 
Cathcart to the Duke of Newcastle, MS 15,3884.
Healdtown (No.5) - notes and documents including letter 
by Sir George Grey, MS 15,523*
Letters and reports to the General Secretaries of the 
Society from South African missionaries (microfilm),
MS 15,429, Reel 2.
Incoming correspondence, South Africa, Albany/Grahamstown/ 
Kaffraria (microfilm), MS 15,862, Reels 2-5, 22-26.
Outgoing letters from boxes I, III, IV, V, VII, XIX, XXII, 
XXIII, 1818-1884 & Correspondence with the Colonial 
Office, 1822-77 & Circular letters (microfilm), MS 1 5 ,866/ 
1- 2 .
Jenkins, The Rev. T. - letters to General Secretaries 
of the Wesleyan Missionary Society 1862-67, MS 15,391*
Impey, The Rev. W. - letters from Maclean 1856 & 1861,
MS 15,450.
Circuit reports. Synod Minutes, Notices, etc.
WMMS Archives, SOAS, London.
Synod minutes - South Africa, 1820-1867.
Albany and District minutes and reports, 1854-58.
Synod minutes, 1856, Box 336.
Synod minutes, 1857 - 6 3, Box 337*
Synod minutes, 1864 - 68, Box 338.
Methodist Archives, Cory Library.
List of Accessions, 22;
Methodist Missionary Notices, 1857-59
Wesleyan Missionary Reports, 1851-54
Wesleyan Missionary Report, 1855-58
Report of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society,
1859-62
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Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, Reports, London, 
1818-1894
Shaw, The Rev. B. - copy of Wesleyan Missionary Society's 
instructions to missionaries, 1843, MS 15,392.
Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, General Committee 
minutes and related documents, 1798-1884, faicrofilm)
MS 15,867/1-4.
WMMS Notices, 1854 — 5» (microfilm), MS 1 5,868/2.
Albany and Kaffraria District:
Circuit reports, minutes of district meetings, 1845-58, 
MS 15,023.Circuit reports, 1859-71, MS 15,024.
Fort Beaufort Circuit:
minute book: missionary meetings, annual reports and 
other meetings, 1854-87, MS 15,062.
Grey Collection, South African Library. Cape Town.
Wesleyan Methodist Auxiliary Missionary Society - 
Albany and Kaffraria District, Report 1853, G33.C.14
The Report of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society 
for the year ending April 1854.
Report of the Missions in South Africa and of auxiliaries, 
1854.
The Wesleyan notices newspaper, London, Wesleyan Mission 
House (18-?-)
Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society Annual Report, 
London, Wesleyan Missionary Society, (18-?-), G 33.C.15*
1.1.2 Church of Scotland
Church of Scotland - Private Papers and Manuscripts
Church of Scotland Archives, National Library of Scotland, 
Edinburgh.
South African Papers, Acc. 7548, D80.
Church of Scotland Archives, Cory Library.
Brownlee, C. - The condition of the native tribes during 
the century preceeding the introduction of the Gospel 
among them, 1872, MS 8730.
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Brownlee, J. - Letters to Bryce Ross, 1853-70,
MS 8313-15; MS 8698.
Douglas, G.C.M. - letter to the Rev, Bryce Ross, 1861,
MS 8340.
Govan, William - letter to Calderwood, 1855* MS 9114*
- Letters to the Rev. Bryce Ross, 1861-71, MS 8370-74;
MS 8376.
- letter to the Rev. J. Ross, 1856, MS 9115*
- letters by Ross, Govan and Laingbetween 1852 and 1854, 
MS 8726.
Laing, The Rev. - Journal, Vol.II, 1859-77, MS 9043*
- letters to John Ross, MS 8442-43.
- letters to John Ross, I860, MS 9185.
Ross, The Rev. B. - Reports of meetings of Presbytery, 
1854, MS 8711-8713.
- letter to Mr. G. Morrison, 1861, MS 8081.
- letters to father, the Rev. J. Ross, 1852-1868,
MS 7628-7680.
- letters to his father, 1836-1867, MS 7888-7927;
MS 8074-75; MS 8077­
- letters to his wife, 1859-80, MS 7613-7623.
Ross, The Rev. J. - Diaries of John Ross 1829-1870,
MS 3246-3260; MS 3262-3282; MS 8216-18; MS 8221;
MS 8223-4.
- letters MS 8131
- notes about Col. Maclean, 1858, MS 8222
- notea on the visit of Grey to Lovedale, 1855, MS 8168; 
MS 8131.
- Presbytery Report, 1855, MS 8210-11.
- Report of Grey's donation, 1857, MS 9073.
- letter to Grey 1859, MS 8169*
- letters to the Rev. Laing, 1844-57, MS 8170-2.
- letters to Rev. Laing, I860, MS 9184 a-f.
Stormont Papers - correspondence relating to the Scottish 
mission and B.P.C. of South Africa.
Thomson. The Rev. W.R. - letter to J. Ross, 1859, MS 8601.
Grey Collection, South African Library.
B r o w n le e , The Rev. J .  -  l e t t e r  24 M arch  1857 t o  S i r  
George G re y ,  G . 1 0 . C . 1 3 ( 1 1 ) .
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Correspondence - Official
Church of Scotland Archives, Edinburgh.
Letters to United Presbyterian Missionaries, 
MSS 7639-44.
Letters to Free Church Missionaries, MS 7745*
Reports, Minutes, Notices, etc.
Church of Scotland Archives, Edinburgh.
Minutes of the Acting Committee, Foreign Missions 
of the Free Church, 1854-60, Dep.298.
Church of Scotland, Cory Library.
Free Church of Scotland (Kaffraria) Presbytery minutes, 
1824-1889, Vols.1-5, MS 9037-9041.
Free Church of Scotland Presbytery of Kaffraria - 
Formula, 1862-1875, MS 9042.
Missions of the Free Church of Scotland in India and 
Africa, PR 1353; PR 1618.
Grey Collection, South African Library.
The Home and Foreign Record of the Free Church of 
Scotland 1843-1861, G.33.b.13.
Foreign Missions of the Free Church of Scotland, India 
and Africa fields for missionary effort, No.XIX,
G.33.b.15.
Free Church of Scotland report to General Assembly,
May 1858, G.33.b.18.
Free Church of Scotland reports of Colonial and Conti­
nental Committee, May and June 1858, G.33.b.19.
Missions of the Free Church of Scotland - Quarterly, 
No. 1, March 1858; No. 2, June 1858.
1 . 1 . 3  M i s s io n a r i e s  -  G e n e ra l
1820 Settler Museum Archives - Missions
SMD 39(3) Chalmers from Gwali
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SM 5398(8vi) Short sec. work, Rev. Birt at Peelton.
SM 5411(7) Picture of Tyumie
SMD
SM
39(3) 
5411 (1 ) Chalmers from Tyumie
SMD 157 Rev. J. Bennie
SM
SMD
SM
549(6)
630(i)
114(A)
The Rev. William Shaw - grant of land, 
Botanical gardens, biographical sketch, 
diary.
SM 3074 The Rev. J. Ayliff, extracts from journal, 
1826-40.
SM 4722(e-f) Innes - family notes.
Missionary Museum, King William's Town. 
General information.
Archives. Cape Town.
Missionaries:
A 80; 431; 476; 558; 559; 605; 728; 768; 611; 1129;
1217; 1415; 1487; 1538; 1963; 1991; 1999; 2048.
Missionary work:
A 22; 396; 431; 558; 605; 680; 683; 728; 751; 892;
1129;
A728
1217; 
(5 vols)
1538; 1697; 2048.
- Historical notes made by the Rev. D. Clinton
for work on missionaries.
Grey Collection. South African Library.
Missions - Cape of Good Hope, C 1.266.3»G.
1.2 SIR GEORGE GREY 
Private papers - miscellaneous
Grey Collection. South African Library 
Private Papers, MSB 223•
Chase - letter 1858 to Grey, G 11.c.16(2). 
Extract from notebook, G 12.c.6(3)
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L e t t e r s  f ro m  K a f f i r  C h ie f s  t o  S i r  George G re y , G 1 0 . c . 13(16
O b s e r v a t io n s  on th e  p o l i c y  o f  E n g la n d  as r e s p e c t s  h e r  
p o s s e s s io n s  a t  th e  Cape o f  Good Hope, 1857 , G .11 .C
The L i b r a r y  o f  G rey  p r e s e n te d  t o  th e  S o u th  A f r i c a n  P u b l i c  
L i b r a r y  1863, M .S . L i s t  c o m p i le d  by W.H. B le e k ,
G« 1 0 . C . 1 8 .
Archives, Cape Town*
Extracts from letters from South Africa 1857-8, A 597* 
(Sophia D Fisher to her family in Belfast.)
Grey, Sir George - A 301; A 597; A 1456.
Grey family - A 1691.
Grey collection - A 515*
Kilpin Collection - notes, articles, press cuttings re 
among others, Sir George Grey, A 1456.
Cory Library for Historical Research, Rhodes University.
Notes, Sir George Grey and the Orange Free State, 
MS 1213.
Grey Collection, list of African letters, MIC 41 .
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1.3 Unpublished Official Papers
Public Record Office. Kew.
C.0.48 series:
C.0.48/365 Cape of Good Hope 1855366 U It I t It I t
367 t t 11 I t I t t t368 11 M tt It M
369 Cape of Good Hope - Public Office370 Cape of Good Hope - War Office
371 Cape of Good Hope - Individual372 Cape of Good Hope 1 856
373 ft I t t t f l I t
374 I t I t t t I t I t
375 tt t t I t tt I I376 I t t t It It I I
377 M It 11 I t I f378 Cape of Good Hope - Offices, except war.
379 Cape of Good Hope - War Department A-Z380 Cape of Good Hope 1857381 It tt t t I t I t
382 It tt tt I t I t
383 tt t t I t I t I t
384 tt tt It t t t t
385 n i t It t t I I386 Cape of Good Hope - Offices, except war
387 Cape of Good Hope - Individual388 Cape of Good Hope 1858
389 tt tt !1 I t I t390 i t I t tt I t t t
391 Cape of Good Hope - Offices, except war,
392
tion.
Miscellaneous and Individual
393 Cape of Good Hope 1859394 It 11 I I I t I t
395 11 It I t tt I t396 It I t t t It II
397 It It I t It It398 Cape of Good Hope - Offices, except war.
399 Cape of Good Hope - Individual400401 CapeCape
of
of
Good Hope 
Good Hope - Lt. Gov. Wynyard 1 860
402 Cape of Good Hope - Land
403 Cape of Good Hope I860
404 I t I t t t It t t
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C.O.48/405 Cape of Good Hope406 Cape of Good Hope
407 Cape of Good Hope408 I I I t I I I f
409 II II I I I I410 Cape of Good Hope
411 Cape of Good Hope
- Offices, except War
- War office and individual
1861
II
I
- Offices, except War
- Offices, War and individual.
British Kaffraria Records, Archives, Cape Town.
Ref. B.K.
B.K. 1 - 5 7,8 
10 
1 1
14
15
69 - 72
79
80
90 - 92 
100,101  
109
113
114 140 
373376-381
386,387401
405-409
415
High Commissioner 1847-1863 
Colonial Secretary 1852-1862 
Letters to Lt. Governor 1852-64 
Letters' from Lt. Governor 1856-63 
1856-60
Judge for British Kaffraria 
Magistrates with chiefs 
Tambookie 
Sewani
Missions 1848-1866
Native Hospitals
Government Notices
Kaffir Depredations
Circulars and replies
Pensions & allowances, Kaffir Chiefs
Letters to High Commissioner 1854-63
Schedules
Letter Book
Letter Book, Clerk of Peace 
Miscellaneous, Letters despatched
II II II
Archives of the Colonial Secretary's Office of the Cape 
of Good Hope, Archives, Cape Town.
Ref. C.0.
C.O. 634 
637 
655 
677 690 
694 
715
719
739
741760
Chief Commissioner, British Kaffraria 1854 
Ecclesiastical 1854
II IIII  II
Chief Commissioner, British Kaffraria 1857 
Ecclesiastical 1857
Colonial Office, Government House, Convict 
Department and Superintendent of Kaffirs 1858 
Ecclesiastical 1858
Colonial Office, Government House, Superintendent 
of Kaffirs 1859
Ecclesiastical and Educational 1859 
Ecclesiastical I860
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Letters received from Civil Commissioner 1854:
2898 A - B
2899 C2900 F - G
2901 M - Q
2902  3
2903 U - W
2904-2909
2910-29152916-2920
2923-2928
2929-29332936-2940
2941-29472952-2962
2963-29672972-2980
2981-2987
2991
Resident Magistrates 1854 
Civil Commissioners 1855 
Resident Magistrates 1855 
Civil Commissioners 1856 
Resident Magistrates 1856 
Civil Commissioners 1857 
Resident Magistrates 1857 
Civil Commissioners 1858 
Resident Magistrates 1858 
Civil Commissioners 1859 
Resident Magistrates 1859 
A - B Civil Commissioner I860
2. Official Printed Sources
British Parliamentary Papers, Cape of Good Hope, (Irish 
University Pres si”.
Vol.25 Papers regarding the Kaffir tribes and the Affairs 
of the Cape Colony 1852-1858.
1852-53 (1635), Vol.LXVI 
1854-55 (1969), Vol.XXXVIII1856 (2096), Vol. XLII
1857 Session 1 (2202), Vol. X 
1857 Session 2 (97), Vol. XXVIII 
1857.58 (2352), Vol. XL
Vol.26 Correspondence regarding the establishment of
responsible government, the annexation of Griqualand 
West and other Affairs of the Cape Colony 1857-73.
1857-58 (389), Vol. XL I860 (216), Vol. XLV
1860 (357), Vol. XLV
1861 (117), Vol. XXXVI
1862 (403), Vol. XXXVI
Cape of Good Hope Blue Books
4/1/1/1 - 4/1/1/13 Native Affairs 1849-1900
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4/1/1/1 Papers relating to Native Affairs 1849-62 
4/1/1/2 Treaties with Native Chieftains and other 
Border tribes (52) 1857
Government House Records
Ref. GH
Cattle Killing and eating of corn by natives:
GH 50/12 
GH 1/263
Kreli (Sarhili):
GH 30/13; 1/257; 1/263; 31/1; 3/57; 1/110-1;1/185-6; 1/229; 22/2; 30/12; 30/14; 1/287; 1/288;
1/290-1; 1/292/137; 1/305; 1/304; 1/306; 1/307-8;
1/343; 1/365; 1/369; 1/370-1.
Cape of Good Hope - Parliament:
Correspondence between Grey and Secretary of State for 
Colonies 1855-7* Presented to both Houses of Parliament 
by his Excellency the Governor - April 1857*
Appendices to notes and proceedings of Parliament. First 
session 1854, Appendix 1 & 2; second session 1855, Appendix 
2, 3v
Cape of Good Hope - Annexures to the Votes and Proceedings 
of the House of Assembly. Vol.1 A1-125 1861
Cape of Good Hope - Statutes (Acts Nos 1-16 1855)*
Great Britain - Parliament:
House of Commons - Select Committee Report on Aborigines 
(British Settlements, 1836).
South African Public Library:
Copies of the Government Gazette from 1800.
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3. Unofficial Contemporary Printed Sources 
3.1 General
Armstrong, Rt. Rev. John, Bishop of Grahamstown, Notes from
South Africa made in 1854-5, (London, S.P.C.K., 18 5 6)•
Backhouse, J. Extracts from the letters of James Backhouse 
whilst engaged in a religious visit to van Piemans Land,
New South Wales and South Africa, (London, 1842).
Boyce, W.B. Notes on South African Affairs from 1834-38 with 
reference to civil, political and religious condition of 
the Colonists and Aborigines^ (Grahamstown, 1838).
Bruce, C. Graphic scenes in Africa's story - settlers, 
slavery, missions, battlefields, (Edinburgh, 1888).
Calderwood, H. Caffres and caffre missions with preliminary 
remarks on the Cape Colony as a field for emigration and 
basis of missionary operation, (London, Nisbet, 1858).
Cassidy, Capt. Loftus The Kaffir and the Christian. Peace 
or War? (Cape Town, 18 5 6).
Dohne, Jacob Ludwig Das Kafferland und seine Bewohner,
(Berlin 1843).
Gorrie A plea on behalf of the mission of the Free Church 
of Scotland, (Cape Town, 1851 ) •
Kinloch, C.W. The Cape of Good Hope and the Kafir Question, 
(Cape Town, 1856).
Maclean, Col. C.B. Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs,
(Grahamstown, 1856).
Noble, R. (ed) The Cape and its people and other essays by 
South African writers, (S,A. 1 8 6 9).
Read, James The Kat River Settlement in 1851 described in a 
series of letters published in 'The S.A, Commercial Advertise: 
(Cape Town, A.S. Robertson, 1852).
Shaw, W. Defence of the Wesleyan Missionaries in South 
Africa, (Aldum & Harvey Printers, 1839)•
3.2 Autobiographical
Ayliff, J. The Journal of John Ayliff, ed. Peter Hinchliff, 
(Cape Town, 1971). "
Backhouse, J. A narrative of a visit to Mauritius and 
South Africa. (London, Hamilton, 1844).
Brown, J. Personal Adventure in South Africa, (London, 
Blackwood, 1855). " ’
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Brownlee, C.P. Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History, 
(Killie Campbell Africans Library - Reprint Series, 
University of Natal Press).
Clarke, George Notes on Early Life in New Zealand,
(Hobart, 1903)*
Currey, John Blades Half a Century in South Africa, 
ed. Phillida Brooke Simons (for future publication, 
Brenthurst Press).
Edwards, J. Reminiscences of the early life and missionary 
labours of the Rev. J. Edwards, fifty years a Wesleyan 
missionary in South Africa, (Grahamstown, T.H. Grocott,
1 883 K
Govan, W. Memorials of Rev. James Laing, (Glasgow, 1875)*
Keppel, H. A Sailor's Life under Four Sovereigns, (London, 
1899).Lady, a Life at the Cape a Hundred Years Ago, (Struik, 1963
Livingstone, D. Missionary travels and researches in South 
Africa including sixteen years residence in the interior 
of Africa, (London, 1857).
Sadler, C. (compiled) Never a Young Man Extracts from 
Letters and Journals of Rev. William ShawT (Haum, 19&7) •
Shaw, B. Memorials of South Africa, (Cape Town, 1970).
Shaw, W. Memoir of the Rev. William Shaw late general
superintendent of the Wesleyan missions in south-east 
Africa. (London, Nichols, 1875).
Shaw, W. The Story of my Mission among the native tribes of
South Eastern Africa. (1872).
Wilmot, R. A Cape Traveller's Diary, 1856. (A.D. Donker,
for the Univ. of Witwatersrand Library, 1984).
3.3 Newspapers, pamphlets, etc.
The Cape Monthly Magazine, (January 1857-February 1859).
Eastern Province Monthly Magazine, (Vol 1-2, September 1856- August 1858).
Grahamstown Journal, (1856-7).
The South African Christian Watchman and Missionary Magazine. 
(1846-1865).
The South African Commercial Advertiser. (1856-61).
The South African Evangelical Magazine and Church of England 
Recorder, (January 1856 - December 1858).
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Cam eron, J. 'Faith and Patience with their results.
Grahamstown Wesleyan Missions 1854', (Sermon preached in 
Commemoration Chapel, Grahamstown, 18 June 1854)*
Schultheiss, J. 'Die Bewohner der Ostkuste Siid-Afrika' s: 
ein Vortrag auf Veranlassung des Evangelischen Vereins 
fur kirchliche Zwecke gehalten am 23. Januar 1854', 
(Berlin, V/. Schultze, 1854).
Sutherland, J. 'Memoir respecting Kaffirs, Hottentots and 
Bosjemans of South Africa, 1845-46', (Grey Coll.).
Wynberg Times (1898)
4. Bibliographies, Guides, Atlases
Adam, M.I. Guide to the Principal Parliamentary Papers 
relating to the Dominions 1812-1911, (Oliver & Boyd, 
Edinburgh, 1915).
Archives Year Book and List of Accessions to the Cape 
Archives
Bell & Morrell, Select Documents on British Colonial Policy
1 830 - 1 8 6 0 .
Beyers, C.J. Dictionary of South African biography, Vol.iv 
(1981 XX 803(XXlJ)
Cason, M. Protestant Missionary Archives, in Henige, D. (ed), 
History in Africa, 8(19811.
Colvin, I.D. Introduction to Africana, (A.A. Balkena 1979)-
Davenport, T.R.H. & Hunt, K. (eds) The Right to the Land, 
(David Philip, 1974).
Dictionary of South African biography,(3 vols), (Tafelberg 
1968-77)
du Toit, A.E. The earliest South African documents on the 
Education and Civilization of the Bantu, (Pretoria, 1963)•
Eybers, G.W. Select Constitutional Documents illustrating 
South African History 1795-1910, (George Routledge & Sons,
1 91 8 ) .
Hall, D. (ed) International African Bibliography, (London, 
Vols 12(1982),”13(1983), 14 (January-July 1984)).
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Index to the Annexures, Bills, etc, of the House of Assembly, 
1854-1897. '
Index to South African Periodicals, (Johannesburg, Public 
Library, 1940-)
Long, U. Index to authors of Unofficial, Privately
Owned Manuscripts Relating to the History of South Africa,
1812-1920, (Lund Humphries, 1947 ).
Matthews, D.G. (ed) Current Bibliography on African Affairs, 
(Baywood Publishing Co. 1983 ) •
Mendelssohn, S. South African Bibliography, (2 vols),
(Kegan Paul, 1910).
Moodie, D. (ed) The Record, or a Series of Official Papers 
Relative to the Condition and Treatment of the Native Tribes 
of South Africa, (A.A. Balkema, 1960).
Muller, C.F.J., van Jaarsveld, F.A. & van Wyk, T. A Select 
Bibliography of South African History, (Pretoria,Univ. of 
South Africa, 1966).
Muller, C., et al (eds) South African History and Historians 
A bibliography, (UNISA, 1979 ) •
Muller, C., et al (eds) Supplement to A Select Bibliography 
of South African History*! (UNISA', 1974 ).
Musiker, R. & N. Guide to Cape of Good Hope Official 
Publications 1854-1910. (G.K. Hall & Co, 1976).
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National Register of Archives, Quality Court, London,
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Socs 12965.
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(Human Sciences Research Bulletins).
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(African History Dictionaries No.37, Scarecrow Press Inc. 
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Skota, T.D. M. (ed) The African Who's Who, (CNA 1 9 6 6 ).
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Anderson Graham, P. The Victorian Era, (Longmans, Green 
& Co, 1897).
Anderson-Morshead, A.E.M. A Pioneer and Founder Remini­
scences of Robert Gray, (Skeffington & Son, London, 1905)•
Beattie, J. Other Cultures, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd,
1964).
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University Press, 1982 ).
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Brockway, F. African Socialism, (The Bodley Head Ltd, 1963).)
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de Kiewiet, C.W. A History of South Africa Social and 
Economic, (Oxford University Press, 1941).
de Kiewiet, C.W. The Imperial Factor in South Africa: A 
Study in Politics and Economics  ^ (Cambridge University 
Press, 1937).
de Klerk, W.A. The Puritans in Africa A story of 
Afrikanerdom, (Penguin books, 1976 ).
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de Vries, J.L. Mission and Colonialism in Namibia,
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1978).
du Plessis, J. History of Christian Missions in South 
Africa, (London, 1911)*
Egerton, H.E. A Short History of British Colonial Policy, 
(Methuen, 1897"J7
Eldridge, J.E.T. (ed) Max Weber: The Interpretation of 
Social Reality, (Schocken Books, New York, 1980).
Elphick, R.& Giliomee, H. (eds) The Shaping of South African 
Society 1652-1820, (Longman Penguin 1979).
Eveleigh, W. The Settlers and Methodism 1820-1920,
(Methodist Publishing Office, Cape Town, 1920).
Findlay, G.G. & Holdsworth, W.W. (eds) The History of the 
Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (5 Vols) (London 1921)
Frederickson, G.M. White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in 
American and South African History, (O.U.P. 1981)
Galbraith, J.S. Reluctant Empire: British policy on the 
South African Frontier 1834-54, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1963 ).
Galbraith, J.K. The Nature of Mass Poverty, (Harvard 
University Press'^  1 979 ).
Gerdener, G.B.A. Studies in the Evangelisation of South 
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Gordon Balfour, R. Presbyterianism in the Colonies,
(Machiven & Wallace^ 1899)•
Gray, The Rev. C.N. (ed) Life of Robert Gray, (Rivington's 
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Guy, J. The destruction of the Zulu Kingdom The Civil 
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Hammond-Tooke, W.D. (ed) The Bantu-Speaking Peoples of 
Southern Africa, (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1974)•
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